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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
From the Garden of Eden to the digital age, our world is full of distractions. 
Even when people really have to work or study, their mind often drifts away 
to internal mental content, such as thoughts about what to cook for dinner 
Ì}Ì]À ÌiÝÌiÀ> ÃÌÕ] ÃÕV>Ã V}i>ÌwV>ÌÃ°	ÕÌÜÞ
Ã«i«i½Ã>LÌÞÌVViÌÀ>ÌiÃwVi¶7Þ`iÃÌiÀ``ÀvÌ>Ü>ÞÌ
thoughts and things that do not serve their current goals? In this dissertation, 
I present and examine a perspective on how these every-day distractions hap-
pen. In short, I draw from classic and recent work on motivation and attention 
to help better understand why people get distracted.
This introduction is structured as follows. First, I will explain what I mean by 
everyday distractions. Then, I will review a traditional theoretical approach on 
how distractions happen. Next, I will lay out the motivational approach more in 
detail. Lastly, I will outline my dissertation’s major goals.
DISTRACTIONS
ÌÃ`ÃÃiÀÌ>Ì]`iwi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÃ>Ã«iÀvÀ>Vi`iVÀiiÌÃÌ>ÌVVÕÀ
closely after the onset of a task-irrelevant stimulus. The word distractions, as 
it is used in daily language, seems to carry a negative connotation. Indeed, 
in western society, the protestant work ethic dictates that it is people’s moral 
duty to work hard (Furnham, 1984). In line with this ethic, distractions are often 
seen mainly as a threat to productivity and well-being (Carr, 2011a; Gazzaley & 
Rosen, 2016; Hassan, 2011), rather than as something positive, such as an op-
«ÀÌÕÌÞÌÌ>i>LÀi>­iÌÌEiÀ}i]ÓääÎ®°yÕiVi`LÞÌiÃi`i>Ã]«i-
ple vehemently try to reduce the impact of internal distractions, for instance by 
practicing mindfulness meditation (Clarke, Black, Stussman, Barnes, & Nahin, 
2015), as well as external distractions by removing all clutter from their living 
space (Kondo, 2014) and trying to follow a minimalist life style (Nicodemus & 
Fields Millburn, 2011).
Corroborating the negative intuition lay audiences have about distractions, re-
search shows that task-irrelevant stimuli can cause negative outcomes in many 
areas of life. For instance, in a study from work psychology, researchers in-
vestigated the amount of interruptions that knowledge workers (in this case, 
software developers) have to deal with on an average working day. Findings 
11
Introduction
showed that these employees spent approximately 70% of their working time 
with dealing with interruptions from colleagues and incoming emails, probably 
at the expense of their overall effectiveness (Sykes, 2011). Along similar lines, 
previous studies show that interruptions from instant messaging have a neg-
>ÌÛi«>VÌÜÀ«iÀvÀ>Vi]>ÃÌiÃiÌiÀÀÕ«ÌÃ>`iÌ`vwVÕÌÌ
ÃÜÌVL>VÌÌiÜÀÌ>Ã­
âiÀÜÃ]ÀÛÌâ]E7Ìi]Óää{®]>`>Ã«i-
ple tended to forget the primary goal of a work task (Cutrell, Czerwinski, & Hor-
vitz, 2001). Studies from educational science show similar negative outcomes. 
For example, students who used their laptops or smartphones during lectures, 
were more likely to have worse grades at the end of the semester (Samaha & 
>Ü]Óä£ÈÆ->>]7iÃÌ]E
i«i`>]Óä£Î®°Ƃ``Ì>Þ]ÌÀ>vwVÃ>viÌÞÃ>v-
fected adversely by task-irrelevant stimuli, such as smartphones. Perhaps not 
ÃÕÀ«ÀÃ}Þ]>ÀiViÌiÌ>>>ÞÃÃVwÀi`Ì>Ì>ÌÌi`}ÌÌiÝÌiÃÃ>}iÃ
Üi`ÀÛ}Ã>ÃÃV>Ìi`ÜÌv>Ì>À>`>VV`iÌÃ­
>À`]ÃÌ]7iÃÃ]
Asbridge, & Steel, 2014). Altogether, these potentially serious consequences 
of real-life distractions highlight the urgency of studying the basic mechanisms 
Ì>ÌV>ÕÃiÌi°ÌiÀÜÀ`Ã]ÌÃ«ÀÌ>ÌÌw`ÕÌÜÞ]>`Õ`iÀÜ>Ì
circumstances, distractions occur.
How distractions occur: Bottom-up and top-down attentional 
selection
A remarkable feature of the human mind is that it is well able to make sense of 
the constant stream of incoming external stimuli. Traditionally, cognitive psy-
chology has assumed that the processes via which people make sense of this 
V} vÀ>Ì] ÛÛi Ãi ÌÞ«iv wÌiÀ} ­	À>`LiÌ] £xnÆ	ÕÃ-
chman & Miller, 2007; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; 
Treisman, 1969). That is, when people are presented with multiple stimuli at 
the same time, all these stimuli undergo some initial screening. During this 
initial screening, people’s mind determines which stimulus is (or which stimuli 
>Ài®ÜÀÌ«>ÃÃ}ÌÀÕ}ÌiwÌiÀ°-ÌÕÌ>Ì«>ÃÃÌiwÌiÀ]ÀiViÛivÕÀÌiÀ
processing. As a consequence, these stimuli are more likely to affect people’s 
decisions (Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). Also, they are more likely to be re-
membered afterwards (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002).
7>ÌV>À>VÌiÀÃÌVÃvÃÌÕ]Ìi]>ÜÌiÃiÃÌÕÌ«>ÃÃÌiwÌiÀ¶>L-
oratory research shows that the mind quickly, effortlessly, and involuntarily se-
lects stimuli that are physically distinct from other stimuli—for instance, due 
to their abrupt onset, their odd size, their loudness, or their distinctive color 
1
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(e.g., Theeuwes, 1992; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). A rudimentary psychological 
process, this type of selection is called bottom-up attentional selection. It is 
easy to see how this basic process, which is also present in lower animals like 
`À>}yiÃ­7i`iÀ>E"½
>ÀÀ]Óä£Î®]V>i>`Ì`ÃÌÀ>VÌÃ«i«i°
After all, bottom-up attentional selection works irrespective of people’s current 
goals (Theeuwes, 1992, 2004, 2010). In other words, even when they are trying 
to focus on their computer monitor, employees will still preferentially process 
stimuli that stand out physically, such as abrupt sounds and odd colors. And, 
even when they are highly motivated to do their homework, high school stu-
dents will still preferentially process the blink of their smartphone.
Besides stimuli that stand out due to their physical properties, there is another 
class of stimuli that the mind is likely to select for further processing: stimuli that 
are in line with people’s current goals. Unlike in bottom-up processes, in top-
down attention, people voluntarily select stimuli for further processing based 
on their goals, intentions, and expectations (Theeuwes, 2010). Early empirical 
evidence for top-down selection comes from experiments that demonstrated 
that people can voluntarily direct attention to certain types of stimuli, or to cer-
tain areas in space, for instance, to the top–left part of the screen (Posner, 1980; 
Theeuwes & Van der Burg, 2007). Top-down attentional selection is a process 
that has important implications for real-life, too. For instance, when people’s 
major apparent goal is to eat (i.e., when they are hungry), they are more likely 
to attend to food related cues (Tapper, Pothos, & Lawrence, 2010). Somewhat 
paradoxically, people who are trying to diet (vs. people who are not) direct 
more attention to hedonically-pleasant food items, such as pizza and chocolate 
(Papies, Stroebe, & Aarts, 2008). So, in general, goals guide the way people 
wÌiÀvÀ>Ì\ÃÌÕÌ>Ì>ÀiÀiiÛ>ÌÌ«i«i½ÃVÕÀÀiÌ}>Ã]>ÀiÀi
likely to be attended to. Thus, if people are trying to work or to study, goals 
unrelated to work or study—such as their goals to socialize or to eat—may 
cause people to attend to task-irrelevant information, disrupting their current 
task, causing distraction.
For decades, cognitive psychologists have assumed that these two processes 
— bottom-up and top-down attentional selection — could together explain 
ÜÌi`wÌiÀÃV}vÀ>Ì°"vVÕÀÃi]ÌiÀiÜiÀi>Ü>ÞÃÃi
open questions, such as how the two processes are similar (answer: both en-
hance downstream cognitive processing, e.g., Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 
2003), how the two processes are different (answer: they are different in several 
ways, such as their time-course, e.g., Müller & Rabbitt, 1989), and how the 
13
Introduction
processes relate to each other (cautious answer: they seem to be uncorrelated, 
e.g., Pinto, van der Leij, Sligte, Lamme, & Scholte, 2013). Regardless of these 
open questions and their answers, however, the usefulness of the bottom-up 
vs. top-down dichotomy itself was usually not called into question.
Interestingly, this situation has changed in the past eight years, when research-
ers discovered a phenomenon called reward-driven distraction (Anderson, Lau-
ÀiÌ]E9>ÌÃ]Óä££LÆi*iiÞ]*i>ÀÃ]ÀvwÌÃ]E	iiÃiÞ]Óä£xÆ/iiÕÜiÃE
Belopolsky, 2012). In a series of experiments, Anderson and colleagues (2011) 
found that task-irrelevant stimuli (distractors) that were associated with earning 
money captured participants’ attention—even when people were explicitly in-
structed to ignore these task-irrelevant stimuli. This study, along with a large 
wave of conceptual replications (which I systematically examine in Chapter 2), 
have established the idea that people attend to reward-related stimuli, (a) even 
if these stimuli are not relevant to the current task, (b) even when they are not 
physically salient and (c) even if these stimuli are not serving people’s current 
goals. In other words, attention can be modulated by rewards independently 
of the top-down and bottom-up mechanisms – opposed to what researchers 
previously thought (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012). The discovery of re-
ward-driven distraction marks the starting point of my dissertation. In particular, 
my point of departure is that we know less about distraction than we previously 
thought. I further suggest that working towards a modern, motivational per-
spective on distraction may be a fruitful way forward.
A motivational perspective on distraction
Although the classic approach to studying attentional selection, and the distrac-
tions that ensue, has generated an important body of research, it can readily 
be criticized for adopting a rather passive view on human nature. In particular, 
it generally conceptualizes people as machines or passive processors, whose 
main task is to sift through incoming information, while they follow external 
instructions.
In this dissertation, I lay out an alternative way of looking at distractions. In 
particular, I assume that cognition can best be conceptualized as a system that 
has evolved by natural selection (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013). That is, throughout 
evolution, cognition has progressed to deal with complex problems and use 
information to regulate action adaptively (Elliot, 2008; Goschke, 2003; Hom-
mel, 2015). Therefore, we need to consider that cognition is crucially regulated 
1
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by needs, goals, and rewards (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Braver et al., 2014). 
These motivational states are responsible for directing and energizing behavior 
towards desirable (i.e., rewarding) outcomes in the environment (e.g., food, 
money, talking to peers, receiving likes on social media)—and these outcomes 
sometimes happen to be irrelevant to the current task goal (e.g., working or 
studying). From this perspective, then, the reason why people occasionally dis-
i}>}ivÀÌiÌ>Ã>Ì>`}ÌÌLiÃiiÀÀÀ>ºwÌiÀ»°,>ÌiÀ]
suggest that distractions stem from people’s adaptive urge to explore the envi-
ronment for valuable outcomes.
The idea that cognitive processes and behavior can be understood by examin-
ing people’s current goals, needs, or the rewards offered by the environment, 
is not new (Atkinson, 1964; Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Ferster & Skinner, 2015; 
Hull, 1944; Edwin A. Locke & Latham, 2002; Theeuwes, 2010). However, as I 
LÀiyÞiÌi`>LÛi]Ì>ÃÞÀiViÌÞLiViVi>ÀÌ>ÌÌiÀiÜ>À`Û>-
ue of stimuli is capable of capturing attention by itself, even when those stimuli 
are not physically salient, even when they are not relevant to people’s current 
goals, and even when they are fully irrelevant to the task at hand (Anderson et 
al., 2011b; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006, 2009; Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 
2010a). Findings from this line of research, then, suggest that it is potentially 
worthwhile to examine distractions—and the cognitive processes that cause 
them—from a reward-based point of view (Anderson, 2016b; Failing & Theeu-
ÜiÃ]Óä£ÇÆÀiLÃ]	iiÀ]E7`Àvv]Óä£ä®°
Based on the line of reasoning laid out above, the main goal of the current 
dissertation is to investigate whether distractions stem from people’s tendency 
to seek rewards in the environment. In order to test this idea, I developed a 
model, which I call reward-driven distraction. This model is explained in greater 
detail throughout this dissertation, but in greatest detail in Chapter 3. In short, 
this model suggests that distraction during a task is driven by the reward value 
of distractors. In particular, the main prediction of the model is that people 
perform worse on the task when they are exposed to task-irrelevant stimuli (or 
distractors) that carry high reward value vs. when they are exposed to task-irrel-
evant stimuli that carry low or no reward value.
Ü>ÌvÜÃ]  >ÞÕÌÌiÃ«iVwV}>ÃvÌiVÕÀÀiÌ`ÃÃiÀÌ>Ì°/iÃi
goals are also summarized in Table 1.1.
15
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Table 1.1. Overview of research goals and chapters.
Research goals
C
ha
p
te
r 2
C
ha
p
te
r 3
C
ha
p
te
r 4
C
ha
p
te
r 5
C
ha
p
te
r 6
Goal 1 Test the reward-driven distraction model × × ×
Goal 2 Explore the real-life relevance of reward-driven 
distraction
× ×
Goal 3 ÛiÃÌ}>Ìi>`ÀiyiVÌÀiÃi>ÀV«À>VÌViÃ × ×
GOAL 1: TEST THE REWARD-DRIVEN DISTRACTION MODEL
/iwÀÃÌ}>vÌÃ`ÃÃiÀÌ>ÌÜ>ÃÌÌiÃÌÌiViÌÀ>Þ«ÌiÃÃÌ>ÌvÜÃ
from the reward-driven distraction model: whether people perform worse when 
they are distracted by stimuli associated with high reward (vs. stimuli associated 
with low or no reward). In order to test this idea, I took two approaches.
First, I systematically investigated whether existing evidence from previous re-
search supports a motivational perspective on distractions (Chapter 2). As I 
mentioned above, past research on reward-driven distraction has been dra-
matically expanding in the last couple of years. Surprisingly though, there is no 
µÕ>ÌÌ>ÌÛiÀiÃi>ÀVÃÞÌiÃÃvÌÃÀ>«`Þ}ÀÜ}ivÌiÀ>ÌÕÀi°/w
this gap, I conducted a meta-analysis across 91 studies (N = 2362 participants) 
that examined reward-driven distraction from many different angles. I system-
atically searched for studies that that used different types of cognitive perfor-
>ViÌ>ÃÃ­i°}°]ÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀVÌ>ÃÃ]VyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}Ì>ÃÃ]Ã«>Ì>VÕi}
tasks) and different types of reward-associated distractor stimuli (e.g., monetary 
rewards, food, romantic pictures, etc.). One of the main contributions of this 
meta-analysis is that it establishes the magnitude of reward-driven distraction 
across different tasks, stimuli, and contexts. Such magnitude estimates are im-
portant for future basic research on this topic, as it can tell us some things about 
how to do research most effectively. In addition, these magnitude estimates are 
important for applied research areas. After all, if the magnitude of reward-driv-
en distraction is large, it is likely to affect real-life performance at work and at 
school. In that case, it may be fruitful to think of distractions from a motivational 
perspective when designing policies at the workplace or classrooms.
My second approach to test the reward-driven distraction model was to design 
1
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a novel experimental paradigm, to study whether reward-associated distrac-
tors are capable of disrupting complex cognitive operations, such as cognitive 
control (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). As mentioned above, there are existing 
studies that examined reward-driven distraction. However, the vast majority of 
the studies that I synthesized in the meta-analysis (Chapter 2) examined basic 
cognitive processes, such as visual attention. However, I felt that this approach 
was limited, because in real-life settings, people often have to do more than 
just visually search for certain stimuli. That is, many tasks at work or at school 
involve more complex cognitive processes, such as maintaining, recalling, or 
updating information. Therefore, I designed a new paradigm that allowed to 
test whether reward-associated distractors can disrupt performance on com-
plex tasks that are more prevalent at work or school.
ÃÀÌ]ÌiiÜ«>À>`}]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃwÀÃÌi>ÀÌ>ÃÃV>ÌiL>ÃVÛÃÕ>
features of stimuli (i.e., colors) with the delivery of reward (e.g., earning 8 cents). 
Later, in a test phase, they solve math problems (i.e., adding up numbers with 
time constraints), while the previously rewarded colors reappear as distractors. 
I expect that distractors that are associated with high rewards (e.g., 8 cents) 
during the training phase would harm performance on the math task (i.e., peo-
ple would be less accurate) more than distractors that were associated with no 
rewards.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I present three experiments (N = 182) that tested 
whether distraction was stronger when distractor stimuli were associated with 
reward. Additionally, I wanted to know more about under what circumstanc-
es this reward-driven distraction effect is more likely to happen. Therefore, in 

>«ÌiÀÎ] >Ã ÛiÃÌ}>Ìi`Ü«i«i½ÃVÕÀÀiÌÌÛ>Ì>ÃÌ>ÌiÃ yÕ-
ence reward-driven distraction. I based this idea on the exploitation-explora-
tion dilemma (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007). That is, people are expected to 
optimize performance (i.e., to exploit) in the current task as long as (a) it yields 
valuable outcomes and (b) there are no alternatives that signal potentially even 
more valuable outcomes. However, when the outcome value of the task de-
creases, people become more distractible and tend to search for (i.e., explore) 
alternative behaviors that could provide higher value to them – eventually lead-
ing to distraction from the primary task (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). Building 
on this reasoning, in Chapter 3, I present two experiments that tested how the 
ÌÛ>ÌÌiÝ«ÌÌiÌ>ÃyÕiViÃÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°
>«ÌiÀ
4, I designed a more focused test of reward-driven distraction – without the 
17
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additional motivation manipulation.
GOAL 2: EXPLORE THE REAL-LIFE RELEVANCE OF REWARD- 
DRIVEN DISTRACTION
There is a growing societal concern that smartphones make people unproduc-
ÌÛi>`ivwViÌÌiÀÌ>ÃÃ­
>ÀÀ]Óä££LÆ>ââ>iÞE,Ãi]Óä£ÈÆ>ÃÃ>]
2011). Research corroborates this idea. Recent studies show that smartphones 
can impair people’s cognitive performance in many areas of life, such as work-
ing or studying (Clayton, Leshner, & Almond, 2015; Kushlev, Proulx, & Dunn, 
2016; Mehrotra, Pejovic, Vermeulen, Hendley, & Musolesi, 2016; Samaha & 
Hawi, 2016; Stothart, Mitchum, & Yehnert, 2015; Thornton, Faires, Robbins, 
& Rollins, 2014). However, we do not know much about the underlying mech-
anisms of distractions by smartphones. In fact, there is a disconnect between 
research on real-life distractions and research targeting the underlying, basic 
cognitive mechanisms of such distractions. Studies from cognitive psychology 
mainly used abstract stimuli (e.g., squares and circles of different colors) to 
investigate distractions and do usually not extend their investigation to exam-
}Ài>vi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ]ÃÕV>ÃÃ>ÀÌ«iÃ]Ài>ÌwV>ÌÃ°
Therefore, in this dissertation, I took up the challenge to make the connection 
between research on the basic, cognitive mechanisms of distractions and re-
search on real-life distractions. I did this in three ways. First, in the meta-analy-
sis (Chapter 2), I examined the scope of reward-driven distraction. I examined 
whether the phenomenon is likely to generalize across many different cogni-
tive processes, such as attention, working memory, or decision-making. If re-
ward-driven distraction affects a wide range of cognitive tasks, it is likely to 
have implications for life outside the laboratory.
Second, in Chapter 5, I introduced real-life stimuli to a basic paradigm, to direct-
ly test whether smartphone distractions could be explained by a reward-driv-
en mechanism. In prior literature, it has been suggested that the reason why 
smartphones constantly distract people from their task is because they carry 
very high social value to people (Oulasvirta, Rattenbury, Ma, & Raita, 2012). 
ÜiÛiÀ]ÌiÀiÃi«ÀV>iÛ`iVivÀÌÃ>ÃÃÕ«Ì°À`iÀÌwÌÃ
gap, I investigated whether smartphones are distracting because of their social 
reward value. In Chapter 5, I present an experiment (N = 120), which tested 
how smartphone cues that signal social reward (e.g., Facebook app icon) im-
1
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pact (smartphone deprived) people’s performance on a cognitive task.
GOAL 3: INVESTIGATE AND REFLECT ON RESEARCH PRACTICES
The goal of doing research is to discover truth about the world. But doing re-
Ãi>ÀVÃ>Ã>LwÛi`>ÞÃ>Üii>`ÌÃ`iLÞ«i«i]Ü>ÛiÌiÀ
personal goals and needs. For instance, generally, researchers have the person-
al goal to progress in their career. To progress, researchers need to publish. To 
«ÕLÃ]ÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃii`Ìw`Ã}wV>ÌÀiÃÕÌÃ°
"ÛiÀÌi>ÃÌviÜÞi>ÀÃ]Ìiwi`v«ÃÞV}V>ÃViViLiV>iVViÀi`
that the way we do science, in psychology and beyond, is not optimal. That is, 
when the results of a study determine whether it gets published, researchers 
>ÀiiÞÌiÝ«ÀiÌiÀ`>Ì>Ìi«ÕÀÃÕÌvw`}Ã}wV>Vi­p < .05). 
For instance, they may be inclined to try out different analyses, analyze only a 
subset of the data, or simply measure a lot of variables. Exploring the data, of 
course, is not a problem in itself. It is a problem, though, when these explora-
tory analyses are reported as if they were predicted, i.e., when researchers do 
not make a sharp distinction between what analyses were planned before data 
ViVÌÛÃ°Ü>ÌÜ>Ã`i>vÌiÀÌiÀiÃÕÌÃÜiÀi>Ài>`ÞÜ­7}L`ÕÃ
& Dotsch, 2016). Such nontransparent data exploration is a major contributor of 
the current reproducibility crisis in psychological science (Munafò et al., 2017).
/iÀi«À`ÕVLÌÞVÀÃÃÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÌ>ÌÌiÀi>Ài>Þw`}ÃÕÌÌiÀiÌ>Ì
we simply cannot assume to be true (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). In par-
ticular, a recent collaborative project showed that only one third of the studies 
in three prestigious journals could be replicated. Similarly, replication attempts 
v «ii> Ì>Ì >Ûi Lii yÕiÌ>  Ìi «>ÃÌ ­i°}°] i}`i«iÌÆ
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998, social priming; Bargh, Chen, & 
Burrows, 1996) have not been successful (Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 
2012; Hagger et al., 2016). As a solution to this problem, researchers came up 
ÜÌÜ>ÞÃÌ«ÀÛiÕÀwi`]vÀÃÌ>Vi]ÜÌ«ÀiÀi}ÃÌÀ>Ì>``ÀiVÌÀi«-
lications (Munafò et al., 2017). In essence, these practices aim to ensure trans-
parency of methods and analyses, as well as replicability of the results. All these 
things should get more priority than making sure the results are attractive.
In order to contribute to this collective effort, the third goal of the current dis-
ÃiÀÌ>ÌÜ>Ã Ì ÛiÃÌ}>Ìi >` ÀiyiVÌ  ÀiÃi>ÀV «À>VÌViÃ  Ìi wi` v
studying reward-driven distraction. I aimed to meet this goal in two ways. First, 
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in Chapter 2, as a part of the meta-analysis, I assessed the general health of the 
ÌiÀ>ÌÕÀiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°7iÌÃÌiÀ>ÌÕÀiÃL}pÌiÀi
are plenty of conceptual replications of the reward-driven effect—there are 
some potential shortcomings, too. For instance, many studies have rather small 
sample sizes (e.g., N = 8–15). Also, there are no pre-registered studies in this 
entire literature (with two exception: Rusz, Bijleveld, & Kompier, 2019, 2018a). 
Thus, in order to assess the health of the literature on reward-driven distraction, 
I tested whether it suffers from biases, such as publication bias. Additionally, I 
conducted a p-curve analysis (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014a; Simon-
sohn, Simmons, & Nelson, 2015) to test whether there is true evidential value 
for reward-driven distraction.
-iV`]ÀiyiVÌi`ÌÀ>Ã«>ÀiÌÀiÃi>ÀV«À>VÌViÃvÀÞÜiÝ«iÀiVi°
Throughout my entire PhD project, I aimed for conducting my research in a 
Ài«À`ÕVLi>`ÌÀ>Ã«>ÀiÌÜ>Þ°
>«ÌiÀÈ]ÀiyiVÌÌÃ«ÀViÃÃvÀ>
professional, but also from a personal perspective. I discuss how using prereg-
istration and direct replication can be sometimes challenging, but at the same 
time inspiring and productive.
Finally, each chapter of this dissertation is based on an article that has been 
«ÕLÃi`ÀÃÕLÌÌi`Ì>ÃViÌwVÕÀ>°/iÀivÀi]i>VV>«ÌiÀV>Li
read independently and in any order.
1

This chapter is based on: 4WU\&.G2GNNG[/'-QORKGT/#,/CKV.$KLNGXGNF'
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ABSTRACT
People have a strong tendency to attend to reward cues, even if these cues 
>ÀiÀÀiiÛ>ÌÌÌiÀVÕÀÀiÌ}>ÀÌiÀVÕÀÀiÌÌ>Ã°7iÀiÜ>À`VÕiÃ>Ài
goal-irrelevant, their presence may impair cognitive performance. In this me-
ta-analysis, we quantitatively examined the rapidly growing literature on the 
«>VÌv ÀiÜ>À`Ài>Ìi``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃV}ÌÛi«iÀvÀ>Vi°7i VÕ`i`
91 studies (N = 2,362) that used different cognitive paradigms (e.g., visual 
Ãi>ÀV]VyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}®>`ÀiÜ>À`Ài>Ìi`ÃÌÕ­i°}°]iÞ]>ÌÌÀ>VÌÛi
food). Overall, results showed that reward-related distractors consistently im-
paired cognitive performance across different tasks and stimuli – with a small 
ivviVÌÃâi ­-Ì>`>À`âi`i>
>}ir °Î{Ç®°7ivÕÀÌiÀÃÜi`Ì>Ì ÌÃ
reward-driven distraction effect was robust across different reward-learning 
mechanisms, contexts, and methodological choices, and that this effect exists 
independently of explicit task instructions to ignore distractors. Additionally, we 
ÃÜi`iÌ>>>ÞÌViÛ`iViÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À`Ài>Ìi``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃyÕiViV}-
tive processes in a rapid, involuntary fashion. Funnel plot and p-curve analyses 
revealed no evidence of publication bias or researcher degrees of freedom; in 
ÌiÀÜÀ`Ã]ÌiÌiÀ>ÌÕÀiÃ}`i>Ì°/iw`}ÃvÌÃiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ
strengthen recent theoretical developments that cognitive processes can be 
modulated by rewards, independently of current goals and physical salience. 
As we found that reward-driven distraction is a robust effect, this phenomenon 
may be able to explain distractions that happen in real-life settings.
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REWARD-DRIVEN DISTRACTION: A META-ANALYSIS
The human mind has evolved to work harder when rewards – such as food, 
drink, sex, or money – are available in the environment. As a result, when peo-
ple can earn rewards, they learn faster, think harder, and perform better. In-
deed, the past decades of psychological research have shown that rewards 
generally boost performance on a broad range of physical and cognitive tasks 
(Atkinson & Birch, 1978; Braver et al., 2014; Garbers & Konradt, 2014; Geen, 
£xÆ°Ƃ°Vi]>Ì>]EÀiâ]£nnÆ*>`>>E*iÃÃ>]Óä££Æ7}wi`E
Eccles, 2000). Paradoxically, though, attending to rewards – or to stimuli associ-
ated with rewards – can be counterproductive in real-life settings. For example, 
Ã>ÀÌ«iÌwV>ÌÃÃ}>Ì>ÌÃV>ÀiÜ>À`Ã>Ài>Û>>Li]LÕÌÌiÃi-
ÌwV>ÌÃ«>À«i«i½Ã>LÌÞÌÃ>viÞ`ÀÛiÌiÀV>À°ƂÌÌivwVi]ÌiÃi
of brownies signals that rewards are near, but this smell distracts attention away 
vÀÜÀ°ƂÌi] iÌyÝ«>Þ}ÌiL>V}ÀÕ`Ã}>ÃÌi«ÃÃLÌÞv
entertainment, but it takes attention away from doing homework. Daily life thus 
offers some situations in which attending to goal-irrelevant rewards may cause 
negative outcomes. But how do these negative outcomes arise?
In recent years, psychological experiments have discovered a phenomenon 
that can explain why attending to rewards can be counterproductive. This phe-
nomenon is called reward-driven distraction1 and it refers to the temporary im-
pairment of cognitive performance after the onset of task-irrelevant, reward-re-
lated stimuli. In many cases, reward-driven distraction stems from the visual 
system’s tendency to prioritize reward-related information (Chelazzi, Perlato, 
Santandrea, & Della Libera, 2013). This prioritization process presumably op-
erates continuously: it does its job both when information is useful (in many or 
most situations, rapid orienting to reward-related stimuli is advantageous), but 
>ÃÜiÌ ÃÌ°7iÌiÛÃÕ>ÃÞÃÌi«ÀÀÌâiÃvÀ>ÌÌ>Ì ÃÌ
relevant to the current task, reward-driven distraction ensues.
An early demonstration of the reward-driven distraction was reported by An-
derson, Laurent, & Yantis (2011b; but also see Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; 
Della Libera, Perlato, & Chelazzi, 2011; Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a, 
2010b; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012) who found that distractors that were 
1 Note: this phenomenon sometimes has been referred to as value-driven attentional capture (An-
derson et al., 2011b) or value-modulated attentional capture (Le Pelley et al., 2016). In the current 
paper, we use the term reward-driven distraction because we will examine a broad range of cog-
ÌÛi«ÀViÃÃiÃqLiÞ`>ÌÌiÌqÌ>Ì>ÀiyÕiVi`LÞ}>ÀÀiiÛ>ÌÀiÜ>À`Ã°
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associated with earning money captured participants’ attention – even when 
ÌiÞÜiÀiiÝ«VÌÞÃÌÀÕVÌi`Ì}ÀiÌiÃi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ°/Ãw`}Ü>ÃÃÌÀ-
ing for two reasons. First, at the time, researchers typically assumed that there 
ÜiÀiÞÌÜ>yÕiViÃ«i«i½Ã>ÌÌiÌÆ>ÌÌiÌVÕ`Li`ÀÛ-
en by people’s current goals (top-down) or by the physical salience of stimuli 
(bottom-up). The Anderson et al. (2011b) study suggested a third possibility, 
namely that attention can also be driven by the reward value of stimuli, which 
challenged the classic bottom-up–top-down dichotomy (Awh et al., 2012). Sec-
ond, Anderson et al. (2011b) inspired a large wave of conceptual replications 
­>ÀÕ`£ääÃÌÕ`iÃ®]ÃÌvÜVÀi«ÀÌi`Ã>Àw`}ÃÌÌiÀ}>«>-
per (for reviews, see Anderson, 2013, 2016a, 2018; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017; 
i*iiÞ]ÌVi]	iiÃiÞ]iÀ}i]E7Ã]Óä£È®°-]ÛiÀÌi«>ÃÌnÞi>ÀÃ]
an increasing body of research has established the idea that people attend to 
reward-related cues, even if these cues are not serving their current goals.
Although evidence for reward-driven distraction appears strong at this point, 
there are several open questions and controversies, troubling the interpretation 
of this rapidly growing literature. To address these questions and controversies, 
this paper presents a meta-analysis, with three aims. First, we aim to establish 
the magnitude and the scope of the reward-driven distraction phenomenon. 
-iV`]ÃiÀiViÌ]VÀÌV> ÀiÛiÜÃ>ÛiÀ>Ãi``ÕLÌ>LÕÌÜiÌiÀw`-
ings reported in prior work actually demonstrate reward-driven distraction, or 
whether something else (not related to reward) is driving the observed be-
havior (Le Pelley et al., 2016; Sha & Jiang, 2016). Our analysis will address 
this pressing controversy. Third, we aim to systematically investigate several 
iÞiÌ`}V> >Ã«iVÌÃ v ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi `ÃÌÀ>VÌ° -«iVwV>Þ] Üi ­>®
assess the general health of the literature (e.g., publication bias, researcher 
degrees of freedom) and (b) test whether certain methodological choices (e.g., 
reward-learning or reward value) modify the magnitude of the effect.
"ÕÀÌÀ`ÕVÌÃÌ>ÀÌÃÜÌ>LÀivÛiÀÛiÜviÝÃÌ}w`}ÃÀiÜ>À``ÀÛ-
en distraction (for recent, comprehensive reviews, see Anderson, 2016a; Failing 
& Theeuwes, 2017; Le Pelley et al., 2016). Then, we discuss the three aims in 
Ãi«>À>ÌiÃiVÌÃ°Ài>V>]ÜiwÀÃÌ >ÞÕÌ ÌiÌiÀiÌV>L>V}ÀÕ`]
then discuss our methodological approach.
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Reward-driven distraction: A brief review
ivÌiÃÌyÕiÌ>ÃÌÕ`iÃÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ­Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ
>°]Óä££L®]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃwÀÃÌ«iÀvÀi`>ÀiÜ>À`i>À}Ì>Ã­°i°]>training 
phase, see Figure 2.1A), in which they learned to associate stimulus features 
ÜÌÌiÀiVi«ÌvÀiÜ>À`Ã°-«iVwV>Þ]i>VÌÀ>ÃÝVÀViÃ>««i>Ài`>
¼Ãi>ÀV`Ã«>Þ½]>`«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ½Ì>ÃÜ>ÃÌw`Ìitarget, which was either 
a red or green circle. If participants responded rapidly and accurately, they 
would receive a monetary reward; critically, the size of this reward was deter-
i`LÞÌiVÀvÌiÌ>À}iÌÌ>ÌÃ«iVwVÌÀ>° vÌiÌ>À}iÌ>««i>Ài`
in the high-reward color (e.g., red), participants would typically earn a large 
ÀiÜ>À` ­Ã«iVwV>Þ]nä¯v ÃÕV ÌÀ>Ã ÌiÞ ÀiViÛi`xViÌÃ] >` Ìi
remaining 20% they received 1 cent); if the target appeared in the low-reward 
color (e.g., green), participants would typically earn a small reward (80% of such 
trials earned 1 cent, and 20% earned 5 cents). After a long training session 
(e.g., 1,008 trials), participants completed the test phase (Figure 2.1B). During 
ÌÃ Ì>Ã]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ >}>>` Ìw`> Ì>À}iÌ]ÜVÜ>ÃÜ`iwi`>Ã
the unique shape in the display (e.g., a diamond among circles). Importantly, 
on the majority of trials, one of the non-target circles had either the high-re-
ward or the low-reward color from the training phase. During the test phase, 
these colored circles were no longer relevant to the task – that is, they were 
distractors – and participants were instructed to ignore them. Despite these 
ÃÌÀÕVÌÃ] ÀiÃÕÌÃ ÃÜi` Ì>Ì «>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜiÀi Ã}wV>ÌÞ ÃÜiÀ Ì Ài-
spond to the target when the search display contained a distractor previously 
associated with high-reward, compared to when there were no previously re-
ward-associated colors present. The authors concluded that attention can be 
modulated by the value of (task-irrelevant) rewards. Interestingly, this type of 
attentional modulation is distinct from top-down or bottom-up mechanisms: 
it is neither modulated by ongoing goals (participants knew the target would 
never be colored in the test phase, and hence there was no reason to attend to 
the colored distractors, suggesting the attentional shift is not voluntary), nor by 
physical salience (because reward-related cues were no more physically salient 
than other cues; Anderson et al., 2011b).
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Figure 2.1. The original illustration of training phase and testing phases of Anderson et al (2011b). 
-iµÕiVivÌÀ>iÛiÌÃ°­Ƃ®/>À}iÌÃ`ÕÀ}ÌiÌÀ>}«>ÃiÜiÀi`iwi`LÞVÀ­Ài`
or green, exactly one of which was present on each trial), and participants reported the 
identity of the line segment inside of the target (vertical or horizontal). Correct responses 
were followed by the delivery of monetary reward feedback. One of the target colors was 
followed by a high reward on 80% of the trials and a low reward on 20% of the trials; for the 
other target color, this mapping was reversed. (B) During the test phase, the target was de-
wi`>ÃÌiÕµÕiÃ>«i]>`ÀiÜ>À`vii`L>VÜ>Ã«ÀÛ`i`°">vvÌiÌÀ>Ã]i
of the nontarget items—the distractor—was rendered in the color of a formerly rewarded 
target (each color equally often).
Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°½Ã­Óä££L®w`}ÃÃ«Ài`>iÜÜ>ÛivÃÌÕ`iÃ]>ÞvÜV
adopted the original study’s empirical approach (i.e., using a reward learning 
phase, then a testing phase). In this wave of studies, researchers studied re-
ward-driven distraction from many different angles. Although the majority of 
studies have been conducted on the allocation of spatial attention (Anderson, 
Folk, Garrison, & Rogers, 2016; Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a, 2014; An-
derson & Yantis, 2012, 2013; Gong, Jia, & Li, 2017; Jahfari & Theeuwes, 2016; 
Jiao, Du, He, & Zhang, 2015; Laurent, Hall, Anderson, & Yantis, 2015; MacLean, 
Diaz, & Giesbrecht, 2016; MacLean & Giesbrecht, 2015; Miranda & Palmer, 
2013; Qi, Zeng, Ding, & Li, 2013; Rajsic, Perera, & Pratt, 2016; Roper, Vecera, 
& Vaidya, 2014; M. G. van Koningsbruggen, Ficarella, Battelli, & Hickey, 2016), 
reward-driven distraction has also been shown to impair performance on other 
tasks. That is, reward-associated distractors were found to disrupt temporal 
attention (Failing & Theeuwes, 2015; Le Pelley, Seabrooke, Kennedy, Pearson, 
EÃÌ] Óä£Ç®] VyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ} ­ÀiLÃ]	iiÀ]Ƃ««iL>Õ]E7`Àvv]
Óä£ÎÆÀiLÃ]	iiÀ]}iÀ]E7`Àvv]Óä££ÆÀiLÃiÌ>°]Óä£ä®]ÛÃÕ>i
ory (Gong, Yang, & Li, 2016; Infanti, Hickey, & Turatto, 2015; Klink, Jeurissen, 
Theeuwes, Denys, & Roelfsema, 2017), and decision-making (Hopf et al., 2015; 
ÌÌ«ÕÀ«>Ì]
>],>}Ã«>Ì]E-iÀiViÃ]Óä£x®°ƂÌ}iÌiÀ]ÌiÃiw`}Ã
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ply that reward-driven distraction may be a domain-general process (Braver et 
al., 2014) – and thus may have consequences in many areas of life.
There is another reason why reward-driven distraction may have broad con-
sequences: there are many circumstances under which stimuli can acquire re-
Ü>À`Û>Õi°ÀÃÌ]ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌVÕ`ÀiyiVÌÃÌÀÕiÌ>i>À}°
That is, when people learn that a response to a cue (e.g., attending to red 
circles) is rewarded, then this may reinforce that response and make it more 
likely to be enacted in future, even when it becomes inappropriate (e.g., dur-
ing the test phase of Anderson et al.’s study). Other evidence suggests that 
reward-driven distraction can also result from Pavlovian reward learning; that is, 
learning that a stimulus is a reliable signal of the availability of reward. These 
studies demonstrate that stimuli that merely co-occur with reward, regardless 
of people’s actions, also become more likely to distract people (e.g., Bucker, 
Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2014; Bucker & Theeuwes, 2016b; Le Pelley, Pearson, 
ÀvwÌÃ]E	iiÃiÞ]Óä£xÆiE->]Óä£xÆ*i>ÀÃ]]/À>]ÃÌ]E
Le Pelley, 2015). Moreover, the stimuli that can cause reward-driven distraction 
come in many shapes and sizes. Although the majority of studies used very ba-
sic, low-level stimulus features (such as colors) as reward-associated distractors, 
recent studies show that other, more complex stimulus dimensions (e.g., spatial 
location, shape, picture, or semantic meaning) may acquire reward value and 
disrupt later performance (Anderson, 2015a, 2016a; Failing & Theeuwes, 2015; 
Hickey, Kaiser, & Peelen, 2015). Interestingly, one of those dimensions appears 
to be auditory, as some studies show that reward-associated sounds may also 
cause reward-driven distraction (Anderson, 2016c; Asutay & Vastfjall, 2016; 
*ÀiÃ>iiÌ>°]Óä£{®]ÃÕ}}iÃÌ}Ì>ÌÌi«iiÃÌVwi`Ì
ÌiÛÃÕ>`>°Ƃ>]ÌiÃiw`}ÃÌ}iÌiÀÃÕ}}iÃÌÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi
distraction is generalizable across many different contexts.
Aim 1: To establish the magnitude and scope of reward-driven 
distraction
Although the literature reviewed above supports the existence of reward-driv-
en distraction, the magnitude of the phenomenon is not yet well-established 
(Failing & Theeuwes, 2017). Because the literature on reward-driven distraction 
has quickly become substantial, the time is ripe for a systematic investigation 
of how strong and consistent the effect is across different paradigms, contexts, 
and stimuli. If it is true that reward-driven distraction is a clear and reliable ef-
fect, it likely has implications for applied research areas, such as work psycholo-
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gy and educational science. Therefore, with this meta-analysis, we estimate the 
general magnitude of reward-driven distraction.
In addition, we also aim to address the scope of reward-driven distraction. Spe-
VwV>Þ]>ÃiÌi`>LÛi]«>ÃÌ ÀiÃi>ÀV ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ>Ã
been mainly restricted to visual search tasks (Anderson, 2016b). Nevertheless, 
some recent studies have examined whether reward-driven distraction impacts 
performance on other types of tasks, such as cognitive control tasks (Anderson, 
Laurent, & Yantis, 2012; Krebs et al., 2011). These studies are important, be-
cause they may indicate that reward-driven distraction is generalizable across 
different performance situations. Indeed, in real life – e.g., at work and at school 
– many performance situations require people to interact with information in 
complex ways, rather than to merely locate target stimuli (as in visual search). 
7iÀi>Ãi`Ì>ÌvÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ}iiÀ>âiÃÌÌ>ÃÃÌ>ÌÀiÞ
many different cognitive operations, then being exposed to these reward-relat-
ed distractors is likely to harm performance in daily life.
On this latter point, we note that there are existing studies that have investi-
gated how reward-driven distraction relates to real-life settings. However, these 
studies mainly focused on reward-driven distraction’s role in the development 
of psychopathologies, such as substance abuse (Albertella et al., 2017; Ander-
son, Kronemer, Rilee, Sacktor, & Marvel, 2016) and depression (Anderson, Leal, 
Hall, Yassa, & Yantis, 2014). It remains an open question, though, whether these 
w`}ÃiÝÌi`Ìi>ÌÞ`Û`Õ>Ãi`ÕV>Ì>>`VVÕ«>Ì>«iÀvÀ-
mance settings – an area that is unexplored in the reward-driven distraction 
literature.
Our methodological approach
In order to identify the magnitude of reward-driven distraction, we aggregated 
data from individual studies and calculated an overall effect size estimate. In 
particular, we examined the effect size for the difference in cognitive perfor-
mance when a distractor associated with high versus low (or neutral) reward was 
present in the task.
À`iÀÌ`iwiÌiscope of reward-driven distraction, we explored whether 
certain study characteristics modify the magnitude of reward-driven distraction. 
To do this, we coded three characteristics of each study for moderator analyses. 
First, we coded the nature of performance interference, that is, which para-
digm was used to assess distraction by reward-associated cues. By comparing 
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different paradigms, we can test whether reward-driven distraction is mainly 
important for visual attention or also extend to other forms of (non-visual) in-
ÌiÀviÀiVi]ÃÕV>ÃVyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}À>Ì>}Ì>ÃÀiiÛ>ÌvÀ>Ì]
which are very important for optimal performance at work and education.
Second, we coded the difference between training and test phases. That is, 
we coded whether the training and testing phases of the experiment (where 
applicable) were the same task (e.g., both visual search) or different tasks that 
target distinct cognitive processes (e.g., reward training was a visual search task 
and testing was a working memory task). One possibility is that reward-driven 
distraction is harmful only when learning and testing took place in a similar 
context (e.g., similar task and/or stimuli). That is, context may evoke a set of 
i>Ài`ÃÌÕÕÃÀiÜ>À`>ÃÃV>ÌÃÌ>Ì>ÛiLiiiÝ«iÀiVi`Ã«iVwV>Þ
ÜÌÌ>ÌVÌiÝÌ]>`Ì>ÞLiÌiÃiVÌiÝÌÕ>ÞÃ«iVwVÀiÜ>À`>ÃÃV>-
tions that impair cognitive operations (Anderson, 2015b). However, it is also 
possible that the negative impact of reward-associated cues can transfer across 
contexts and cognitive tasks (Anderson et al., 2012). If transfer turns out not 
to be strongly dependent on context, this would imply greater relevance to 
real-life educational and work-related performance situations.
Third, we coded task instructions. That is, we coded whether participants were 
explicitly instructed during the task to ignore reward-associated distractors, or 
ÜiÌiÀÌiÀiÜiÀiÃÕViÝ«VÌÃÌÀÕVÌÃ°7ÌÌÃ`iÀ>ÌÀÜiiÝ>-
ined what role voluntary control processes play in overriding a reward-based 
distraction effect. It is important to investigate whether conscious preparation 
to discount distracting events helps to reduce performance decrements (e.g., 
via pro-active control; Braver, 2012). If external instructions to ignore distractors 
turn out to diminish reward-driven distraction, this would imply that the neg-
ative impact of reward-associated cues might be easily prevented in applied 
settings. In particular, it would suggest that effective interventions may need 
to only target the current task (e.g., by using instructions to concentrate, or 
by making tasks more interesting or engaging), and that it is not necessary to 
remove the sources of distractions altogether (e.g., by banning smartphones 
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from the classroom).
Aim 2: To examine an alternative explanation: Have we been 
studying selection-driven distraction instead of reward-driven 
distraction?
,iÃi>ÀViÀÃÕÃi>}Õ>}iÌ>ÌÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÌiÞ>ÀiVw`iÌÌiiÝÃÌiViv
reward-driven distraction. Nevertheless, very recently, some researchers have 
raised doubts about whether prior experiments on the topic have demonstrat-
ed a reward-driven process after all (Anderson & Halpern, 2017; Le Pelley et 
al., 2015; Sha & Jiang, 2016). Their doubts stemmed from the way reward-driv-
en distraction is usually operationalized. In particular, in many previous exper-
iments, the existence of reward-driven distraction is inferred from a compari-
son between two conditions: (a) a condition in which a high-reward distractor 
was present and (b) a condition in which no distractor was present (Anderson, 
2015a; Anderson et al., 2011b; Sali, Anderson, & Yantis, 2014). Problematical-
ly, this particular comparison leaves room for an alternative explanation: it is 
possible that high-reward distractors hurt performance not because they signal 
higher rewards, but because they have an extensive history of having been 
searched for, and selected, in the preceding training phase.
Recall that in the training phase of many previous experiments (see Figure 2.1), 
«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜiÀiÃÌÀÕVÌi`ÌÃi>ÀVvÀ>Ã>«iÌ>Ì>`>Ã«iVwVVÀ­i°}°]
>Ài`VÀVi>}VÀViÃvÌiÀVÀÃ®°7i«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÀi«i>Ìi`Þ«iÀ-
form this search, they develop a strong, top-down attentional set for the target 
color, which facilitates future searches. This attentional set might then carry 
over to the test phase, such that the previously selected target (now distrac-
tor) color keeps drawing attention, even after it is no longer task-relevant. The 
consequence would be that, when comparing trials with (a) an often-selected 
distractor color versus (b) trials with no such distractor, performance would be 
impaired in the former case. Notably, this account makes no reference to a spe-
VwVivviVÌvÀiÜ>À`°-]>>ÌiÀ>ÌÛiiÝ«>>ÌvÀ>Þ«ÀiÛÕÃw`}Ã
is that results were due to selection-driven distraction rather than reward-driven 
distraction.
To address this pressing problem, researchers have developed more rigorous 
ways to test whether reward-driven distraction exists. First, rather than compar-
ing participants’ performance on high-reward versus no-distractor trials, one 
can test whether high-reward distractors hurt performance more strongly than 
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low-reward (or neutral2) distractors (Le Pelley et al., 2016). For example, in the 
paradigm introduced by Anderson et al. (2011b) there are two target colors 
(e.g., red and green), each of which is associated with a different reward mag-
nitude (e.g., red with 5 cents, green with 1 cent). Crucially, these target colors 
are equally likely to be selected in the training phase, because both served 
as targets; they differ only in the magnitude of reward they signal. Therefore, 
comparing performance in the presence of high-reward versus low-reward dis-
tractors allows us to isolate the effect of reward value—rather than selection 
history—and hence provides a direct test for reward-driven distraction. Unfor-
tunately, this more stringent test of the effect of reward on attention is not 
always reported among the results of the relevant studies.
Another way to rule out selection-driven accounts is to use a design without 
a separate learning phase. In this design, participants do not learn to select 
certain stimuli more than others. Instead, this approach uses just one testing 
session, in which the presence of certain distractor stimuli signals rewards. For 
example, in a study by Le Pelley et al. (2015; see also Bucker & Theeuwes, 
2016b), participants performed a visual search task, in which they had to make 
an eye-movement to a shape-singleton target (e.g., a diamond among circles) 
as quickly as possible. Importantly, in some trials, one of the non-target circles 
was a color-singleton (e.g., a red circle among gray circles), with the color of 
this singleton signaling whether a high or low-reward was available on that 
trial. So, even though these colors signaled reward, they were never the target 
that participants were required to respond (or attend) to in order to earn that 
reward. That is, participants were never required to look at the reward-signaling 
distractors; in fact, the task was arranged so that if they did look at the colored 
distractor, the reward that would otherwise have been delivered on that trial 
Ü>ÃV>Vii`°`}ÃÃÜi`Ì>Ì«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÃÌÃiÌiÃwÝ>Ìi`Ìi
colored distractor, even though this was counterproductive. More importantly, 
this happened most often when this distractor signaled high-reward (versus 
ÜÀiÜ>À`®°/Ãw`}ÃÜÃvÕÀÌiÀÃÕ««ÀÌ vÀ>«ÕÀiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`Ã-
traction effect, ruling out the alternative, selection-related explanation.
Taken together, it is now clear that comparing high-reward versus low-reward 
distractors is the most accurate test of reward-driven distraction. Still, several 
2 In some studies, researchers use neutral distractors instead of low-reward distractors (e.g., Le 
Pelley et al., 2017). A neutral distractor is a distractor that was paired with the delivery of 0 cents/0 
points. So, it carries no reward value; however, it has the same selection history as the high-reward 
distractor.
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past studies have compared high-reward distractors to no distractors at all, and 
then concluded that distraction was reward-driven, despite the confound of 
differences in selection history. The use of this suboptimal comparison is poten-
tially important when considering the robustness of reward-driven distraction, 
vVw`iViÌiivviVÌÃ>ÞL>Ãi`ÌiÃÌÃÌ>Ì`ÌÀi«ÀiÃiÌ>ÌÀÕi
reward-driven account. To address this issue, the current meta-analysis tested 
whether the magnitude of reward-driven distraction is robust across different 
ways of operationalizing the phenomenon.
Our methodological approach
To investigate this issue, we tested whether the magnitude of reward-driven 
distraction depends on the type of comparison that is made. Following the 
line of reasoning addressed above, we calculated effect sizes separately for 
two different comparisons (a) our original effect size estimate: high-reward dis-
tractors versus low-reward (or neutral) distractors and (b) high-reward versus no 
`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ«ÀiÃiÌ°7i>Ài«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞÌiÀiÃÌi`iÃÌ>Ì}ÌiivviVÌÃâi
for the former comparison, which we consider the cleanest test of reward-driv-
en distraction, even though it is not always reported in empirical papers. If the 
latter comparison (which is less clean) yields a higher effect size than the former 
comparison, this suggests that selection-driven distraction is part of the expla-
>ÌvÀ>Þ«ÀiÛÕÃÞÀi«ÀÌi`w`}Ã°
Aim 3: To provide methodological guidelines for studying  
reward-driven distraction
Researchers have become increasingly worried about the replicability of many 
w`}Ã«ÃÞV}V>ÃViVi\>Þ¼V>ÃÃV½>`}ÞyÕiÌ>w`}Ã
(e.g., ego-depletion, unconscious priming) simply could not be replicated 
(e.g., Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Hagger et al., 2016; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015). One of the major contributors to replicability is-
sues is publication bias (Renkewitz & Keiner, 2018), which refers to the idea 
Ì>Ì Ã}wV>Ìw`}Ã>ÀiÀi iÞ ÌLi«ÕLÃi`  ÃViÌwV ÕÀ>Ã
Ì>Ã}wV>Ìw`}Ã­	ÀiÃÌi]i`}iÃ]}}Ã]E,ÌÃÌi]Óä££®°

ÃiµÕiÌÞ]«ÃÌÛiw`}Ã>ÞLiÛiÀÀi«ÀiÃiÌi`Ìi«ÕLÃi`ÌiÀ-
>ÌÕÀi]ÜÌi}>ÌÛiw`}ÃVÃ}i`ÌÌiºwi`À>ÜiÀ»­-«i>]Óä£Ó®°
Ƃ``Ì>Þ]iÛiv>ÃÌÕ`Þ]>ÌwÀÃÌ]`iÃÌÞi`Ã}wV>ÌivviVÌÃ]ÀiÃi>ÀV-
iÀÃV>Ì>i>ÌvLiÀÌÞÌÀÞ}ÌÀi>VÃ}wV>Vi°/ÃLi>ÛÀÃvÌi
referred to as p-hacking or researcher degrees of freedom and entails practices 
such as carefully choosing which items to include in analyses, or which partic-
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ipants to exclude (Simonsohn et al., 2014a). The consequence of publication 
bias and p-hacking is that a meta-analysis of a certain effect (if anything) tend 
ÌÛiÀiÃÌ>ÌiÌi>VÌÕ>ÃâivÌiivviVÌq>ÃÌii}>ÌÛiw`}Ã>ÀiÌ
>Û>>LiÌVÕ`iÌiiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ]>`Ìiw`}Ãv«ÃÌÛiÃÌÕ`iÃ
>ÞLi>ÀÌwV>Þ y>Ìi` ­,iiÜÌâEiiÀ]Óä£nÆ-Ã] iÃ]E
Simmons, 2014b).
-Ì>ÌÃÌV>ÌÃ>ÛiLii`iÛi«i`À`iÀÌ`iÌiVÌ>`iÃÌ>ÌiÌiyÕ-
ence of publication bias and p-hacking on effect sizes in psychological science. 
In this meta-analysis, we deployed these tools to assess whether the magnitude 
of reward-driven distraction is likely to have been overestimated in the litera-
ture, and more generally how much trust we can place in this effect.
Additionally, we conducted a methodological assessment of the literature. 
That is, studies testing reward-driven distraction make various methodological 
choices about stimuli and study design. For instance, some studies used money 
as reward cues (Anderson et al., 2011b), while others used the smell of choc-
>Ìi ­*]	ÀÃV]i«>µÕi]E->`iÀ]Óä£{®°7iVÕÀÀiÌÞ`ÌÜ
whether these methodological choices modify the magnitude of reward-driven 
distraction. Our meta-analysis therefore tested whether these methodological 
VViÃyÕiViÌi>}ÌÕ`ivÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°,iÃÕÌÃvÀÌÃ
test can inform theory on the reliability of reward-driven distraction across dif-
ferent methodological approaches, but also can make suggestions for future 
researchers on how to design their studies.
Our methodological approach.
7iÌiÃÌi`ÜiÌiÀÌiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÌiÀ>ÌÕÀiÃÜÃiÛ`iVivÀ
publication bias and p-hacking. Recent studies show that publication bias is 
`vwVÕÌ Ì >ÃÃiÃÃ >` ÃiiÌ`Ã>Þ i>` Ì v>Ãi VVÕÃÃ ­,ii-
witz & Keiner, 2018). Thus, in order to draw reliable conclusions, we assessed 
publication bias in three different ways. If the results from these three methods 
correspond, we can be more certain about our conclusions. First, we built a 
funnel plot and conducted a test of funnel plot asymmetry (Duval & Tweedie, 
2000; Sterne et al., 2011). Second, we conducted a fail-safe analysis, which 
iÃÌ>ÌiÃÌiÞ«ÌiÌV>ÕLiÀvÃÌÕ`iÃÌiºwi`À>ÜiÀ»­°i°]i}>ÌÛi
w`}ÃÌ>Ì>ÀiÌ«ÕLÃi`Æ,ÃiLiÀ}]ÓääxÆ-«i>]Óä£Ó®°/À`]Üi
conducted a p-curve analysis (Simonsohn et al., 2014a) to test whether there is 
evidence for p-hacking and whether there is evidential value for reward-driven 
distraction.
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In order to test whether methodological choices impact the magnitude of re-
ward-driven distraction, we coded seven moderators. First, we coded type of 
learning. That is, we coded whether participants had to select certain stimuli 
to gain rewards (i.e., instrumental learning), or instead whether stimuli merely 
signaled the magnitude of the available reward, but participants were not re-
quired to respond to these stimuli (i.e., Pavlovian learning). Second, we coded 
ÌÞ«ivÀiÜ>À`]Ì>ÌÃ]ÌiÀiÜ>À`Ì>ÌÜ>Ã>ÃÃV>Ìi`ÜÌ`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ°7i
some studies used primary rewards that have higher biological relevance, such 
as food (Piech, Pastorino, & Zald, 2010) or odor (Pool, Brosch, et al., 2014), 
others used secondary rewards that have acquired their value through sociali-
zation, such as money, points, or people’s own names (Ljungberg, Parmentier, 
Jones, Marsja, & Neely, 2014). Third, we coded the ratio of low versus high, 
that is, the ratio between how much money participants received on low versus 
high-reward trials (note: this moderator was only coded for studies that used 
money or points). In some studies, the difference between the reward value of 
low and high was small (e.g., 1 cent vs. 5 cents; e.g., (Anderson et al., 2011b), 
whereas in other studies this difference was larger (e.g., 25 cents vs. 1.5 dollars; 
Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2016). Fourth, we coded length of training, that is, 
the duration of the training phase (number of trials) to test whether longer train-
ing leads to stronger interference as a consequence of the greater opportunity 
vÀ ÀiÜ>À` i>À}° vÌ]Üi V`i` ÃÌÕÕÃ vi>ÌÕÀiÃ] Ì>Ì Ã]Ü>Ì Ã«iVwV
stimulus feature was associated with rewards (e.g., low level features like color 
and location, or higher-level features like semantic category). Sixth, we coded 
measure, that is, whether the study used a direct (e.g., eye movements) versus 
indirect (e.g., reaction time [RT] or accuracy) measure to assess reward-driven 
distraction. Seventh, we coded physical salience, that is whether reward-asso-
ciated distractors were physically salient (e.g., a single red shape among a set 
of grey shapes) or not (e.g., a single red shape among a set of uniquely colored 
shapes).
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METHOD
This research was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Social Science Fac-
ÕÌÞ°7i>i`Ì>iÕÀiÌ>>>ÞÃÃÀi«À`ÕVLi°	>Ãi`}Õ`iiÃ
from recent work (Lakens, Hilgard, & Staaks, 2016), we disclose all decisions 
we made in coding effect sizes, all meta-analytic data, and our analysis script 
online on the Open Science Framework (OSF; https://osf.io/rgeb6/?view_on-
ly=1249df637a5541a5bad30b992ede3770). In addition to providing transpar-
ency, this will also facilitate future meta-analyses of the same data-set using dif-
ferent techniques as new theoretical approaches or statistical methods emerge 
(Lakens et al., 2016).
Inclusion criteria
7iÃiiVÌi`ÃÌÕ`iÃÌ>ÌiÌÌivÜ}VÀÌiÀ>\
1. The article was written in English.
2. The article contained original data that were collected from healthy human 
populations and were published before August 2017.
3. The study used a task that measures any type of cognitive performance 
­i°}°]ÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀV]VyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}]iÌV°®°
4. The dependent variable in the study was either a behavioral measure (e.g., 
RT or accuracy) or eye-gaze behavior.
5. The study contained distractor stimuli that were associated with any type 
of reward (e.g., a primary reward, such as food, or a secondary reward, 
such as money).
6. The study measured our contrast of interest, that is, it examined the effects 
of distractor stimuli associated with high versus low (or neutral) reward. 
7i>ÃVÕ`i`ÃÌÕ`iÃÌ>ÌiÝ>i`ÌiivviVÌÃv`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃÌÕ>Ã-
sociated with high-reward versus no task-irrelevant stimuli present. Stud-
ies that compared high-reward distractor stimuli with anything other than 
low-reward or neutral distractor stimuli (e.g., reward vs. loss, erotic pictures 
vs. mutilated pictures) were not included in this meta-analysis.
7. The contrast of interest was tested with a within-subject design.
8. The effect size of the contrast of interest could be calculated from descrip-
tive statistics (mean and standard deviation for each condition).
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Systematic search strategy
7i Ãi>ÀVi` vÀ «ÕLÃi` >ÀÌViÃ  ÌÀii Ü>ÞÃ ­Ãii }ÕÀi Ó°Ó®° ÀÃÌ] Üi
Ãi>ÀVi`vÀ>>Û>>LiÀiVÀ`Ã7iLvÜi`}iÕÌƂÕ}ÕÃÌÓä£Ç°À
this, we used the following search terms: TS = ((value OR reward) AND (irrele-
vant OR incidental) AND (attention* OR performance OR cognit*) AND (stimul* 
OR cue*)). This search yielded 292 hits. Second, we systematically consulted 
the two most recent narrative reviews and their reference sections (Anderson, 
2016b; Le Pelley et al., 2016), which yielded 440 articles. Third and last, we 
searched for articles that cited the key publication (Anderson et al., 2011b), 
which yielded 294 articles. Overall, these three searches yielded 868 papers, 
after deleting duplicates.
Figure 2.2. Selection procedure of articles.
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7i>««i`ÕÀVÕÃVÀÌiÀ>ÌÜÃÌi«Ã°ÀÃÌ]iÀ>ÌiÀÀi>`Ìi>LÃÌÀ>VÌÃ
of all articles and checked whether they met the Step-1 criteria (inclusion crite-
À>£x>LÛi®°V>ÃiÌÜ>ÃÌVi>ÀÜiÌiÀ>ÃÌÕ`ÞvÕwi`>VÕÃVÀ-
terion, a second rater also read the abstract, and the two raters made a mutual 
decision. This phase of the systematic search yielded 119 articles.
Second, two raters read the remaining 119 articles in full and checked the Step-
Ó VÀÌiÀ> ­VÕÃ VÀÌiÀ> Èn vÀ Ìi ÃÌ >LÛi®°7i >ÃÃiÃÃi` ÌiÀÀ>ÌiÀ
Û>À>LÌÞLÞV«>À}Ìi`iVÃÃvÌiÌÜÀ>ÌiÀÃ°7ivÕ`Ì>Ì>}Àii-
ment was moderate (Cohen’s k = .79). Then, the two raters discussed the dis-
agreements and came to a consensual decision. This search phase yielded 65 
articles, which reported a total of 101 experiments.
Calculating effect sizes
As discussed above, we were mainly interested in the difference between high 
versus low or high versus no reward-associated distractors. However, these 
comparisons (and the corresponding effect sizes) were not always explicitly re-
ported in the articles. Instead, many articles reported an omnibus test (e.g., 
F test) that compared three conditions: high, low, and no reward-associated 
distractors. An effect size of this omnibus test (i.e., partial eta squared) is not 
particularly informative, as it does not reveal (a) which conditions differ from 
each other and (b) what the direction of the effect is. Thus, in many cases, the 
ÃÌ>ÌÃÌVÃÀi«ÀÌi`Ìi>ÀÌViÃÜiÀiÌÃÕvwViÌÌÌiÃÌÕÀÃ«iVwVVÌÀ>ÃÌÃ
of interest.
/ÃÛiÌÃÃÃÕi]ÜiV>VÕ>Ìi`ivviVÌÃâiÃvÌiÃ«iVwVV«>ÀÃÃvÀ
descriptive statistics with the escalc function of the metafor package, (version 
Ó°ääÆ6iVÌL>ÕiÀ]Óä£ä®,­,
Ài/i>]Óä£x®°/ÃÃÕÌÜ>ÃLiiwV>
for two reasons. First, we did not have to rely on what was reported in the ar-
ticles but we could calculate effect sizes for all possible comparisons (high vs. 
low or neutral and high vs. no distractor present). Second, it ensured that every 
effect size included in this meta-analysis was calculated in the same way. This 
is especially important because researchers, in general, tend to rely too much 
on statistical software packages that may not provide the optimal effect size for 
ÌiÃ«iVwV`iÃ}Ì>ÌÜ>ÃÕÃi`­>iÃ]Óä£Î®°ÀÌiivviVÌÃâiV>VÕ>Ì]
ÜiiÝÌÀ>VÌi``iÃVÀ«ÌÛiÃÌ>ÌÃÌVÃvÀi>VÃÌÕ`Þ°ÀiÃ«iVwV>Þ]ÜiV`i`
means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for each of the conditions in the study 
(i.e., high-reward, low or neutral-reward, and no distractor present). In some 
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cases, these statistics were reported in the text or in tables. In other cases, 
however, descriptive statistics were not reported in text, but were visualized 
in plots. In these cases, we digitized plots and extracted statistics based on 
guidelines from Parmar, Torri, and Stewart (1998) with a plot digitizer (Rohatgi, 
2019). In these cases, we converted the standard error of the mean to SD. Final-
ly, when no descriptive statistics were available in the articles, we contacted the 
authors to provide us with M and SD in each condition. If the authors did not 
respond to this original email, or to two subsequent reminders, we excluded 
the article from the analysis (n = 2).
After extracting these descriptive statistics, we calculated effect sizes for all 
possible comparisons (i.e., high-reward vs. low-reward/neutral and high-re-
ward vs. no distractor present). Based on guidelines on meta-analysis (Morris, 
2000; Viechtbauer, 2017), the optimal effect size for within-subject designs and 
quantitative dependent variables was standardized mean change using change 
score standardization (SMCC). The change score had to be standardized be-
cause we had one dependent variable that was measured in different ways: that 
is, our dependent variable was performance, but it could be measured in terms 
of response times, accuracy, eye-gaze, etc. (Borenstein et al., 2011). Thus, in 
the current meta-analysis, SMCC refers to the mean change in response time or 
accuracy when participants were exposed to low (or neutral) versus high-reward 
distractors during the task.
7i}>Ûi-

>«ÃÌÛiÃ}Üi«iÀvÀ>ViÜ>ÃÜÀÃiÌi}Ài-
ward distractor condition compared to the low (or neutral) reward distractor 
V`Ì°7i«iÀvÀ>ViÜ>ÃLiÌÌiÀÌi}ÀiÜ>À``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀV`-
tion compared to the low-reward distractor condition, we gave SMCC a nega-
tive sign.
Importantly, calculating an effect size for within-subject comparisons is critically 
dependent on the correlation between conditions (i.e., in this case, correlation 
between performance on high-reward and low-reward/neutral distractor trials). 
In general, when the correlation is large, the error tends to be smaller and thus 
ÌiÌiÃÌÃÌ>ÌÃÌVÃ>Ài>À}iÀ°7iÌiivviVÌÃâiÃV>VÕ>Ìi`vÀÃÕVÌiÃÌÃÌ>-
tistics, it is often overestimated (Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996). Thus, 
ÌVÀÀiVÌvÀÌÃ«ÌiÌ>ÛiÀiÃÌ>Ì]ÜiVÕ`i`ÌiVÀÀi>ÌVivw-
cient between high versus low/neutral condition in our effect-size calculation. 
Unfortunately, the correlation between conditions is almost never reported in 
published research. To solve this issue, we calculated an average correlation 
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VivwViÌvÀÀ>Ü`>Ì>Ì>ÌÜiÀi>Û>>LivÀÌÞ«V>ÃÌÕ`iÃÌ>Ì>Ài>«>ÀÌ
v ÌÃiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ ­i`>7ÕÃÌivi`] 	À>`viÀ] E -VÕL] Óä£ÈÆ i
*iiÞiÌ>°]Óä£x®°7ÌÌÃ«ÀVi`ÕÀi]ÜiiÃÌ>Ìi`Ìi>ÛiÀ>}iVÀÀi>Ì
between performance with high-reward versus low-reward/neutral distractors 
to be .90.
Decisions about effect sizes
7iV`}ivviVÌÃâiÃ]Üi>`iÌivÜ}`iVÃÃ\
1. In order to be consistent in effect size calculation (Lakens et al., 2016), we 
only included studies in which the simple effect of reward (high-reward vs. 
low-reward/neutral; high-reward vs. no distractor present) could be calcu-
lated. Based on this decision, we had to exclude studies that measured our 
contrast of interest with an interaction effect between reward and other 
characteristics (Asgeirsson & Kristjánsson, 2014; Asutay & Vastfjall, 2016; 
Hickey et al., 2010b, 2010a; Hickey & van Zoest, 2013).
Ó° 7iÌiÃÌÕ`ÞVÌ>i`>V`ÌÜÌ>ÞÃÀÌvVV>ÃÞ«Ì]
we coded statistics only for the healthy control condition (e.g., Anderson, 
Faulkner, Rilee, Yantis, & Marvel, 2013; Anderson et al., 2014).
Î° 7i ÌiÀiÜiÀiÕÌ«i >>ÞÃiÃ Ài«ÀÌi` vÀ ÌiÃÌ} ÕÀ VÌÀ>ÃÌ v
ÌiÀiÃÌ] Ì>Û`VvÕÃ]Üi>ÃÃÕi` Ì>Ì ÌiwÀÃÌ >>ÞÃÃ Ì>ÌÜ>Ã
reported in the paper was the main analysis. Therefore, we coded statistics 
from this analysis (e.g., in Anderson & Yantis, 2012).
4. There were several studies that reported descriptive statistics of high-re-
ward distractors, low-reward/neutral distractors, and no distractor present 
conditions across the levels of an additional factor (e.g., invalid vs. valid, 
congruent vs. incongruent). In order to be consistent, in all of these stud-
ies, we decided to select only one condition, which suited our inclusion 
VÀÌiÀ>LiÃÌ°ÀiÃ«iVwV>Þ]ÜiÌiÃÌÕ`ÞÕÃi`>Ã«>Ì>VÕi}Ì>Ã
(Bourgeois, Neveu, Bayle, & Vuilleumier, 2015; Bourgeois, Neveu, & 
Vuilleumier, 2016; Bucker & Theeuwes, 2016a; Munneke, Hoppenbrou-
wers, & Theeuwes, 2015; Pool, Brosch, et al., 2014; Rutherford, O’Brien, 
E,>Þ`]Óä£ä®]ÜiÃiiVÌi`ÌiiÝ}iÕÃ]Û>`V`Ì°7i
the study employed the Stroop task (Krebs et al., 2013, 2010), we select-
i`ÌiV}ÀÕiÌ]ÀiÜ>À`V`Ì°7iÌiÃÌÕ`Þi«Þi`>
y>iÀÌ>Ã­Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°]Óä£ÓÆ >Õ]i`]EÕ>]Óä£Î®]Üi
selected the incongruent condition. In some other cases, when it was 
impossible to choose one condition that suited our inclusion criteria (e.g., 
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when descriptive statistics were presented by different blocks of trials; 
e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2015), we contacted authors for descriptive statistics. 
À>Ài`iÌ>i`ÃiiVÌ«ÀVi`ÕÀi]ÃiiºVÕÃ`iVÃÃ»wi
our OSF page (https://osf.io/rgeb6/?view_only=1249df637a5541a5bad-
30b992ede3770).
x° 7iV`i`` iÃVÀ«ÌÛiÃÌ>ÌÃÌVÃvÀLÌÀiÃ«ÃiÌiÃ>`>VVÕÀ>VÞ­Üi
Ài«ÀÌi`®°ÀÌiw>ivviVÌÃâiV>VÕ>Ì]ÜiVÕ`i`ÌiiÌ>ÌÜ>Ã
the most meaningful in the design of the study (e.g., RT in search tasks, 
>VVÕÀ>VÞÀ>«`ÃiÀ>ÛÃÕ>«ÀiÃiÌ>ÌQ,-6*R®°7iÞiÞiÌÀ>V}
i>ÃÕÀiÃÜiÀi Ài«ÀÌi`]ÜiV`i` ÀiÃ«Ãi >ÌiVÞ>` Ìi ÌwÝ>Ìi
the target as response times and proportion of trials on which gaze fell on 
the distractor as accuracy. For a more detailed selection procedure, see 
ºVÕÃ`iVÃÃ»wiÕÀ"-«>}i­Ãii>LÛi®°
Moderators
/ÜÀ>ÌiÀÃV`i``iÀ>ÌÀÃ­/>LiÓ°£®°7iV>VÕ>Ìi`ÌiÀÀ>ÌiÀÛ>À>LÌÞLÞ
comparing the decision of two raters on 15 articles. Cohen’s k varied between 
.86 and 1 across all moderators with an average of .96. Thus, overall inter-rater 
variability was high. In case of disagreements, the coding decisions were dis-
cussed, and the two raters came to an agreement. Details about moderators 
V`i`vÀi>VÃÌÕ`ÞV>LivÕ`ÕÀ"-«>}i­wiº>>Ì>»\https://
osf.io/rgeb6/?view_only=1249df637a5541a5bad30b992ede3770).
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Table 2.1. List of moderators grouped by the three major aims.
Moderator Levels (k)
Aim 1
0CVWTGQHRGTHQTOCPEG
interference
XKUWCNUGCTEJ
URCVKCNEWGKPI
4582
LWFIOGPV

EQPƃKEVRTQEGUUKPI
XKUWCNOGOQT[

URCVKCN
PQPURCVKCN

2. Difference between training and 
test phases
same (37), different (23), no learning phase (31)
3. Task instructions no instructions (53), ignore distractors (38)
Aim 3
6[RGQHNGCTPKPI KPUVTWOGPVCN
2CXNQXKCP

6[RGQHTGYCTF OQPG[
RQKPVU
QYPPCOG
QFQT
UQEKCN

HQQF
CNEQJQN

4CVKQDGVYGGPNQYCPFJKIJ money/points assigned to low value divided by money/
points assigned to high value (continuous)
.GPIVJQHVTCKPKPI number of trials (continuous)
5VKOWNWUHGCVWTGU EQNQT
RKEVWTG
QTKGPVCVKQP
UQWPF
UJCRG
(5)
6[RGQHFKUVTCEVKQPOGCUWTG KPFKTGEV
FKTGEV

2J[UKECNUCNKGPEG RJ[UKECNN[UCNKGPVFKUVTCEVQT
RJ[UKECNN[PQPUCNKGPV
distractor (59)
k = number of studies
2
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RESULTS
Meta-analytical procedures
7iV`ÕVÌi`ÌiiÌ>>>ÞÌVV«ÕÌ>ÌÃ,­,
Ài/i>]Óä£x®]ÕÃ}
the metafor package (version 2.0-0;Viechtbauer, 2010). In order to calculate 
summary effect sizes, we ran a random effects model. For moderator analyses, 
we used mixed-effects for meta-regression models.
Aim 1: To establish the magnitude and scope of reward-driven 
distraction
Magnitude
In our main meta-analysis, we tested whether performance is more impaired 
by high-reward compared to low-reward (or neutral) distractors. This analy-
ÃÃ `V>Ìi`>Ã}wV>Ì>`Ã>ivviVÌ>VÀÃÃÃÌÕ`iÃ ­k = 91, n = 2362), 
showing that performance is systematically more impaired by high-reward than 
low-reward (or neutral) distractors (Standardized Mean Change [SMC] = .347, 
CI = .257 – .437, Z = 7.54, p < .001); Figure 2.3 shows a forest plot for this 
meta-analysis. Heterogeneity was high, indicating that there is large variation 
between studies, Q = 353.9, p < .001, I2 = 76.3%, T2 = .142, [CI] = .111 - .262. 
 }iiÀ>] } iÌiÀ}iiÌÞ ÕÃÌwiÃ ÕÃ} > À>`ivviVÌÃ`i ­ÛÃ° >
wÝi`ivviVÌÃ`i®>`ÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÌ>ÌÌ>iÃÃiÃiÌiÝ>i`iÀ>ÌÀÃ°
7i>ÃV>VÕ>Ìi`>«Ài`VÌÉVÀi`LÌÞÌiÀÛ>vÀÕÀivviVÌÃâiiÃÌ>Ìi]
following previous recommendations (IntHout, Ioannidis, Rovers, & Goeman, 
2016). A prediction interval refers to the range of true effects that we can ex-
pect in 95% of hypothetical studies that we would conduct in the future. In our 
V>Ãi]ÌiVÀi`LÌÞÌiÀÛ>­
,r°ÎÈq£°ä£®Ü>Ã>À}iÀÌ>ÌiVw`iVi
ÌiÀÛ>°/Ãw`}]Ì]ÃVÃÃÌiÌÜÌ}iÌiÀ}iiÌÞ>VÀÃÃÃÌÕ`iÃ
(IntHout et al., 2016).
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Figure 2.3. Forest plot showing the estimated standardized mean change of cognitive 
performance in high-reward distractor trials compared to low-reward or neutral distractor 
trials (RE model, bottom row). The left columns shows the authors, year, and experiment 
numbers. The middle column shows the individual study effect sizes (black square), with 
ÌiiÃÌ>Ìi`x¯Vw`iViÌiÀÛ>Ã­iÀÀÀL>ÀÃ®°/iL}}iÀÌiÃµÕ>ÀiÃ]Ìi>À}iÀÌi
sample size of the study is. The right column shows these effect sizes and CIs numerically. 
The arrow at the left or right side of the error bars indicates that the CI is large and it con-
tinues beyond the size of the graph.
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Scope
In order to explore the scope of reward-driven distraction, we tested whether 
reward-driven distraction is moderated by (a) the nature of the performance 
task, (b) whether training and test phases used different methods, and (c) 
whether participants were explicitly instructed to ignore distractors. First, we 
included all three predictors in our mixed-effects meta-regression model. This 
ÛiÀ>`iÜ>ÃÃ}wV>Ì]QM (8) = 23.8, p = .003, which indicates that a 
Ã}wV>Ì«À«ÀÌvÌiiÌiÀ}iiÌÞÌiÌÀÕiivviVÌV>LiiÝ«>i`
by at least one of these moderators.
7iiÝÌiÝ>i`ÌiivviVÌvi>V`iÀ>ÌÀÃi«>À>ÌiÞ°Ã«iVÌv/>-
ble 2.2 shows that only the nature of performance interference moderated the 
>}ÌÕ`i v ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi `ÃÌÀ>VÌ Ã}wV>ÌÞ° -] Ãi «iÀvÀ>Vi
tasks are more conducive to reward-driven distraction than others. More spe-
VwV>Þ]Üi vÕ` Ã}wV>Ì ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌivviVÌÃ Þ vÀ ÛÃÕ>
Ãi>ÀVÌ>ÃÃ]À>«`ÃiÀ>ÛÃÕ>«ÀiÃiÌ>Ì­,-6*®Ì>ÃÃ]>`VyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ-
}Ì>ÃÃ°/iÌiÀÌÜ`iÀ>ÌÀÃ``ÌÃ}wV>ÌÞ>vviVÌÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi
distraction.
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Table 2.2. Summary results of the moderator analysis.
Moderator k SMC 95% CI QM QE T
2 I2
Aim 1
Nature of performance 
interference
Visual search
Spatial cueing
RSVP
Judgment

yVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}
Visual memory
59
8
7
7
5
5
.349***
.268
.732**
.235
.710***
-.315
.246-.452
-.016-.552
.431-1.032
-.057-.526
.325-1.095
-.689-.058
22.6*** 297.2*** .115 72.1
Nature of performance 
interference
Spatial
Non-spatial
66
25
.336***
.378***
.230-.443
.204-.552
<1 353.8*** .144 76.5
Difference between training 
and test phases
Same
Different
37
23
.268***
.332***
.149-.388
.179-.486
<1 174.2*** .087 65.1
Task instructions
No instructions
Ignore distractors
53
38
.341***
.356***
.222-.461
.216-.497
<1 353.2*** .144 76.6
Aim 3
Type of learning
Instrumental
Pavlovian
55
36
.320***
.388***
.202-.437
.246-531
<1 352.4*** .143 76.5
Type of reward
Money
Points
Other
52
32
7
.391***
.347***
.020
.274-.509
.198-.496
-.301-.340
4.6 334.6*** .136 75.4
Ratio between low and high <1 224.5*** .099 69
Length of training <1 165.7*** .084 64.6
Stimulus features
Color
Picture
Orientation
Sound
Shape
65
10
6
5
5
.345***
.614**
.209
.150
.216
.239-.451
.344-.884
-.149-.567
-.210-.510
-.179-.610
5.9 337.5*** .139 75.9
Type of distraction measure
Indirect
Direct
79
12
.298***
.663***
.205-.392
.424-902
7.8** 328.8 .129 74.4
Physical salience
Physically salient distractor
Physically non-salient distractor
32
59
.388
.326
.235-.541
.213-.438
<1 353.1 .144 76.5
Note: k = number of studies, SMC = standardized mean change, QM = test of moderator, QE 
= residual heterogeneity (measure of weighted squared deviations, T2 = between-studies 
variance, I2 = the ratio of true heterogeneity to total observed variation.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, p < .001
2
46
Chapter 2
À`iÀÌ}iÌÀiÃ}ÌÌÜÌi>ÌÕÀivÌi«iÀvÀ>ViÌ>ÃyÕ-
ences the magnitude of reward-driven distraction, we grouped the paradigms 
ÌÌÜ`ÃÌVÌV>Ìi}ÀiÃ°-«iVwV>Þ]ÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀV>`Ã«>Ì>VÕi}ÜiÀi
categorized as conducive to a spatial form of distraction, in which distractors 
>««i>À>Ì` vviÀiÌV>ÌÃÌ>Ì>À}iÌÃ°	ÞVÌÀ>ÃÌ]VyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}],-6*]
judgment, and visual memory were categorized as assessing a non-spatial form 
of distraction, in which distractors and targets appear at the same location. 
So, we again conducted a mixed-effects meta-regression model, but now with 
this dichotomous variable (spatial vs. non-spatial) as the only moderator. Table 
Ó°ÓÃÜÃÌ>ÌÌÃ>>ÞÃÃÜ>ÃÌÃ}wV>Ì°-]w`}ÃÃÕ}}iÃÌÌ>ÌÌi
reward-driven distraction effect is not markedly stronger when reward-related 
distractors appear in different locations than task-relevant target stimuli. 
Aim 2: To examine an alternative explanation: have we been 
studying selection-driven distraction instead of reward-driven 
distraction?
In the introduction, we reasoned that the most accurate test of reward-driv-
en distraction is the comparison between how high-reward distractors and 
ÜÀiÜ>À`­ÀiÕÌÀ>®`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃyÕiVi«iÀvÀ>Vi°9iÌ]ÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃv-
ten report different comparisons. Most notably, prior work has often compared 
the effects of high-reward distractors to no distractors. The problem with this 
comparison is that it may stem from a selection-driven process, rather than a 
reward-driven process (see Introduction; Anderson & Halpern, 2017; Le Pelley 
et al., 2016; Sha & Jiang, 2016). Therefore, we assessed whether the estimated 
magnitude of reward-driven distraction changes based on the type of compar-
ison researchers make. 
To examine the effect of choice of comparison, we calculated an effect-size 
iÃÌ>ÌiÌ>ÌÀiyiVÌi`Ìi`vviÀiViLiÌÜiiÜiÌiÀiÜiÀihigh-reward 
distractors present versus when there were no distractors present. Note that 
some studies used physically salient reward distractors (e.g., distractors were 
color singletons; Le Pelley et al., 2015). In these studies, any difference be-
tween high-reward distractors versus no distractors could stem from the impact 
of physical salience on attention (Theeuwes, 1992), not just from selection-driv-
en and reward-driven processes. To rule out this alternative explanation, in this 
analysis, we included studies that used distractors that were not physically sa-
lient (e.g., shapes in the critical test phase were heterogeneously colored, and 
hence distractors were not color singletons). Results are summarized in Figure 
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2.4. As before (when we compared high-value vs. low-value distractors), results 
from this meta-analysis (k = 45, n = 1,140) showed that high-reward distractors 
systematically impair performance compared to when there are no distractors 
present (SMC = .493, CI = .301 - .685, Z = 5.03, p < .001). Heterogeneity 
was again high, indicating that there was large variation between studies (Q = 
297.1, p < .001, I2 = 88 %, T2 = .366, [CI] = .292 - .969), CR = -.708 – 1.694). Im-
portantly, the effect size in this analysis (SMC = .493) was 1.4 times larger than 
ÕÀÀ}>ivviVÌÃâiiÃÌ>Ìi ­-
r°Î{Ç®°7iÃÕ`Ìi] ÌÕ}]Ì>Ì
ÌiVw`iViÌiÀÛ>ÃvÀÌiÌÜiÃÌ>ÌiÃÛiÀ>«°7ÌÃiV>ÕÌ]
this difference suggests that it is plausible that published effect sizes do not 
just stem from a reward-driven process, but also from a selection-driven pro-
ViÃÃ]>`Ì>Ì«ÀiÛÕÃÃÌÕ`iÃL>Ãi`Ìiº}ÀiÜ>À`ÛiÀÃÕÃ` ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ»
contrast may sometimes have overestimated the magnitude of reward-driven 
distraction.
Figure 2.4. Forest plot showing the estimated standardized mean change of cognitive 
performance in high-reward distractor trials compared to no-distractor trials (RE model, 
bottom row). The left column shows the authors, year, and experiment numbers. The middle 
column shows the individual study effect sizes (black square), with the estimated 95% con-
w`iViÌiÀÛ>Ã­iÀÀÀL>ÀÃ®°/iÀ}ÌVÕÃÜÃÌiÃiivviVÌÃâiÃÕiÀV>Þ°
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Aim 3: To provide methodological guidelines for studying re-
ward-driven distraction
Publication bias
ƂÀiViÌÃÌÕ`ÞÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÌ>Ì>ÃÃiÃÃ}ÌÀÕi«ÕLV>ÌL>ÃÃ`vwVÕÌLiV>ÕÃi
existing methods are not always reliable, for instance, when there is high het-
erogeneity (Renkewitz & Keiner, 2018), such as is the case in the literature cov-
ered in our meta-analysis. So, following previous recommendations (Quintana, 
2018), we complemented the traditional way of assessing publication bias (fun-
nel plot asymmetry) with two other methods. Thus, we assessed publication 
bias in three ways.
First, we constructed a funnel plot (Figure 2.5). As noted in the Method section, 
published articles do not all report effect sizes for the same comparison. So, 
to be consistent across studies, we calculated effect sizes ourselves, based on 
means and standard deviations, for the comparison we consider most appro-
priate (i.e., high value vs. low value or neutral distractors). In the funnel plot, 
Üi`ÃÌ}ÕÃLiÌÜiiÃÌÕ`iÃ Ì>Ì Ài«ÀÌi` ÌÃ Ã«iVwVV«>ÀÃ ­wi`
circles) versus those that reported a different comparison (empty circles).
Figure 2.5 presents the effect size of individual studies against the standard 
error (SE) of those same effect sizes. In general, one would expect funnel plots 
to be tent-shaped, such that more precise studies (i.e., studies with small SEs) 
produce effect size estimates that are closest to the meta-analytic effect size 
(vertical line in Figure 2.5). Our funnel plot approximates a tent-shaped pat-
tern. Further visual inspection of the plot suggests that there seems to be no 
systematic difference between the studies that reported the appropriate (full 
circle) versus other (empty circle) comparison. More importantly, funnel plots 
are sometimes asymmetrical to the right; that is, sometimes, there are more 
studies on the right side rather than the left side of the plot. In the traditional in-
terpretation, an asymmetric plot indicates a relationship between the effect size 
estimate and study precision, which might be a consequence of publication 
bias wherein small studies showing null/negative effects are less likely to be 
published (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997). Importantly, the current 
vÕi«ÌÃÜÃ>ÃÞiÌÀÞ­}}iÀ½ÃÌiÃÌv>ÃÞiÌÀÞÜ>ÃÌÃ}wV>Ì]
Z = 1.3, pr°£Ó®]ÜV«iÃÌ>ÌÌiÀiÃÃ}wV>ÌiÛ`iViv«ÕL-
cation bias in the reward-driven distraction literature.
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Figure 2.5. Funnel plot displaying each individual observed effect size (x-axis) against the 
corresponding standard error (y-axis). The funnel illustrates the 95% CI. The full circles rep-
resent studies that explicitly reported the effect size in the article, whereas the empty circles 
represent studies that did not report the effect size explicitly in the article.
Second, we assessed publication bias by computing the fail-safe N (Rosenberg, 
2005). This method estimates the robustness of the meta-analytic effect size by 
calculating the number of studies with null effects that would have to be in the 
wi`À>ÜiÀ]À`iÀÌV>}iÌiiÌ>>>ÞÌVivviVÌÃâiÌÌi««ÃÌi`-
ÀiVÌ°vÌÃÕLiÀÃ}]ÜiV>«ÕÌÀiVw`iViÕÀiÌ>>>ÞÌV
effect size. The fail-safe N analysis indicated that we would need to add 7433 
studies to get the opposite effect for reward-driven distraction. As this number 
ÃHÇÇÌiÃ}iÀÌ>ÌiÕLiÀvÃÌÕ`iÃÕÀiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ]ÌÃw}ÕÀi
suggests that our meta-analytic effect size is robust.
Third, to assess the strength of the evidence for reward-driven distraction in 
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the published literature, we conducted a p-curve analysis (Simonsohn et al., 
2014a). A pVÕÀÛi>>ÞÃÃiÝ>iÃÌi`ÃÌÀLÕÌvÃÌ>ÌÃÌV>ÞÃ}wV>Ì
p values in a set of published studies (Simonsohn et al., 2014a). If a set of pub-
lished studies is examining a true effect, it is likely that most p values in this 
set of studies will be lower (e.g., p < .001) rather than higher (e.g., p values 
LiÌÜii°ä£>`°äxÆi>E,>]Óä£{Æ7>Ã]£{Ó®°-]ÜiÌi
distribution of p values in a set of studies is right-skewed (a large proportion of 
low p-values), this suggests that this set of studies is healthy, in that it has high 
iÛ`iÌ>Û>Õi°7iÌi`ÃÌÀLÕÌvpÛ>ÕiÃ>ÃiÌvÃÌÕ`iÃÃy>Ì]ÌÃ
ÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÌ>ÌÌÃÃiÌvÃÌÕ`iÃ>ÃÜiÛ`iÌ>Û>Õi°7iÌi`ÃÌÀLÕÌ
of p values in a set of studies is left-skewed (with a relatively large proportion 
of p values close to p = 0.05), this suggests that this set of studies not only has 
low evidential value, but also that it contains studies that have been p-hacked 
(e.g., researchers may have considered different ways of dealing with outliers, 
analyzed only a subset of participants, computed dependent variables in multi-
ple ways, included different covariates, etc.). Indeed, assuming that p-hacking 
Ã>i`>ÌÀi>V}ÌiÃ}wV>ViVÀÌiÀ­p < .05), and that it is less likely 
to go further in the pursuit of very low (e.g., p < .001) p-values (Simonsohn 
et al., 2015), a set of studies in which p-hacking is common should produce a 
left-skewed distribution of pÛ>ÕiÃ°7i>VÜi`}iÌ>Ì«>V}>ÞÜi
happen without malicious intent (Gelman & Loken, 2013); it does not imply 
fraudulent behavior.
In our p-curve analyses, we only included studies that explicitly reported our 
contrast of interest. That is, the study had to report a test (t-test or F-test) of 
cognitive performance in high-reward distractor compared to low-reward dis-
tractor or neutral distractor conditions. Of the 58 studies that reported such 
>ÌiÃÌ]{ÎÞi`i`>Ã}wV>Ì«Û>Õi°/iÃi{ÎÃÌÕ`iÃÜiÀiVÕ`i`Ìi
pVÕÀÛi >>ÞÃÃ ­Ãii º«VÕÀÛi`>Ì>» wi  ÕÀ"-«>}i Ì Ài«À`ÕViÕÀ
p-curve analysis: https://osf.io/rgeb6/?view_only=1249df637a5541a5bad-
30b992ede3770®°7iiÌiÀi`ÌiÀiiÛ>ÌÌiÃÌÃvÌiVÌÀ>ÃÌvÌiÀiÃÌÌ
the p-curve web application (www.p-curve.com/app/). Results, plotted in Fig-
ure 2.6, showed that the distribution of pÛ>ÕiÃÜ>ÃÃ}wV>ÌÞÀ}ÌÃiÜi`]
Z = -5.4, p < .001, which suggests this set of studies contains high evidential 
value for reward-driven distraction.
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Figure 2.6.*VÕÀÛi\`ÃÌÀLÕÌvÃ}wV>Ì«Û>ÕiÃ>VÀÃÃÌiiÝ«iÀiÌÃÌiÀi
ward-driven distraction literature (blue line). The red dotted line indicates the expected 
distribution of p values if there is no true effect and the green dashed line indicates the 
expected distribution of p values under 33% statistical power. The p-curve is right skewed 
(there are more studies that report a p value < .025 than a p value > .025), which indicates 
that there is high evidential value for reward-driven distraction.
The distribution of p-values can further be used to estimate the statistical power 
typically used in these studies. The estimated statistical power from this p-curve 
­}ÕÀiÓ°È®ÃxÓ¯°Ài«ÀiVÃiÞ]vÜiÜÕ`Ì>i>ÞÃiÌÃv{ÎÃ}wV>Ì
ÃÌÕ`iÃÌ>Ì>>`xÓ¯«ÜiÀ]>vvÌiÃiÃiÌÃÜÕ`«ÀL>LÞÃÜ>y>ÌÌiÀ
p-curve than ours; the other half of these sets would probably show a more 
right-skewed p-curve than ours. Thus, 52% should be considered merely as a 
rough estimate of the power of the typical study in this area.
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Methodological variations across studies
7i>ÃÃiÃÃi`ÜiÌiÀÌiiÌ`}V>«>À>iÌiÀÃvÌiiÝ«iÀiÌÃyÕ-
enced the magnitude of reward-driven distraction. To this end, we conducted 
a mixed-effects meta-regression model with predictors: type of learning, type 
of reward, length of training, stimulus format, type of measure and physical 
salience (note: the moderator low-to-high ratio was not included in this model 
as it was calculated only for studies that used money/or points; we report this 
`iÀ>ÌÀÃi«>À>ÌiÞ/>LiÓ°Ó®°/Ã`iÜ>ÃÃ}wV>Ì]QM (28) = 42.58, 
p = .034, indicating that at least part of the heterogeneity in the true effect is 
related to one of these moderators.
Next, we examined these moderators separately (Table 2.2). Most notably, re-
ward-driven distraction was stronger when it was assessed using direct meas-
ures of attention (eye movements) rather than indirect measures (manual re-
sponse times or accuracy). Interestingly, other methodological differences did 
ÌÀi>LÞ`iÀ>ÌiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°7i}}ÌÌÜÕw`}Ã
iÀi°ÀÃÌ]Üi``Ìw`Ì>ÌÌiÕÃiviÝ«VÌiÌ>ÀÞViÌÛiÃÃiV-
essary to produce reward-driven distractions; the symbolic use of points (that 
can later be converted to money) works equally well. A small number of stud-
ies (n = 7) used rewards other than money or points (e.g., alcohol cues, food 
VÕiÃ®°/iÃiÃÌÕ`iÃ``ÌÞi`Ã}wV>ÌÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌivviVÌÃ]
unlike studies that used money or points (see Table 2.2). Second, experiments 
Ì>ÌÕÃi`}iÀÀiÜ>À`i>À}ÃiÃÃÃ``Ìw`Vi>ÀiÀiÛ`iVivÀÀi-
ward-driven distraction.
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DISCUSSION
7ÌÌiVÕÀÀiÌiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ]ÜiÃÞÌiÃâi`ÌiÀ>«`Þ}ÀÜ} ÌiÀ>ÌÕÀi
ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°7i>`ÌÀii>À}>Ã°ÀÃÌ]Üi>i`ÌiÃ-
tablish the magnitude and scope of reward-driven distraction. Second, based 
on recent critical remarks (Le Pelley et al., 2015; Sha & Jiang, 2016), we tested 
ÜiÌiÀiÝÃÌ}w`}ÃV>LiiÝ«>i`vÀ>ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi«ÀViÃÃ]>Ã
is usually assumed, or if an alternative explanation is viable, too. Third, we 
assessed the general state of the literature by assessing potential publication 
bias, assessing the literature’s evidential value, and examining whether meth-
`}V>VViÃ yÕiViÌi>}ÌÕ`ivÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°	i-
Ü]Üi`ÃVÕÃÃw`}ÃÀi>Ìi`ÌÌiÃiÌÀii>Ã°
Aim 1: To establish the magnitude and scope of reward-driven 
distraction.
In order to establish the magnitude of reward-driven distraction, we systemati-
cally compared the impact of high-reward distractors to low-reward (or neutral) 
distractors on cognitive performance across 91 studies (N = 2,362). These stud-
iÃÕÃi`>Ü`iÛ>ÀiÌÞvV}ÌÛiÌ>ÃÃ]ÃÕV>ÃÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀV>`VyVÌ«À-
cessing, and a wide variety of rewards, such as money, food, and people’s own 
>iÃ°/iiÌ>>>ÞÃÃÞi`i`>Ã}wV>ÌÌÕ}Ã>ivviVÌÃâi­-
r
.347), which implies that on average, presence of a high-reward distractor im-
pairs performance by just over one third of a standard deviation compared to 
low-reward or neutral distractors. This result indicates that high-reward distrac-
tors consistently impair people’s cognitive performance compared to low-re-
ward/neutral distractors across different paradigms and across different reward 
cues.
/Ã w`} >Ã > «ÀÌ>Ì ÌiÀiÌV> «V>Ì°ƂÃ Ìi`  Ìi ÌÀ-
duction, a traditional view sees attention as being modulated via two routes: a 
top-down route (in which current goals determine attentional selection) and a 
bottom-up route (in which physical salience determines attentional selection; 
Theeuwes, 2010a). Along with recent work (for reviews, see Anderson, 2016a; 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2017; Le Pelley et al., 2016), this meta-analysis supports 
the existence of a third route, by showing that attention can be modulated by 
rewards independently of people’s current goals, and independently of stim-
uli’s physical salience. Going beyond previous work, our analysis reveals that 
attention can be modulated by rewards in a broad collection of performance 
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situations. In these situations, reward-related stimuli may distract people from 
the current task, impeding their performance.
7iiÝ>i`Ìi}iiÀ>ÌÞvÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌLÞiÝ>}«Ìi-
tial moderators. Reward-driven distraction occurred on three (out of six) task 
categories; it occurred regardless of whether there was a clear task difference 
between learning and testing phases; and it occurred regardless of explicit 
ÃÌÀÕVÌÃ Ì }Ài Ìi `ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ° /iÃi ÌÀii w`}Ã ÃÕ}}iÃÌ Ì>Ì Ài-
Ü>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ>Ã>LÀ>`ÃV«i°7iÜÜ`ÃVÕÃÃÌiÃiw`}Ã
in greater detail.
In most previous experiments on reward-driven distraction, researchers used 
visual search tasks (Anderson, 2016b). These studies consistently show that 
visual attention is modulated by reward cues, even when these reward cues 
are irrelevant to the current search task (i.e., even when reward cues are not 
search targets). However, there is surprisingly little research on whether and 
how reward-driven distraction impacts other cognitive processes, beyond vi-
sual search (e.g., Failing & Theeuwes, 2015; Krebs et al., 2010; Le Pelley et al., 
2017). In our study, we found that reward-driven distraction was reliably pres-
ent not only in visual search, but also in rapid serial visual presentation tasks 
>`VyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ} Ì>ÃÃ°/Ãw`} ÃÕ}}iÃÌÃ Ì>Ì>Ì i>ÃÌ ÌÀii ÌÞ«iÃ
of cognitive processes can be perturbed by rewards. First, rewards guide sac-
cades, even when this potentially hampers task performance. Second, rewards 
modulate the time course of attention, potentially causing temporary blind 
spots (attentional blinks) right after rewards are presented. Third, rewards may 
L>ÃV}ÌÛiVÌÀ]VÀi>Ã}ÌiÃÌÀi}Ìv«ÌiÌ>ÀiÃ«ÃiVyVÌÃ°
Collectively, these three ways in which rewards may harm performance may 
emerge in many performance domains.
7ivÕ`ÃÞÃÌi>ÌViÛ`iVivÀÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÃ«>Ì>VÕi-
}]Õ`}iÌ]>`ÛÃÕ>iÀÞÌ>ÃÃ°ÕÀÛiÜ]ÌiÕw`}Ài>Ìi`Ì
spatial cueing is particularly interesting. After all, spatial cueing tasks should 
be sensitive to the same reward-driven processes that also affect visual search 
(Bourgeois et al., 2015; Munneke et al., 2015) – that is, reward drawing spatial 
>ÌÌiÌ>Ü>ÞvÀÌ>ÃÀiiÛ>ÌÃÌÕ°/ÃÕw`}VÕ`ÀiÃÕÌvÀÌi
difference in the timing of the distractor in the two tasks: while in search tasks 
the distractor is presented simultaneously with the target, in cueing tasks it 
is typically presented before the target. If the effect of reward on attention is 
rapid and short-lived, then it may dissipate by the time the target appears in a 
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VÕi}Ì>Ã°Ƃ>ÌiÀ>ÌÛi«ÃÃLÌÞÃÌ>ÌÌÃÕw`}VÕ`Ã«ÞLi>
consequence of low power: our meta-analysis included very few spatial cueing 
studies (n = 8) compared to visual search studies (n = 59). 
ƂÌÕ}Üi >Ûi  Ã«iVwV iÝ«>>Ì vÀ ÜÞÜi vÕ` > Ài>Lii-
ta-analytic reward-driven distraction effect in visual search tasks, but not spatial 
cuing tasks, we did further explore how reward-driven distraction was affected 
by whether distraction was spatial or non-spatial in nature. An outstanding the-
oretical question with regard to reward-driven distraction is whether reward-as-
sociated stimuli affect only shifts of spatial attention, which can quickly be 
corrected, or whether reward-related cues can also produce performance im-
pairments via other, non-spatial cognitive processes, such as temporal attention 
(Anderson et al., 2012; Failing & Theeuwes, 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2017; Sha & 
Jiang, 2016). Thus, we categorized tasks according to whether distraction was 
spatial (i.e., visual search, spatial cueing) and tested whether this dichotomous 
`iÀ>ÌÀyÕiVi`ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°/iÀiÃÕÌÃvÀÌÃ>>ÞÃÃ
suggest that the magnitude of the effect of reward-driven distraction is similar, 
regardless of whether it is spatial or non-spatial in nature.
ƂÌiÀw`}Ì>ÌÃÌÀi}ÌiÃÌi`i>Ì>ÌÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ>Ã>
broad scope is that reward-driven distraction did not seem to be tied to one 
context. In particular, we found reward-driven distraction regardless of wheth-
er the training and testing phases took place in the same context (e.g., both 
training and testing phases are visual search tasks) or different contexts (e.g., 
ÌiÌÀ>}«>ÃiÃ>ÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀVÌ>Ã]LÕÌÌiÌiÃÌ}«>ÃiÃ>y>iÀÌ>Ã®°
Thus, we found meta-analytic evidence for the idea that stimulus-reward-as-
sociations learned in one task can generalize to another, qualitatively different 
Ì>Ã°/Ãw`}«iÃÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À`>ÃÃV>ÌÃÌ>ÌÕ`iÀiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi
distraction may affect new situations and stimulus contexts (Anderson et al., 
2012). 
In further support of the idea that reward-driven distraction has a broad scope, 
we found that reward-driven distraction was present regardless of whether 
people were explicitly instructed to ignore these distractors. Based on the du-
al-mechanisms framework of cognitive control (Braver, 2012; Meiran, Pereg, 
Kessler, Cole, & Braver, 2015), we reasoned that explicit instructions may in-
duce proactive control in participants, which is characterized by strong mainte-
nance of goal-relevant information and less susceptibility to distraction. On this 
account, we might expect that explicit instructions would weaken the impact 
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of reward-associated distractors. Contrary to this idea, however, we found me-
ta-analytic evidence that explicit instructions to ignore distractors had no sig-
wV>ÌivviVÌÌi>}ÌÕ`ivÀiÜ>À`Ài>Ìi``ÃÌÀ>VÌ]ÃÕ}}iÃÌ}Ì>Ì
motivation to resist distracting events did not weaken the impact of distrac-
tors. This implies that reward-associated distractors are capable of penetrat-
}ÃÌÀ}]Ì«`Ü«ÀViÃÃiÃ]ÃÕLÃÌ>Ì>Ì}w`}ÃvÀ«ÀiÛÕÃÃÌÕ`iÃ
­Õii]	i«ÃÞ]E/iiÕÜiÃ]Óä£ÈÆÕiiiÌ>°]Óä£xÆ7>}]Õ>]
/iiÕÜiÃ]E<Õ]Óä£{Æ7>}iÌ>°]Óä£x®°
/}iÌiÀ]ÌiÃiw`}Ã«ÌÌÜ>À`ÃÌi`i>Ì>ÌÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ
is a domain-general and adaptable mechanism that is not restricted to certain 
Ã«iVwV iÝ«iÀiÌ> «ÀVi`ÕÀiÃ ­Ƃ`iÀÃ] Óä£ÈL® q >` ÌÕÃ] >Ã >Ü`i
scope. This provides prima facie evidence for the idea that reward-driven dis-
traction will exert meaningful effects in real-world situations. Distractions in 
real life come in all shapes and sizes: people encounter plenty of interruptions 
in the workplace (Czerwinski et al., 2004; Jett & George, 2003; Sykes, 2011) 
or get distracted by their smartphones (Kushlev et al., 2016; Stothart et al., 
2015; Thornton et al., 2014). Reward-driven mechanisms may contribute to the 
distraction that occurs under such circumstances (an idea which is, for exam-
ple, in line with recent thoughts about the nature of pervasive smartphone 
distractions; Oulasvirta, Rattenbury, Ma, & Raita, 2012). Future research could 
investigate the connection between reward-driven distraction and real-life dis-
tractions.
Aim 2: To examine an alternative explanation: have we been 
studying selection-driven distraction instead of reward-driven 
distraction?
Recent studies have raised doubt about whether prior work has been measur-
ing a reward-driven process after all (Anderson & Halpern, 2017; Le Pelley et 
al., 2015; Sha & Jiang, 2016). In particular, several past studies operationalized 
reward-driven distraction by comparing cognitive performance when there was 
a high-reward distractor to when there was no distractor present. However, as 
we laid out in the introduction, this operationalization has a major shortcoming: 
we cannot distinguish whether distraction here was indeed driven by rewards, 
or by selection history (Anderson & Halpern, 2017; Le Pelley et al., 2016; Sha 
& Jiang, 2016). Thus, the reward-driven distraction literature may have estab-
lished an effect that may not be explained by a pure reward-driven mechanism 
after all.
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To examine this issue, we systematically tested whether the use of this subop-
timal comparison matters for the conclusion researchers tend to draw about 
ÌiÀLÕÃÌiÃÃvÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°7iV«>Ài`ÌiivviVÌÃâiÃvÀ
studies that measured high-reward versus no distractors present (including only 
studies that used non-physically-salient distractors), to the effect sizes from 
studies that measured high-reward versus low-reward or neutral distractor (our 
À}>iÌ>>>ÞÌVivviVÌÃâiiÃÌ>Ìi®°7ivÕ`Ì>ÌÜiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛ-
en distraction is assessed with the suboptimal comparison that has alternative 
explanations (i.e., high-reward vs. no distractor present), the effect size of re-
ward-driven distraction may well be overestimated (potentially by 40%).
/}iÌiÀ]L>Ãi`ÌiÃiw`}Ã]ÌÃiiÃ«>ÕÃLiÌ>ÌÌiÜ>ÞÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃ
«iÀ>Ì>âiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÌiÀÃÌÕ`iÃ>ÌÌiÀÃ°7ÌV>ÕÌ]
we conclude that many previous studies could have overestimated the mag-
ÌÕ`ivÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ]>ÃÌiÃiÃÌÕ`iÃ½w`}ÃV>]«>ÀÌ]Li
explained from a selection-driven process. In order to avoid alternative expla-
nations in future studies, researchers should aim for selecting an operationali-
zation (i.e., by making a comparison between high-reward vs. low-reward dis-
tractors) that does not allow for alternative explanations (Anderson & Halpern, 
2017; Le Pelley et al., 2016, 2015; Sha & Jiang, 2016).
Aim 3: To provide methodological guidelines for studying  
reward-driven distraction
The general state of the literature
Publication bias is a prominent problem for meta-analysis because it leads to an 
overestimation of true effect sizes (Borenstein et al., 2011; Renkewitz & Keiner, 
2018). Therefore, in this meta-analysis, we assessed whether publication bias is 
iÞÌLi>«ÀLiÌiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÌiÀ>ÌÕÀi°7i>ÃÃiÃÃi`
publication bias with three different methods. Results from these methods con-
sistently demonstrated no evidence for bias. First, the funnel plot showed no 
>ÃÞiÌÀÞÌÌiÀ}Ì]ÃÕ}}iÃÌ}>««>ÀiÌL>ÃvÀ«ÃÌÛiw`}ÃÌi
literature (Egger et al., 1997; Sterne et al., 2011). Second, the fail-safe N meth-
od estimated that almost 7,500 hypothetical studies with null results should 
LiÃÌÌ}Ìiºwi`À>ÜiÀ»ÌV>}iÌiVVÕÃÃvÕÀiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ
(Rosenberg, 2005). Thus, our meta-analytic effect size can be considered to 
be quite robust. Finally, the p-curve analysis (Simonsohn et al., 2014a, 2014b, 
2015) showed that there is no sign of p-hacking in the reward-driven distraction 
literature and that the literature showed high evidential value for reward-driven 
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`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°/iÃiw`}ÃÌ}iÌiÀ`V>ÌiÌ>ÌÌiÌiÀ>ÌÕÀiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛ-
en distraction is in good health and that our meta-analytic effect size estimate 
is reliable.
7iÜiÜiÀiV`}>>ÀÌViÃvÀÌÃiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ]Üi``ÌVi>Vi>À
shortcoming of this body of literature, which is that the reporting of tests and 
effect sizes of reward-driven distraction is far from consistent across articles. For 
example, some papers report an omnibus test of the difference between high, 
low, reward and no distractors, other papers report only the comparison be-
tween high-reward versus low-reward distractors, and yet further papers zoom 
in on some other comparison (see Aim 2). In addition to the problems laid out 
in the previous section, this inconsistency in reporting is problematic in itself. 
In particular, in the absence of a clear reporting standard, it is impossible for 
Ài>`iÀÃÌ>ÃÃiÃÃÜVÃ«iVwV>>ÞÃÃÜ>ÃÕÃi`ÌÌiÃÌÌi>Þ«ÌiÃÃ
(Simonsohn et al., 2014a). In other words, in these studies, readers cannot be 
ÃÕÀiÜiÌiÀ > w`}Ü>Ã Ã«iVwV>Þ «Ài`VÌi` >«ÀÀ] ÀÜiÌiÀ ÌÜ>Ã
found only after (at least some) data exploration. In general, a lack of clarity 
regarding what analyses were planned has been argued to have contributed 
to the ‘replicability crisis’ in psychological science (Munafò et al., 2017). A po-
tential way to circumvent this issue would be using preregistration (Forstmeier, 
7>}i>iÀÃ]E*>ÀiÀ]Óä£Ç®°*ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀ}ÌiÞ«ÌiÃiÃ>`ÌiÃ«iVwV
>>ÞÃÃ«>vÀ>ÃÌÕ`ÞÜÕ`i«Vi>Þ`ÃÌ}ÕÃLiÌÜiiVwÀ>ÌÀÞ
and exploratory analyses, which is an important aspect of open science (Mu-
nafò et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 2015; Nosek, Ebersole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 
Óä£nÆ7>}i>iÀÃEÕÌ]Óä£È®°
Methodological choices
7i>ÃÃiÃÃi`ÜiÌiÀÌiiÌ`}V>VViÃ>`iLÞÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃyÕ-
iViÌi>}ÌÕ`ivÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°/ÃÕ>ÀâiÕÀ>w`-
ings: we found that the magnitude of reward-driven distraction is bigger when 
it is being assessed with a more direct measure of attention (eye movements) 
À>ÌiÀÌ>>`ÀiVÌi>ÃÕÀi­,/Ã]>VVÕÀ>VÞ®°7i``Ìw`Ì>ÌÌiÌÞ«iv
learning, type of reward, the ratio between high versus low-reward, the length 
of the training phase, type of stimulus feature that was paired with reward, or 
«ÞÃV>Ã>iVivÌi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀyÕiVi`Ìi>}ÌÕ`ivÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi
distraction.In line with a growing body of prior work (Donohue et al., 2016; Fail-
ing, Nissens, Pearson, Le Pelley, & Theeuwes, 2015; Koenig, Kadel, Uengoer, 
Schubo, & Lachnit, 2017; Le Pelley et al., 2017; Maclean & Giesbrecht, 2015; 
V
ÞE/iiÕÜiÃ]Óä£ÈÆ7>}]9Õ]E<Õ]Óä£Î®]ÜivÕ`iÌ>>>ÞÌV
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evidence for the idea that reward-associated distractors have an immediate, 
À>«`yÕiViÌiÛÃÕ>ÃÞÃÌi°«>ÀÌVÕ>À]ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÜ>Ã
much stronger when measured with a direct response (i.e., eye movements) 
rather than an indirect response, in which a skeletal muscle response is involved 
Ì­°i°]>Õ>ÀiÃ«ÃiÌiÃ®°/Ãw`}ÃVÃÃÌiÌÜÌÌi`i>Ì>Ì
ÀiÜ>À`Ài>Ìi` VÕiÃ iÝiÀÌ > Ài>ÌÛiÞ i>ÀÞ >` ÛÕÌ>ÀÞ yÕiVi Ìi
attentional system (cf. Theeuwes, 2010), such that their effect is more apparent 
in rapid, ‘online’ measures (like eye gaze), as compared to slower, downstream 
measures (like manual responses) which represent the end-point of a longer 
V>vV}ÌÛi«ÀViÃÃiÃ°"ÌÃ>VVÕÌ]ÌiyÕiVivÀiÜ>À`>ÃÃV-
ated distractions can be suppressed by voluntary, top-down control process-
es, but these processes take some time to operate and hence have a greater 
impact on slower forms of behavior. Consistent with this idea, recent studies 
of eye movements have demonstrated that reward-related distraction is most 
pronounced for the very fast eye movements that people make, and is weaker 
for slower responses (Failing et al., 2015; Pearson et al., 2016). Reward-asso-
ciated distractors, then, seem most harmful when they can impact early visual 
selection processes; at later stages, their impact is weakened.
Other methodological choices mattered less. The length of the training phase 
`` Ì `iÀ>Ìi Ìi >}ÌÕ`i v ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi `ÃÌÀ>VÌ° /Ã w`}
suggests that people learn reward-stimulus associations quite rapidly and that 
these associations have a persistent effect on attentional priority and there-
fore on cognitive performance (Anderson et al., 2011b). Moreover, the ratio 
of high versus low-reward magnitudes also did not moderate reward-driven 
`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°"i«ÃÃLi ÌiÀ«ÀiÌ>Ìv ÌÃ w`} Ã Ì>Ì iÛi Ài>ÌÛiÞ
small reward magnitudes are capable of modulating attentional processes and 
cognitive performance. Another possibility is that participants encode reward 
magnitudes in relative terms, effectively as ‘large’ versus ‘small’, and largely 
regardless of their absolute magnitudes. Future studies could investigate this 
issue further by comparing performance for three or more reward levels in the 
same study. 
Further, our meta-analysis found that the stimulus features of the reward-relat-
i``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ `` Ì Ã}wV>ÌÞ`iÀ>Ìi ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ iÌiÀ°
/>ÌÃ>`]ÌÃ«ÌiÌ>ÞÌiÀiÃÌ}Ì>ÌÃ}wV>ÌÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ
was present only when the reward-related feature of the distractor was color 
À«VÌÕÀi]LÕÌÌÜiÌÜ>ÃÀiÌ>Ì]ÃÕ`]ÀÃ>«i°/ÃVÕ`ÀiyiVÌ
a fundamental difference in the encoding processes for different stimulus fea-
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tures or could instead be a consequence of the rather low sample sizes for the 
latter categories (n = 5-6). In sum, reward-driven distraction seems to be con-
ÃÃÌiÌ>VÀÃÃ>ÞiÌ`}V>>ÌiÀ>ÌÃ>`ÌiÃiÀiÃÕÌÃwÌÜiÜÌ
our suggestion (see Aim 1) that reward-driven distraction is robust across tasks, 
stimuli, and contexts.
Results further showed that reward-driven distraction was present independent-
ly of whether the experiment used an instrumental or Pavlovian reward learning 
procedure. Thus, it seems that reward-driven distraction is robust regardless of 
whether participants have to respond to a cue to earn rewards, or whether the 
presence of a cue merely signals the magnitude of the available reward (e.g., 
Bucker & Theeuwes, 2016b, 2016a; Failing et al., 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015). 
These results demonstrate that reward-associated distractors are equally likely 
to capture attention regardless of how their reward value was acquired. Re-
ward-driven distraction is thus not contingent on a trained response to stimuli 
and seems to be independent of strategic attentional control (Bucker & Theeu-
wes, 2016b).
Additionally, we found that the effect of reward on attention was similar for 
physically salient and physically non-salient distractors. The implication of this 
w`}ÃÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À`>`«ÞÃV>Ã>iViiÝiÀÌ`i«i`iÌivviVÌÃ>ÌÌi-
tion, potentially by making additive contributions to the activity of a stimulus’s 
representation on a common attentional priority map (Anderson & Kim, 2019; 
Awh et al., 2012; Pearson et al., 2016).
>ÃÌÞ] ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ`iÃÌÃiiÌLi yÕiVi`LÞÜiÌiÀ
money or points serve as incentives during the task. In typical experiments on 
reward-driven distraction, participants can earn some sort of reward during the 
training phase. These rewards are often money cues, but recently, studies have 
VÀi>Ã}ÞÕÃi`«ÌÃ­«iÀ>«ÃLiV>ÕÃiÌiÞ>ÀiÀiVÃÌivwViÌ®Ì>Ì>Ài
later translated into some monetary bonus. As money cues are strong motiva-
tors (Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2012b; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010; Zedelius et 
al., 2014), one would assume that being directly presented with the amount of 
money during the experiment would lead to stronger cue-reward associations. 
Nevertheless, it seems that points, when they are used in a more symbolic way, 
>ÀiV>«>LivVÀi>Ì}VÕiÀiÜ>À`>ÃÃV>ÌÃ°/Ãw`}Ã «ÀÌ>ÌvÀ
future studies, as it suggests that researchers can potentially conduct experi-
iÌÃÀiVÃÌivwViÌÜ>ÞÃ°
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CONCLUSION
 i ÜÌ ÀiViÌ ÌiÀiÌV> `iÛi«iÌÃ  Ìi wi` ­Ƃ`iÀÃ] Óä£Î]
2016b; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017; Le Pelley et al., 2016), we show meta-analyt-
ic evidence for the idea that cognitive processes can be modulated by rewards, 
independently of current goals and physical salience – supporting the idea that 
we have to think beyond the top-down and bottom-up theoretical dichotomy 
when we want to explain attentional processes (Awh et al., 2012). Importantly, 
Ìiw`}Ì>ÌÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÜ>ÃÀLÕÃÌ>VÀÃÃ>Þ`vviÀiÌ«iÀ-
vÀ>ViÃÌÕ>ÌÃÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÌ>ÌÌ>Ã«V>ÌÃvÀÀi>viÃVi>ÀÃ°7i
suggest that research on real life distractions at the workplace (Jett & George, 
2003; Sykes, 2011), in academic settings (Sana et al., 2013; Shelton, Elliott, 
Eaves, & Exner, 2009), and by smartphones (Clayton et al., 2015; Kushlev et al., 
2016; Mehrotra et al., 2016; Oulasvirta et al., 2012; Stothart et al., 2015; Thorn-
ton et al., 2014) may use insights from the reward-driven literature to explain 
the mechanisms of those distractions.
2

CHAPTER 3 
Reward-Associated Distractors Can Harm 
Cognitive Performance
This chapter is based on: 4WU\&$KLNGXGNF'-QORKGT/#,

4GYCTFCUUQEKCVGFFKUVTCEVQTUECPJCTOEQIPKVKXGRGTHQTOCPEGPLoS ONE, 13,G
JVVRUFQKQTIJVVRUFQKQTILQWTPCNRQPG
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ABSTRACT
7i «i«i V>ÀÀÞ ÕÌ V}ÌÛi Ì>ÃÃ] ÌiÞ ÃiÌiÃ ÃÕvviÀ vÀ`ÃÌÀ>V-
tions, that is, drops in performance that occur close in time to task-irrelevant 
stimuli. In this research, we examine how the pursuit of rewards contributes to 
distractions. In two experiments, participants performed a math task (in which 
they could earn monetary rewards vs. not) while they were exposed to task-ir-
relevant stimuli (that were previously associated with monetary rewards vs. not). 
In Experiment 1, irrelevant cues that were previously associated with rewards 
(vs. not) impaired performance. In Experiment 2, this effect was only replicat-
ed when these reward-associated distractors appeared relatively early during 
Ì>Ã«iÀvÀ>Vi°7iÌiÀiÃÕÌÃÜiÀiÌÕÃÃiÜ>ÌÝi`]ÌiÞ}iiÀ>Þ
support the idea that reward associations can augment the negative effect of 
distractors on performance.
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REWARD-ASSOCIATED DISTRACTORS CAN HARM COGNI-
TIVE PERFORMANCE
ÃÌÀ>VÌÃ]ÜVÜi`iwi>Ã«iÀvÀ>Vi`iVÀiiÌÃÌ>ÌVVÕÀVÃiÞ>v-
ter the onset of a task-irrelevant stimulus, are believed to impair concentration 
and thwart people’s productivity (Carr, 2011a; Gazzaley & Rosen, 2016; Has-
san, 2011). For instance, interruptions from colleagues harm work productivity 
(Sykes, 2011), using one’s laptop or smartphone during lectures is related to 
worse academic outcomes (Samaha & Hawi, 2016; Sana et al., 2013), and using 
one’s smartphone during driving can lead to fatal consequences (Caird et al., 
2014). Although the negative consequences are well established, the underly-
ing cognitive/attentional mechanisms of distractions are not yet entirely clear.
In the past, distractions have been mostly seen as originating from a stimu-
lus-driven (i.e., bottom-up) attentional mechanism. That is, stimuli that are 
physically salient (e.g., because of their abrupt onsets (Yantis & Jonides, 1984) 
or distinctive colors (Theeuwes, 1992) are more likely to attract attention – even 
if these stimuli are irrelevant for the task at hand. This attentional mechanism 
can explain, for example, why a blinking smartphone screen (with an abrupt on-
set and distinctive color) attracts attention away from attending to a lecture or 
driving a car. Recent research, however, shows that physical salience alone may 
not be able to fully explain distractions. There is rapidly growing evidence that 
the extent to which task-irrelevant cues grab attention also depends on how 
much value people associate with those task-irrelevant cues (Anderson et al., 
2011b; Bourgeois et al., 2015; Hickey & van Zoest, 2013; Le Pelley et al., 2015; 
/iiÕÜiÃE	i«ÃÞ]Óä£Ó®°ÌiÃiÃÌÕ`iÃ]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃwÀÃÌi>Ài`Ì>Ã-
sociate some stimulus features (i.e., color) with the delivery of valuable rewards 
(i.e., earning money). Later, in a test phase, they performed a visual search 
task, while the previously reward associated cues reappeared as distractors that 
needed to be ignored. These studies repeatedly found that participants’ atten-
tion was captured by previously-rewarded stimuli, even though these stimuli 
were completely irrelevant to the task that needed to be done.
7i ÌiivviVÌv ÀiÜ>À`>ÃÃV>Ìi``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ ÃÜiiÃÌ>LÃi` >ÌÌi-
tional and visual search tasks (c.f., Anderson, 2016; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017; 
i*iiÞ]ÌVi]	iiÃiÞ]iÀ}i]E7Ã]Óä£È®] viÜiÀÃÌÕ`iÃ ÛiÃÌ}>Ì-
ed how reward-associated distractors impact other cognitive processes (Infanti 
et al., 2015; Krebs et al., 2010). Because real-life tasks (e.g., taking an exam, 
writing a paper) often involve a large set of cognitive control operations (e.g., 
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maintenance and updating of goal relevant information) beyond visual atten-
tion, it is important to investigate whether the impact of reward-related dis-
tractors is generalizable across different cognitive operations (Anderson et al., 
2012; Hickey et al., 2015; Lee & Shomstein, 2014). If this possibility was true, it 
would suggest that reward-driven distractions have important implications for 
real-life settings at work, education, and driving, in which optimal performance 
ÀiµÕÀiÃViÌÀ>iÝiVÕÌÛiÀiÃÕÀViÃ­	>V]Óää®°/iwÀÃÌ>vÌÃÃÌÕ`Þ]
therefore, is to expand the existing literature and investigate whether the nega-
tive effect of reward-related distractors (i.e., reward-driven distraction) extends 
to cognitive control operations.
The second aim of this study is to test whether different motivational states in-
yÕiViÌÃÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌivviVÌ°/>ÌÃ]vÌiiÝÌiÌÌÜV«i-
ple get distracted is dependent on how much value they associate with distrac-
tors, it should also matter how much value they associate to the current task. 
That is, people are expected to try to optimize performance (i.e., to exploit) 
in a task as long as this task yields more valuable outcomes than its potential 
alternatives (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Cohen et al., 2007). In line with this 
idea, Müller and colleagues (Müller et al., 2007) found that monetary incentives 
can reduce the impact of distractors and help the maintenance of task-relevant 
information, which leads to better performance. However, when the outcome 
value of the task decreases, people become less motivated and tend to search 
for (i.e., to explore) alternative behaviors that could provide higher value to 
them—eventually leading to distraction from the primary task (Aston-Jones & 
Cohen, 2005). Based on this line of reasoning, we tested whether distraction 
by reward-related cues is especially strong in situations when the task does not 
yield any valuable outcomes – in other words, we predicted that reward-driven 
distraction is most pronounced when people are not motivated to pursue the 
current task. 
To test these ideas, we developed a new experimental task, building on previ-
ÕÃÀiÃi>ÀV­Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°]Óä££LÆi*iiÞiÌ>°]Óä£x®°ÃÀÌ]ÌiwÀÃÌ
part of the task, participants learned to associate different colors with mone-
tary (vs. no monetary) rewards. Later, in a second part, they were solving math 
problems while the previously reward-associated colors reappeared, but this 
time they had to be ignored. To manipulate participant’s motivational states, 
some of the math problems were incentivized with monetary rewards. Now, we 
ÌÀ`ÕViÕÀiÝ«iÀiÌ>Ì>Ã`iÌ>]>ÞÕÌÕÀÃ«iVwV«Ài`VÌÃ]>`
present results from two experiments.

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THE EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
Reward learning phase
In this task, we adopted a well-established reward learning and testing proce-
dure (Anderson et al., 2011b; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 
2012). In the learning phase, each trial consisted of four stimulus-pairs: a let-
ter and a digit presented in close proximity (see Figure 3.1). Participants’ task 
Ü>ÃÌ `V>ÌiÜiÌiÀ Ìi iÌÌiÀÃ ­i°}°]7]8]9]<®>««i>Ài`  ÌiVÀÀiVÌ
alphabetical order. One of these letters was always colored in either red or 
blue. Although participants were told that they could earn money based on 
correct responses, their reward was also dependent on the colored letter in the 
sequence. That is, a red letter always predicted earning high rewards (+ 8 eu-
rocents), whereas blue always predicted no rewards (+ 0 eurocents) at the end 
vÌiÌÀ>­ÌiVÀÃÜiÀiVÕÌiÀL>>Vi`>VÀÃÃ«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ®°7iiÝ«iVÌi`
that via repeated exposure (150 trials), participants learn to associate rewards 
to these colors, and these colors, in turn, gain attentional processing priority – a 
mechanism that has been repeatedly demonstrated in previous research (An-
derson, Laurent, et al., 2014; Failing et al., 2015; Hickey et al., 2010a; Maclean 
& Giesbrecht, 2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012). In other words, by repeat-
ed pairing with reward, these colors would become more salient and therefore 
would attract attention more than other stimuli. 
Reward-driven distraction phase
Our main objective was to examine whether these reward-associated cues 
harm performance in a complex task. For this purpose, we chose a math task 
that requires a broad set of cognitive functions that people use at work and 
education (DeStefano & LeFevre, 2004). In this phase, participants again saw 
sequences of four stimulus-pairs: a digit and a letter presented in close proxim-
ity (see Figure 3.2). This time they had to add up the digits and report their sum. 
Importantly, in the sequence, one of the letters was presented in the previously 
reward- (vs. no reward) associated color. These colored letters were now task-ir-
relevant, so they needed to be ignored.
In general, we expected that colored letters that were associated high (vs. no) 
ÀiÜ>À`Ã]ÜÕ`«>À«iÀvÀ>Vi°-«iVwV>Þ]Ì}iÌ>Ã}ÌvÌÃ«iÀvÀ-
mance decrement, we have to zoom in the exact procedure of a trial. First of all, 
trials were not self-paced, meaning that the digits were presented in a limited 
3
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time window (700 ms/digit). So, participants had to perform mental additions 
rather quickly. This was especially demanding during presentation of the sec-
ond and third stimulus pair, in which participants had to (a) keep mental rep-
resentations of the targets active (i.e., maintain the sum of the previous digits in 
working memory), while (b) update this mental representation with new target 
information (i.e., the next digit in the sequence). Reward-associated distractors 
appeared during these stimulus pairs. Importantly, as working memory prioritiz-
es processing reward related information (Gong & Li, 2014; Klink et al., 2017), 
we expected that previously reward-associated distractors would be prioritized 
in working memory over the target digits. Consequently, there would be less 
capacity available to encode target digits, which would weaken the mental 
Ài«ÀiÃiÌ>ÌÃvÌiÃi`}ÌÃ>`ÜÕ`>iÌÀi`vwVÕÌÌÕ«`>ÌiÌi
representation with the subsequent digit, especially given the limited available 
time. If mental representations would indeed become weaker because of the 
reward-associated distractors, participants simply would not be able to com-
pute the upcoming mental operation within the allotted time, which would 
result in an incorrect response. Therefore, we operationalized performance as 
the percentage of accurate responses on the math task. 
7i>ÃÌiÃÌi`ÜiÌiÀÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÜÕ`LiiÃ«iV>ÞÃÌÀ}
when people are not motivated to perform the task. In order to test this pos-
sibility, we manipulated participant’s motivational states in the test phase by 
using a monetary reward procedure (e.g., Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2009, 
2011, 2012a). That is, before the trial started, participants were told that they 
VÕ`i>ÀÓäiÕÀViÌÃvÀ>VÀÀiVÌÀiÃ«Ãi°7iiÝ«iVÌi`Ì>Ì«ÀÃ}
monetary rewards would induce a high-motivation state, which has shown to 
boost cognitive resources and effort to perform the task (Botvinick & Braver, 
2015; Pessoa, 2009; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). In turn, we expected that this 
high motivational state would shield mental representations of goal-relevant in-
formation from distraction (Müller et al., 2007; Steinborn, Langner, & Huesteg-
ge, 2017). In sum, we expected that high motivational states would suppress 
reward-driven distraction. 
Hypotheses
In line with decades of research (e.g., Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2012b; Gar-
bers & Konradt, 2014; Liljeholm & O’Doherty, 2012; Zedelius et al., 2014), we 
hypothesize that people are more accurate in the math task when they can earn 
monetary rewards (Hypothesis 1). Second, more importantly, we hypothesize 
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that people are less accurate on the math task when they are exposed to dis-
tractors that were previously associated with high (vs. no) rewards (Hypothesis 
2). Finally, we hypothesize that people are less accurate when they are exposed 
to distractors that were previously associated with high (vs. no) rewards, espe-
cially when their current task does not yield rewarding outcomes (Hypothesis 3). 
Exploring reward-driven distraction
In addition to testing our hypotheses, we also explored two different aspects 
of our paradigm. First, we explored whether the timing of reward-associated 
distractors mattered. That is, we explored whether disruptions in performance 
were stronger when the previously reward-associated distractors appeared ear-
ly (i.e., during the second stimulus pair) vs. late (during the third stimulus pair). 
	iV>ÕÃi«i«i>VÌÛiÞÌÀÌiÌiyÜviÛiÌÃ>`Õ«`>ÌiÌiÀiÝ-
«iVÌ>VÞ>LÕÌvÕÌÕÀiiÛiÌÃ­>}iÀ]-ÌiLÀ]
>ÌÌiÀii]-ÌÕÀ]E7-
es, 2010; Miller & Schröter, 2002; Steinborn & Langner, 2011), the timing of 
distractors may well affect reward-driven distractions.
-iV`] Üi iÝ«Ài` ÜiÌiÀ ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi `ÃÌÀ>VÌ yÕiVi` «iÀvÀ-
mance stability/reliability. That is, on top of traditional performance measures 
(i.e., response times and accuracy), we computed performance variability. In-
deed, previous research implies that high motivational states lead to more sta-
Li«iÀvÀ>Vi­°i°] iÃÃyÕVÌÕ>ÌÃ «iÀvÀ>ViÆ->`iÀÃ]£nÆ-Ìi-
born et al., 2017). Based on this idea, it is plausible that increased motivation 
does not just have a general effect on accuracy, but that it reduces the frequen-
cy of distractions and thus improves performance stability.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants and design
This research has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Social Science 
>VÕÌÞ­
-7Óä£Çänäxxä®°
Forty-seven students from Radboud University participated in the current 
study. Students could participate if they (a) slept at least six hours during the 
night before the experiment, (b) were not colorblind, and (c) were native Dutch 
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speakers could participate. After data collection, three participants neverthe-
less reported to have slept less than six hours, so they were excluded from the 
w>>>ÞÃÃ°ÀiÛiÀ] vÜ}Ã>À«ÀÀÃÌÕ`iÃ ­i°}°]Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°]
2014; Failing et al., 2015; Hickey et al., 2010; Maclean & Giesbrecht, 2015), we 
iÝVÕ`i`i«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜ«iÀvÀi`LiÜÈä¯>VVÕÀ>VÞ°7i``ÌÃ
iÝVÕÃÌ>iÃÕÀiÌ>ÌÌiw>Ã>«iVÃÃÌi`Þv«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜ
ÜiÀiV>«>Liv«iÀvÀ} Ìi Ì>Ã°ƂÃ ÃÕV] Ìiw> Ã>«iVÃÃÌi`v
ÌÀÌÞwÛiÃÌÕ`iÌÃ­ÓÈvi>iÃ>`>iÃÆi>>}irÓÓ°ÎÞi>ÀÃ]-rÎ°Ç®°
Participants received compensation in the form of a gift voucher based on their 
performance (ranging from 7.5 – 12.5 €). The study used a 2(task value: low vs. 
high) × 2(distractor value: low vs. high) within-subjects design.
Procedure
Participants were seated in a cubicle in front of a computer. First, they signed 
>VÃiÌ vÀ>`wi`ÕÌ>µÕiÃÌ>Ài>ÃÃiÃÃ}`i}À>«VÃ ­>}i]
sex), hours of sleep at the previous night, and their need for money on a 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very much) scale (“To what extent are you in need for money at 
ÌiiÌ¶»®°ƂvÌiÀÜ>À`Ã]ÌiÞV>ÀÀi`ÕÌÌiÌ>Ã­ÃiiLiÜ®°>Þ]ÌiÞ
reported on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale how motivated and fatigued 
ÌiÞÜiÀi>`Ü`i>`}>``vwVÕÌÌiÞviÌÌiÌ>ÃÜ>Ã­vÀ`iÃVÀ«-
ÌÛiÃÌ>ÌÃÌVÃ]Ãii/>LiÎ°£®°/iiÝ«iÀiÌÌ{äÕÌiÃÌwÃ°1«
completion of the experiment, they were given the money they earned during 
the task.
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics of Subjective Measures separately for Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Subjective Measures M SD M SD
Sleep (hours) 7.84 0.76 7.83 0.91
Task demands (1-7) 5.69 1.13 5.35 1.20
6CUMFKHƂEWNV[
 4.74 1.36 4.74 1.50
(CVKIWG
 4.34 1.08 4.04 1.30
/QVKXCVKQP
 6.11 0.90 6.11 0.84
0GGFHQTOQPG[
 5.0 1.46 4.33 1.58

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Task
Stimuli
The task was designed with E-prime 2.0. Our stimuli were made up of letters 
and numbers presented in font size 24 in the middle of a monitor screen with a 
resolution of 1920x1080 pixels.
Training phase
*>ÀÌV«>ÌÃwÀÃÌÃ>Ü>wÝ>ÌVÀÃÃ]ÌivÕÀÃiµÕiÌ>`Ã«>ÞÃv>ÕLiÀ
>`>iÌÌiÀ«ÀiÃiÌi`­i°}°]n7]8x]9]>`<ÇÆÃii}ÕÀiÎ°£®°ÌÃ«>Ãi]
letters were the targets and participants were instructed to report whether 
ÌiÞÜiÀiÌiVÀÀiVÌ>«>LiÌV>À`iÀ­i°}°]7]8]9]<®°/iÞÀiÃ«`i`
LÞ«ÀiÃÃ}º+» vÀ VÀÀiVÌ>`º*» vÀ VÀÀiVÌ ÌÀ>Ã°">vv Ìi ÌÀ>Ã
(n = 75), one of the letters had a different color. This colored letter could appear 
either on the second or the third sub-trial. If this letter was blue (or red, coun-
terbalanced across participants), participants could earn a monetary reward (8 
cents). If it was red (or blue, counterbalanced), participants could earn no mon-
etary reward. On low-value trials (e.g., red), responses were followed by visual 
vii`L>V `V>Ì} º`» À º>Ãi»° }ÀiÜ>À` ÌÀ>Ã ­i°}°] LÕi® ÜiÀi
additionally followed by reward feedback (+ 8 cents) and the total amount that 
has been earned during the task so far. Participants were not informed about 
the reward contingency beforehand. There was a 500 ms break in between 
trials. In total, participants completed 4 practice trials and one block of 150 
training trials.
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Figure 3.1. Sequence of events in the training phase. (A) An example of a no reward trial, 
ÜiÀiÌiÀi`VÀi`iÌÌiÀº8»«Ài`VÌi`ÀiÜ>À`°­	®ƂiÝ>«iv>}ÀiÜ>À`ÌÀ>]
ÜiÀiÌiLÕiVÀi`iÌÌiÀº9»«Ài`VÌi`}ÀiÜ>À`­nViÌÃ®°
Test phase
After the training phase, participants directly started the test phase. First, they 
received instructions and then immediately started the math task. Participants 
wÀÃÌÃ>Ü>wÝ>ÌVÀÃÃ°/i]ÌiÞÃ>ÜÌiiÌ>ÀÞÀiÜ>À`Ì>ÌÌiÞVÕ`
earn by responding correctly on that trial (see Figure 3.2). On half of the trials, 
participants could earn money (up to 20 cents); on the other half of the trials, 
they could not (0 cent). Subsequently, participants saw four displays, like in 
ÌiÌÀ>}«>Ãi]i>VÃÜ}>ÕLiÀ>`>iÌÌiÀ­i°}°]n7]8x]9]>`
Z7). In this part, numbers were the targets and participants were instructed to 
report whether the sum of the presented numbers (e.g., 8 + 5 + 9 + 7 = 29) 
was higher or lower than the number presented in the next display (e.g., 28). 
/iÞ ÀiÃ«`i`LÞ«ÀiÃÃ}º+» vÀ Ã>iÀ >`º*» vÀ >À}iÀ ÃÕÃ ­Ó Ã
L}}iÀÌ>Ón]ÃÌiVÀÀiVÌÀiÃ«ÃiÜÕ`Liº*»®°"Ì>ÃÛ>ÕiÌÀ-

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>Ã]ÀiÃ«ÃiÃÜiÀivÜi`LÞÛÃÕ>vii`L>V`V>Ì}º`»Àº>Ãi»°
High task value trials were additionally followed by reward feedback (e.g., + 16 
cents) and the total amount that has been earned during the task so far (e.g., 
4.54 €). The amount that could be won on a certain trial decreased with time 
(Bijleveld et al., 2011), so fast responses were encouraged. There was a 500 
ms break in between trials. Identical to the training phase, on half of the trials, 
one letter was always red and the other half of the trials one letter was always 
blue (again, these colored letters could only appear either on the second or the 
third sub-trial). In this case, the letters served as task-irrelevant stimuli, previ-
ously associated with monetary (vs. no monetary) rewards. In total, participants 
completed 10 practice and one block of 64 test trials (16 trials per condition).
Figure 3.2. Sequence of events in the test phase. Examples of high or no task value trials 
ÜÌ­Ƃ®>`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ­i°}°]VÀÀi`º8»®Ì>ÌÜ>Ã«ÀiÛÕÃÞ>ÃÃV>Ìi`ÜÌÀiÜ>À`­	®>
`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ­i°}°]VÀLÕiº9»®Ì>ÌÜ>Ã«ÀiÛÕÃÞ>ÃÃV>Ìi`ÜÌ}ÀiÜ>À`°
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Results
Data treatment and performance measures
Responses that were three standard deviations faster or slower than the par-
ticipant’s mean and responses (based on e.g., Anderson & Yantis, 2012; As-
geirsson & Kristjánsson, 2014; Bourgeois et al., 2015) faster than 300 ms (which 
were considered guesses) were deleted, which resulted in the exclusion of 5% 
of trials. For each condition, we computed three performance measures. First, 
our major performance measure was accuracy, which indicated the percentage 
of correct responses on the math task. Second, although we did not expect an 
effect of task value or distractor value on participants’ speed, we explored this 
variable. So, we computed response times mean (RTM) to explore the average 
response speed on the math task. Third, we explored performance variability. 
/>ÌÃ]ÜiV«ÕÌi`,/VivwViÌvÛ>À>Ì­,/
6®Ì>ÃÃiÃÃÀi>ÌÛiÃ«ii`
variability on the math task – based on suggestions from prior work (Flehmig, 
-ÌiLÀ]>}iÀ]-Vâ]E7iÃÌvv]ÓääÇÆ-ÌiLÀiÌ>°]Óä£Ç®° iÌiÀ
,/]À,/
6ÜiÀiyÕiVi`LÞÌ>Ã>``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÛ>Õi>«Õ>ÌÃ­>
ps > .05; see descriptive statistics in Table 3.2, see S1 Appendix for RT analy-
ses, see Table 3.3 for variability analyses).
Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics of outcome measures separately for Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2.
Experiment 1 Accuracy (%) RT (ms) Variability (%)
M SD M SD M SD
No Task Value No Distractor Value 77.7 12.7 996 509 41.94 17.32
High Distractor Value 74.7 14.9 1008 466 39.67 15.78
High Task Value No Distractor Value 81.1 11.1 1038 614 38.89 18.75
High Distractor Value 77.8 14.6 1044 776 36.46 16.01
Experiment 2 Accuracy (%) RT (ms) Variability (%)
M SD M SD M SD
No Task Value No Distractor Value 73.0 14.9 1103 487 41.15 17.36
High Distractor Value 73.0 15.6 1111 463 41.81 17.89
High Task Value No Distractor Value 78.5 13.5 1149 517 41.25 19.18
High Distractor Value 77.5 13.1 1174 564 40.25 16.34

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Table 3.3. Results of the Experimental Effects on Accuracy and Performance Variability both 
in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
Experiment 1 Accuracy Variability
dfs F p ɻ2 F p ɻ2
1. Task Value 1,34 6.92 .013 .030 2.10 .157 .027
2. Distractor Value 1,34 11.66 .002 .030 2.29 .139 .015
3. Task Value × Distractor 
value
1,34 .79 .380 .003 .002 .963 < .001
4. Distractor value × 
Timing
1,34 .98 .329 < .001 .958 .334 < .001
Experiment 2
1. Task Value 1,65 8.65 .005 .001 .139 .711 < .001
2. Distractor Value 1,65 .13 .721 < .001 .016 .899 < .001
3. Task Value × Distractor 
value
1,65 .22 .644 < .001 .437 .511 < .001
4. Distractor value × 
Timing
1,65 4.52 .037 .011 .204 .653 < .001
%QPƂTOCVQT[CPCN[UGU
To test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, we performed a GLM analysis with task value 
(high vs. no) and distractor value (high vs. no) as within subject independent 
variables, and accuracy scores as dependent variable (see Figure 3.3A). Effect 
sizes were calculated based on Lakens 2013 (Lakens, 2013). In line with Hypoth-
iÃÃ£]Ìi>ivviVÌvÌ>ÃÛ>ÕiÜ>ÃÃ}wV>Ì]F(1, 34) = 6.92, p = .013, 
ɻ2 = .03, indicating that participants were more accurate when they could earn 
money (vs. no money; see Table 3.2 for descriptive statistics). The main effect 
v`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÛ>ÕiÜ>Ã>Ã Ã}wV>Ì]F(1, 34) = 11.66, p = .002, ɻ2 = .03, 
showing that people were less accurate when they were exposed to a high (vs. 
no) value distractor (in line with Hypothesis 2). The Task value × Distractor value 
ÌiÀ>VÌÜ>ÃÌÃ}wV>Ì]F(1, 34) = .79, p = .380, ɻ2 = .003 – thus showing 
no support for Hypothesis 3.
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Figure 3.3. Results of Experiment 1. (A) Accuracy scores for no (grey bars) vs. high (black 
bars) value distractor trials both in no vs. high task value conditions. (B) Mean accuracy scores 
by distractor value (high vs. low) on all trials (Overall), on trials where the distractor appeared 
i>ÀÞ]>`ÌÀ>ÃÜiÀiÌi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ>««i>Ài`>Ìi°ÀÀÀL>ÀÃÀiyiVÌÃÌ>`>À`iÀÀÀÃ°
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7ivÕÀÌiÀiÝ«Ài`ÜiÌiÀ«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ½­>®ii`vÀiÞ­Ài«ÀÌi`-Ó
Ƃ««i`Ý®>`­L®i>ÀÞÛÃ°>Ìi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ>««i>À>Vi>vviVÌi`ÌiÀiÃÕÌÃ°7i
corrected for multiple testing by applying Pocock’s boundary (Pocock, 1977) 
for four sequential analyses (i.e., same GLM 4 times: people low in need for 
money, people high in need for money, early trials, and late trials) by lowering 
the alpha level from 0.05 to 0.0182 – a procedure suggested by Lakens & Etz 
(2017).
Exploratory analysis: distractor timing
7iiÝ>i`ÜiÌiÀÌiÌ}v­}ÛÃ°ÀiÜ>À`®`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃÌiÃi-
quence moderated the effect of distractor value. To test this, we performed the 
same GLM analyses as above, but now also including Distractor timing (early 
ÛÃ° >Ìi® >Ã > >``Ì>ÜÌÃÕLiVÌÃ«Ài`VÌÀ°7i Ã«iVwV>Þ iÝ>i`
the Distractor timing × Distractor value interaction, F(1, 34) = .98, p = .329, 
ɻ2°ää£]ÜVÜ>ÃÌÃ}wV>Ì­Ãii}ÕÀiÎ°Î	®°-]ÜivÕ`Vi>À
evidence for the idea that high (vs. no) value distractors affected performance 
differently based on whether it appeared early or late.
For consistency with Experiment 2 (see below), we further explored the data 
and ran our original GLM with a particular interest for the main effect of distrac-
tor value, separately for trials in which the distractor appeared early (i.e., in the 
second stimulus screen) vs. late (i.e., in the third stimulus screen). On early dis-
tractor trials, participants were less accurate on high (M = 76%, SD = 16%) vs. 
no reward distractor (M = 81%, SD = 16%) conditions, F(1, 34) = 6.21, p = .018, 
ɻ2 = .025. On late distractor trials, the main effect of distractor value was not 
Ã}wV>Ì]F(1, 34) = 3.30, p = .078, ɻ2 < .001.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 provide initial evidence for a motivational perspec-
tive on distraction. In line with Hypothesis 1, we found that people were more 
accurate when they could earn money on the task. This is consistent with the 
idea that motivation (e.g., monetary incentives) boost cognitive control pro-
cesses that lead to better performance on cognitive tasks (Pessoa & Engel-
mann, 2010).
In line with Hypothesis 2, we found that people were less accurate when they 
were exposed to irrelevant cues that were previously associated with high 
3
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­ÛÃ°®ÀiÜ>À`°/Ãw`}ÃÕ««ÀÌÃÌi `i>Ì>Ì ­>®`ÃÌÀ>VÌ>ÞLiÀi-
ward-driven (Anderson, 2016b; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017) (b) that reward-as-
sociated distractors interfere with the active, ongoing maintenance of task rel-
iÛ>ÌvÀ>Ì>`ÌÕÃ«>ÀV}ÌÛi«iÀvÀ>Vi°7iÜ>Ìi`ÌLiÌÌiÀ
understand when these reward-associated distractors harm task performance 
the most. So, we further explored whether the timing of distractors moderated 
this reward-driven distraction effect, but found no evidence for the possibility.
Finally, contrary to Hypothesis 3, we found that participants were no more likely 
to be distracted (by high-reward distractors) when they were in a high (vs. low) 
motivational state. In order to investigate whether the results were replicable, 
we conducted another experiment on an independent sample. Before the start 
of data collection, we preregistered Experiment 2, a direct replication of Exper-
iment 1 at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/y74kx/®°-«iVwV>Þ]Üi
pre-registered our hypotheses, the planned sample size, and the analysis plan. 
As it is important to distinguish between analyses that were planned before vs. 
not (Munafò et al., 2017), we present analyses that were preregistered as con-
wÀ>ÌÀÞ>`>>ÞÃiÃÌ>ÌÜiÀiÌ«ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀi`>ÃiÝ«À>ÌÀÞ°

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EXPERIMENT 2
Method
The design, procedure, and task were identical to Experiment 1. The prereg-
istration, experimental materials, and the data can be found in OSF (https://
osf.io/y74kx/®°7iV`ÕVÌi`>«ÜiÀ>>ÞÃÃÜÌ«Ãi­ÕE*>`Ã]
Óä£x®]ÜVÃÕ}}iÃÌi`Ì>Ì>Ã>«iÃâiv rx{ÃÕ`LiÃÕvwViÌÌ
detect all effects of interest with power = .90. Because of our rather strict ex-
clusion criteria (see below), we wanted to be on the safe side. Therefore, we 
recruited seventy-three students from Radboud University. The same a priori 
exclusion criteria were applied as in Experiment 1. One participant reported 
Ì Ãii« iÃÃ Ì> È ÕÀÃ `ÕÀ} Ìi }Ì LivÀi Ìi iÝ«iÀiÌ >` wÛi
participants performed below 60% accuracy, so they were excluded from the 
w>>>ÞÃÃ°/iw>Ã>«iVÃÃÌi`vÃÝÌÞÃÝÃÌÕ`iÌÃ­xävi>iÃ>`
16 males; mean age = 23.4, SD = 5.4). For descriptive statistics of subjective 
measures, see Table 3.1. Participants received monetary compensation in the 
form of a gift voucher based on performance (ranging from 7.5 – 12.5 €).
Results
Responses that were three standard deviations faster or slower than the partici-
pant’s mean and responses faster than 300 ms (which were considered guesses) 
were deleted, which resulted in the exclusion of 2% of trials. As pre-registered, 
to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, we performed a GLM analysis with task value 
(high vs. no) and distractor value (high vs. no) as within-subject independent 
variables, and accuracy scores (percentage of correct responses) as the de-
pendent variable (see Figure 3.4A).
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Figure 3.4. Results of Experiment 2. (A) Accuracy scores for no (grey bars) vs. high (black 
bars) value distractor trials both in no vs. high task value conditions. (B) Mean accuracy scores 
by distractor value (high vs. no) on all trials (Overall), on trials where the distractor appeared 
i>ÀÞ]>`ÌÀ>ÃÜiÀiÌi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ>««i>Ài`>Ìi°ÀÀÀL>ÀÃÀiyiVÌÃÌ>`>À`iÀÀÀÃ°
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wÀ>ÌÀÞ>>ÞÃiÃ
In line with Hypothesis 1, replicating results of Experiment 1, the main effect of 
Ì>ÃÛ>ÕiÜ>ÃÃ}wV>Ì]F(1, 65) = 8.65, p = .005, ɻ2 = .001, indicating that 
participants were more accurate when they could earn money (vs. no money; 
see Table 3.2 for descriptive statistics). Unlike in Experiment 1, the main effect 
v`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÛ>ÕiÜ>ÃÌ Ã}wV>Ì]F(1, 65) = .13, p = .721, ɻ2 < .001, – 
showing no support for Hypothesis 2. As in Experiment 1, the interaction effect 
Ü>Ã>ÃÌÃ}wV>Ì]F(1, 65) = .22, p = .644, ɻ2 < .001 (i.e., no support for 
Hypothesis 3).
Exploratory analyses on participants’ response times and need for money are 
in S1 Appendix and S2 Appendix. Like in Experiment 1, we corrected for mul-
tiple testing by applying Pocock’s boundary (Pocock, 1977) for four sequential 
analyses (i.e., same GLM 4 times: people low in need for money, people high 
in need for money, early trials, and late trials) by lowering the alpha level from 
0.05 to 0.0182.
Ý«À>ÌÀÞ>>ÞÃÃ\`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÌ}
7i À>ÕÀ À}>]LÕÌ Ü >``i``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ Ì} >Ã > v>VÌÀ° /i
ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÌ}ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÛ>ÕiÌiÀ>VÌÜ>ÃÃ}wV>Ì]F(1, 65) = 4.52, 
p = .037, ɻ2 = .011, suggesting that the timing of the distractor moderated the 
effect of distractor value. Follow up analyses revealed that, the main effect of 
`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÛ>ÕiÜ>ÃiÌiÀÃ}wV>Ìi>ÀÞ`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÌÀ>Ã]F(1, 65) = 3.47, 
p = .067, ɻ2 < .001, nor on late-distractor trials, F(1, 65) = 1.34, p = .251, ɻ2 < 
.001.
In short, in Experiment 2, while the Timing × Distractor value interaction was 
Ã}wV>Ì]ÜivÕ`>ivviVÌv`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÛ>ÕiÃi«>À>ÌiÞi>ÀÞ>`
late timing trials. On the contrary, in Experiment 1, the Timing × Distractor val-
ÕiÌiÀ>VÌÜ>ÃÌÃ}wV>Ì]LÕÌÌii>ÀÞ«>VÌv`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃÃiii`
stronger than late. To provide the most reliable effect size estimates we can 
provide at this point, we re-ran the analysis on the pooled data from both 
iÝ«iÀiÌÃ]>«ÀVi`ÕÀiÃÕ}}iÃÌi`LÞ>iÃ ­>iÃ]Óä£{®°7iiÝ«Ài`
ÌiÃÌÀ>VÌÀÌ}ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÛ>ÕiÌiÀ>VÌ]ÜVÜ>ÃÃ}wV>Ì]F(1, 
100) = 4.21, p = .043, ɻ2 = .006. Inspection of Figure 3.5B suggests that the 
effect of distractor value was the largest for early distractors (ɻ2 = .013), com-
pared to late distractors late (ɻ2 < .001). So, considering both studies together, 
we found some support for the possibility that early high-reward distractors 
>`>ÃÌÀ}iÀ«>VÌÌ>>Ìi}Û>Õi` ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ°7iÌiÌ>ÌÌÃw`}
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should be interpreted with caution, as these analyses were not pre-registered 
and because the effect size was small.
Figure 3.5. Pooled data from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. (A) Accuracy scores for no 
(grey bars) vs. high (black bars) value distractor trials both in no vs. high task value conditions. 
(B) Mean accuracy scores by distractor value (high vs. low) on all trials (Overall), on trials 
where the distractor appeared early, and on trials where the distractor appeared late. Error 
L>ÀÃÀiyiVÌÃÌ>`>À`iÀÀÀÃ°
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DISCUSSION
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate the results of Experiment 1. As 
in Experiment 1, people were more accurate when they could earn money in 
the task (Hypothesis 1). Unexpectedly, however, we did not replicate the neg-
ative effect of reward-associated distractors on performance (Hypothesis 2), 
i.e., people were not less accurate when they were exposed to distractors that 
carried high (vs. no) value. As this null effect was somewhat surprising given 
the strength of the effect in Experiment 1 (ɻ2 = .03), and given the fact that the 
task was identical, we again explored whether early vs. late distractors have 
>``vviÀiÌivviVÌÃ>VVÕÀ>VÞ]LÕÌÜÌi«i`Ã>«i­ r£ä£®°7i
found that the impact of reward-associated distractors was more pronounced 
when it appeared early vs. late in the math sequence. Although this analysis 
Ü>ÃÌ«ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀi`­>`ÃÕ`ÌÕÃLiÌiÀ«ÀiÌi`ÜÌV>ÕÌ®]ÌÃw`-
ing suggests that the effect of distractor value may be more pronounced in the 
early stages of task performance (for interpretations, see General Discussion). 
Ý«iÀiÌÓ]iÝ«iÀiÌ£]Üi``Ìw`Ì>Ì«i«i½ÃVÕÀÀiÌ-
ÌÛ>Ì>ÃÌ>Ìi>vviVÌi`Ìi«>VÌv}Û>Õi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃÆÌÕÃ]w`}Ã`
not provide support for Hypothesis 3.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this research, we had two major aims: (a) to test whether reward-associated 
distractors harm cognitive control processes and (b) to test whether this re-
ward-driven distraction effect can be eliminated by high motivational states. 
Two identical experiments yielded strong evidence for the positive effect of 
monetary incentives on cognitive performance (Hypothesis 1), some evidence 
that reward-associated distractors disrupt cognitive control processes (Hypoth-
esis 2), and no evidence that high motivational states (i.e., promising monetary 
ÀiÜ>À`Ã®Ài`ÕViÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ­Þ«ÌiÃÃÎ®°7iÜ`ÃVÕÃÃi>V
vÌiÃiw`}Ã`iÌ>LiÜ°
In line with Hypothesis 1, both experiments showed that people were more 
>VVÕÀ>ÌiÃÛ}iÌ>>``ÌÃÜiÌiÞVÕ`i>ÀiÞ°/Ãw`}
is in line with the well-established idea that monetary incentives boost cogni-
tive processes (c.f., Pessoa, 2009; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010; Zedelius et al., 
2014), particularly the active maintenance of information in working memory 
(Heitz, Schrock, Payne, & Engle, 2008; Zedelius, Veling, & Aarts, 2011).
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On the contrary, evidence for reward-driven distraction (Hypothesis 2) was 
somewhat mixed across studies. In Experiment 1, we found direct support for 
this hypothesis: people were more distracted by high (vs. no) reward-associat-
ed distractors – independently of whether distractors appeared early vs. late 
during task performance. However, in Experiment 2, support for Hypothesis 
2 was less clear: the timing of reward-associated distractors moderated the 
`ÃÌÀ>VÌivviVÌ°7iÜiiÝ«Ài`ÌÃ`i>vÕÀÌiÀ>VLi`>>ÞÃÃ
of both studies in order to get the most reliable effect size (Lakens, 2013), 
we found that early distractors were indeed more harmful than late distractors 
(ɻ2 = .013 vs. ɻ2r°äääÆÃiiLiÜvÀÌiÀ«ÀiÌ>ÌÃ®°9iÌ]>ÃÌi>ÌÌiÀw`}
was done using a non-pre-registered analysis, it should be interpreted with 
some caution. In sum, results from two studies provide preliminary support for 
the idea that (a) irrelevant, but rewarding cues may disrupt cognitive control 
processes and (b) that this effect may be stronger when distractors appear early 
> ÃiµÕiVivV}ÌÛiVÌÀ«iÀ>ÌÃ°/Ãw`}iÝÌi`Ã«ÀÀ Ài-
search and shows that reward-associated distractors do not only slow down vi-
sual search (Hickey & van Zoest, 2013; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012), but they 
likely interrupt more complex cognitive control operations (i.e., maintenance 
and updating task-relevant information). These conclusions are consistent with 
growing literature that distractions may stem from a reward-driven mechanism 
(Anderson, 2016b; Botvinick & Braver, 2015).
,iÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ]ÌÃÃÌÕ`Þ]Ãiii`ÌLiyÕiVi`LÞÌiÌ}
v`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ Ìi>ÌÃiµÕiVi°ÀiÃ«iVwV>Þ]ÜiiÝ«iVÌi`Ì>Ì}
(vs. no) reward-associated distractors will gain priority in working memory over 
goal-relevant information (Gong & Li, 2014; Klink et al., 2017), which will weak-
en the mental representations of targets, which will result in incorrect respons-
es. Unexpectedly, this effect seemed strongest when high reward associated 
`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ>««i>Ài`i>ÀÞ­ÛÃ°>Ìi®Ìi>ÌÃiµÕiVi°/Ãw`}VÕ`Li
explained by conditional probability monitoring (Langner et al., 2010; Langner, 
Steinborn, Eickhoff, & Huestegge, 2018; Los, Kruijne, & Meeter, 2017; Miller & 
-VÀÌiÀ]ÓääÓÆ-ÌiLÀE>}iÀ]Óä££®°-«iVwV>Þ]V`Ì>«ÀL>LÌÞ
ÌÀ}ÃÌi«iiÌ>Ì«i«iVÌÕÕÃÞÌÀÌiyÜv
events, and update their expectancy about upcoming events; this expectancy, 
in turn, affects how they deal with future, unexpected events. Applying this to 
our paradigm, it seems likely that participants learned that each trial contained 
a distractor. Also, participants may have learned that when the distractor did not 
appear early (i.e., in the 2ndÃÌÕÕÃ«>À®]Ì`iwÌiÞ>`Ì>««i>À>Ìi­°i°]
the 3rd stimulus pair). As a result, when the distractor appeared late, participants 
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4GYCTF#UUQEKCVGF&KUVTCEVQTU%CP*CTO%QIPKVKXG2GTHQTOCPEG
had the opportunity to prepare for it helping them to shield goal-relevant in-
formation from the reward-associated distractor. Conversely, such preparation 
could not happen when the distractor appeared early. As pooled data from 
both experiments were in line with this explanation, it would be interesting to 
ÌiÃÌ ÌÃ `i> > VwÀ>ÌÀÞ>iÀ°-ÕVVwÀ>ÌÀÞÜÀÜÕ` Ãi`
more light on the circumstances under which reward-associated distractors dis-
rupt cognitive control processes. Conditional probability monitoring may well 
be part of the explanation.
Although participants performed better when they could earn monetary re-
wards on the task, both experiments showed no evidence for Hypothesis 3 – 
i.e., the prediction that reward-driven distraction would be the strongest when 
participants are not motivated to perform the task. This is somewhat surprising, 
given that several contemporary models of motivation and task performance 
suggest that people’s performance is determined by a computation between 
the value of the outcomes of the present task and the value of alternatives (Inzli-
cht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kurzban, Duckworth, 
Kable, & Myers, 2013). Also, we expected that higher motivational states would 
help protect mental representations of goal-relevant information (Müller et al., 
2007; Steinborn et al., 2017) from reward-associated distracting information. By 
VÌÀ>ÃÌÌÌiÃi`i>Ã]ÕÀw`}ÃÃÕ}}iÃÌÌ>ÌÌ>ÃÀÀiiÛ>ÌÃÌÕ­Ì>Ì>Ài
associated with rewards) may impact performance independently of whether 
people are currently motivated to perform well. Future research is necessary 
to better understand whether—and, if so, under what conditions—rewards for 
current task can shield people from distractions. Perhaps it may have been 
confusing for participants that both the value of distractors and the value of the 
task was manipulated with monetary rewards. To circumvent this issue, future 
ÃÌÕ`iÃVÕ`>««ÞÃ«iºÌÀÞ>À`iÀ»ÃÌÀÕVÌÃ]ÜV>ÃLiiÃÜÌ
LiivwViÌ`ÕV}ÃÌ>Li«iÀvÀ>Vi]ÜVÃi`Ã>}>ÃÌÌi«>VÌv
distractors (Steinborn et al., 2017).
Adopting a reward-driven perspective on distraction (Anderson et al., 2011b) 
has implications for practice. First, optimal performance at work and school is 
known to rely on central executive resources (Banich, 2009), which we found to 
be disrupted by task-irrelevant stimuli associated with rewards. Smartphones 
may be an instance of such stimuli: at least, smartphones are pervasive sourc-
iÃv`ÃÌÀ>VÌ­7iÀE
i]Óä£È®Ì>Ì`ii`ÌiÀviÀiÜÌÜÀ­iÌÌ
& George, 2003) and study (Sana et al., 2013). Assuming that smartphones 
have rewarding properties (Oulasvirta et al., 2012), this way of thinking about 
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smartphones—i.e., as reward-related distractors—may support new models of 
smartphone-related behavior (e.g., smartphone addiction could be conceptu-
alized, and treated, as a condition similar to Gambling Disorder)
Strengths and limitations
Throughout this project, we aimed to work in an open and transparent way, in 
line with recent discussions in psychology (Munafò et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 
Óä£xÆ"«i -ViVi
>LÀ>Ì] Óä£x®° -«iVwV>Þ]Üi«ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀi` Ìi
second experiment and tried to directly replicate our results, aiming to actively 
avoid drawing false conclusions that would eventually distort the literature on 
the topic (Chambers, 2013).
However, in this replication attempt (Experiment 2) we found evidence for re-
ward-driven distraction only when the distractor appeared early in the math 
sequence. Thus, we have to be careful with drawing strong conclusions. Al-
though, it is plausible that out of multiple studies testing the same hypotheses, 
ÃiÌiÃÌÃÌÕÀÕÌÌLiÃ}wV>Ì­>iÃ]Óä£{®]ÌiVÃÃÌiVÞLi-
tween studies is surprising as the effect of rewarding distractors on attentional 
V>«ÌÕÀi>ÃLiiÜiiÃÌ>LÃi`LÞ«ÀÀÜÀ­Ƃ`iÀÃ]Óä£ÈL®°7iÃÕ`
mention, however, that our experiments are different from most prior experi-
iÌÃ­Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°]Óä££LÆ/iiÕÜiÃE	i«ÃÞ]Óä£Ó® ÌÃwi`
two major ways. Below, we address these two aspects and provide methodo-
logical suggestions.
First, unlike previous experiments, we manipulated participants’ current moti-
Û>Ì>ÃÌ>ÌiÌiÌiÃÌ«>Ãi­ÌÌiÃÌÞ«ÌiÃiÃ£>`Î®°-«iVwV>Þ]>v
of the trials, people could earn money for performing well. Possibly, these per-
formance incentives affected people’s motivational state throughout the task, 
on all trials, in a sustained way (e.g., Flehmig et al., 2007). Very speculatively, 
such sustained changes in motivational state may have reduced the potency of 
high-value distractors. In future research, it may be promising to solely exam-
ine the effect of rewarding distractors, independently of current motivational 
states.
Second, an important difference between the present research and previous 
iÝ«iÀiÌÃ­Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°]Óä££L®ÌÃwi`VViÀÃÌiÃ«>Ì>«ÃÌ
of target and distractor. Although previous studies used a search task, in which 
stimuli are typically located far apart, we used a task in which target and dis-

4GYCTF#UUQEKCVGF&KUVTCEVQTU%CP*CTO%QIPKVKXG2GTHQTOCPEG
tractor were close next to each other, in the center of the screen. Importantly, 
ÌÃViÌÀ>«>ÀÌvÌiÛÃÕ>wi`Ã«ÀViÃÃi`ÃÌivwViÌÞ­
>ÀÀ>ÃV]Óä££®°
/Ãi>Vi`«ÀViÃÃ}ivwViVÞV>«ÌiÌ>ÞiÝ«>ÜÞÕÀÌ>Ã>Þ
be less sensitive to the effects of high-value distractors. To further investigate 
this possibility, future studies may use a task in which the location of target and 
distractor is farther from each other, more like in visual search paradigms.
Concluding remarks
/i«ÀiÃiÌÀiÃi>ÀV«ÀÛ`iÃÃiwÀÃÌÃÌi«ÃÛiÃÌ}>Ì}Üi>`Ü
ÀiÜ>À`}ÀÀiiÛ>ÌVÕiÃ`ÃÀÕ«ÌiÝiVÕÌÛiVÌÀ«ÀViÃÃiÃ°7ivÕ`Ì>Ì
people sometimes perform worse on a math task when they are exposed to a 
stimulus that was previously-rewarded (vs. not rewarded) and when this stimu-
lus appears early during task performance. This effect was not moderated by 
people’s current motivational states. Our studies join a growing body of litera-
ture (Anderson et al., 2011b; Krebs et al., 2010; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012; 
Zedelius et al., 2011) that suggests that it may be fruitful to think of distractions 
from a reward-driven perspective.
3
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ABSTRACT
Over a hundred prior studies show that reward-related distractors capture at-
tention. It is less clear, however, whether and when reward-related distractors 
affect performance on tasks that require cognitive control. In this experiment, 
we examined whether reward-related distractors impair performance during a 
demanding arithmetic task. Participants (N=81) solved math problems, while 
they were exposed to task-irrelevant stimuli that were previously associated 
with monetary rewards (vs. not). Although we found some evidence for reward 
learning in the training phase, results from the test phase showed no evidence 
that reward-related distractors harm cognitive performance. This null effect 
Ü>Ã Û>À>Ì >VÀÃÃ `vviÀiÌ ÛiÀÃÃ v ÕÀ Ì>Ã°7i iÝ>i` Ìi ÀiÃÕÌÃ
further with Bayesian analyses, which showed positive evidence for the null. 
Altogether, the present study showed that reward-related distractors did not 
>À«iÀvÀ>Vi>iÌ>>ÀÌiÌVÌ>Ã°7iVÃ`iÀi`Ì}iÌiÀÜÌ
previous studies, the present study suggests that the negative impact of re-
ward-related distractors on cognitive control is not as straightforward as it may 
seem, and that more research is needed to clarify the circumstances under 
which reward-related distractors harm cognitive control.
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DO REWARD-RELATED DISTRACTORS IMPAIR COGNITIVE 
PERFORMANCE? PERHAPS NOT
The prospect of earning rewards, such as monetary rewards, has a profound 
tendency to boost people’s performance (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). Indeed, 
when rewards can be earned, people learn faster (Le Pelley et al., 2016), invest 
ÀiivvÀÌ­7}wi`EVViÃ]Óäää®]>`}iiÀ>Þ«iÀvÀLiÌÌiÀV}-
ÌÛiÌ>ÃÃ­*>`>>E*iÃÃ>]Óä££®°ƂÌwÀÃÌÃ}Ì]ÌÌÕÃÃiiÃÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À`Ã
consistently facilitate performance during cognitive tasks. Intriguingly, howev-
iÀ] ÀiÃi>ÀV>Ã >Ã `iÌwi` Ãi Ã«iVwV VÀVÕÃÌ>ViÃ Õ`iÀÜV Ài-
wards harm, not help, performance. For instance, smelling some delicious food 
`ÕÀ}ÜÀ>ÌÌivwVii>ÃÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À`Ã>Àii>À]LÕÌÌiÃiÀiÜ>À`Ã`
not necessarily improve performance on the task one is currently working on. In 
this research, we will examine how reward cues that are not directly related to 
the current task (i.e., reward-related distractors) affect cognitive performance.
Prior research has extensively studied how reward-related distractors grab peo-
ple’s attention during visual search (for reviews, see Anderson, 2016; Failing & 
Theeuwes, 2017). Typically, in these studies (e.g., Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 
Óä££®] «>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ wÀÃÌ } ÌÀÕ} > i>À}«>Ãi] ÜV ÌiÞ i>À Ì
associate some stimulus (e.g., a red circle) with earning money (e.g., 5 cents). 
Later, in a testing phase, participants perform a search task (i.e., they have to 
search for a target), while the previously rewarded stimulus (e.g., the red cir-
cle) re-appears as a task-irrelevant stimulus (i.e., as a distractor). These studies 
showed that distractors that were associated with high reward captured visual 
attention more than distractors associated with low (or no) reward, and thus 
slowed down search for the targets (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011; Bucker, Be-
«ÃÞ]E/iiÕÜiÃ]Óä£{Æi*iiÞ]*i>ÀÃ]ÀvwÌÃ]E	iiÃiÞ]Óä£x®°
other words, these studies support the idea that reward-related irrelevant cues 
can harm cognitive processes.
Although previous studies demonstrate that reward-related distractors have a 
strong impact on visual attention (e.g., where people direct their eye-move-
ments), less is known about whether reward-related distractors have broader 
cognitive and behavioral consequences. That is, in daily life at work and school, 
most tasks require complex interactions with information, not merely a search 
for target stimuli. In these contexts, optimal performance, for instance giving 
correct answers during an exam, giving a clear presentation, or constructively 
contributing to a staff meeting, relies on cognitive control processes. Cogni-
4
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tive control refers to the maintenance and adaptive regulation of thoughts and 
behavior in pursuit of internally represented behavioral goals (Braver, 2012). If 
reward-related distractors disrupt control processes, beyond visual attention, 
then being exposed to these reward-related distractors may turn out to be 
especially harmful to outcomes in work and educational settings. So, in the 
current study, we investigated whether reward-related distractors indeed harm 
performance during a task that requires cognitive control (i.e., a mental arith-
metic task).
On the one hand, one might suspect that although reward-related distractors 
disrupt early cognitive processes (e.g., attentional shifts that occur before 150 
ms; Posner, Inhoff, Friedrich, & Cohen, 1987), they may not affect later process-
ing stages (e.g., that occur after 150 ms). Support for this idea comes from a 
study by Theeuwes and Belopolsky (2012), who investigated how reward-relat-
ed distractors impact eye movements. In their experiment, participants had to 
move their gaze to a certain target as fast as possible (i.e., oculomotor capture 
Ì>Ã®°7i`}Ã] ÃÌÕ>««i>Ài` Ì>ÌÜiÀi«ÀiÛÕÃÞ>ÃÃV>Ìi`ÜÌ
reward, but were now unrelated to the task. Findings showed that participant’s 
gaze was rapidly captured by reward-related distractors (e.g., saccades to the 
direction of reward-related distractors), but after this initial capture, people 
could readily disengage. The authors concluded that rewards seem to increase 
the salience of a cue, and therefore capture attention rapidly, but that rewards 
>ÀiiÃÃiÞÌyÕiVi«ÀViÃÃiÃ>vÌiÀÌÃ>ÌÌiÌ>V>«ÌÕÀi­Ãii>Ã>-
ing, Nissens, Pearson, Le Pelley, & Theeuwes, 2015; Le Pelley, Seabrooke, Ken-
nedy, Pearson, & Most, 2017; Maclean & Giesbrecht, 2015). Along similar lines, 
a recent meta-analysis showed that positive emotional cues – regardless of task 
relevance – capture attention rapidly and have stronger impact during early 
(rather than later) stages of processing (Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, & Sander, 
2015). Thus, if reward cues have similar effects to positive emotional cues, one 
could argue that reward-related distractors impact performance on tasks, in 
which performance is mainly dependent on early processes (e.g., visual search), 
but not on tasks that mainly require cognitive control processes (e.g., active 
maintenance of goal-relevant cues).
On the other hand, some studies do suggest that reward-related distractors 
do not just affect visual attentional capture (Anderson et al., 2012; Failing & 
/iiÕÜiÃ]Óä£xÆ>Vi>iÌ>°]Óä£ÈÆÕiiiÌ>°]Óä£È]Óä£xÆ7>}iÌ
al., 2014) and that they may impair cognitive control processes. Support from 
this latter idea comes from Krebs and colleagues (2010), who found that dis-
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ÌÀ>VÌÀÃ>ÃÃV>Ìi`ÜÌÀiÜ>À``ÃÀÕ«Ìi`VyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}>-ÌÀ«Ì>Ã
­Ãii>Ã\ÀiLÃ]	iiÀ]Ƃ««iL>Õ]E7`Àvv]Óä£ÎÆÀiLÃ]	iiÀ]}-
iÀ]E7`Àvv]Óä££®°-«iVwV>Þ]  ÌÃ«ÀÀ ÃÌÕ`Þ] Ãi VÀÃ ­i°}°]
Ài`®ÜiÀi>ÃÃV>Ìi`ÜÌiÌ>ÀÞÀiÜ>À`°7iÌiÃiÃÌÕ>««i>Ài`>Ã
distractors (in this case, as the semantic meaning of the word; e.g., the word 
ºÀi`»«ÀiÃiÌi`ÞiÜ®]ÌiÞÃÜi``Ü«i«i½ÃÀiÃ«ÃiÃÌi-ÌÀ«
task, more so than distractors not associated with reward. Along similar lines, 
another study showed that distractors that are associated with strong emotions, 
disrupt control processes during working memory maintenance (Dolcos & Mc-
Carthy, 2006). Taken together, it seems plausible that reward-related distrac-
ÌÀÃwÀÃÌ>ÌÌÀ>VÌÛÃÕ>>ÌÌiÌ­Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°]Óä££LÆi*iiÞiÌ>°]Óä£xÆ
Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012). Then, in turn, these distractors are more likely 
to permeate into working memory (Gong & Li, 2014; Klink et al., 2017), which 
eventually causes people to have less capacity left to carry out task-relevant 
processes, hence leading to worse performance on the task.
To test the latter possibility, we previously carried out two experiment (reported 
in Rusz, Bijleveld, & Kompier, 2018). In these experiments, we tested whether 
reward-related distractors could harm performance on a demanding math task, 
and whether this putative distraction effect was moderated by people’s current 
ÌÛ>Ì> ÃÌ>ÌiÃ°  ÌiÃi «ÀiÛÕÃ iÝ«iÀiÌÃ] «>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ wÀÃÌ i>Ài`
to associate different colors with high vs. no monetary rewards. Later, in the 
ÌiÃÌ«>Ãi]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ>` Ì ÃÛi>Ì«ÀLiÃ°7i ÌiÞÜÀi`
these problems, the colors associated with high vs. no reward reappeared as 
distractors. To examine the effect of current motivational states, on some trials 
during the math task, participants could earn money for responding accurate-
ly. Findings from these previous studies were inconclusive. In particular, the 
wÀÃÌiÝ«iÀiÌÃÜi`Ì>Ì ÀiÜ>À`Ài>Ìi``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ>Ài`«iÀvÀ>Vi
regardless of motivational states, but we could not directly replicate this effect 
in the second experiment. So, if anything, these previous studies yielded weak 
evidence for reward-based distraction on math tasks.
A possible explanation for why these prior studies yielded only weak evidence, 
is that we manipulated people’s current motivational state in these prior stud-
ies (i.e., participants could earn money on some trials). A side-effect of this 
manipulation may have been that it increased participants’ general motivation 
throughout the math task, which may have made distraction less likely alto-
gether (Müller et al., 2007). Thus, in the present study, we further investigated 
whether reward-related distractors can harm people’s performance on a math 
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task. However, this time, we took a step back, and we did not manipulate peo-
ple’s current motivational state. Instead, we focused solely on testing the re-
ward-based distraction effect.
In particular, we predicted that distractors that were previously associated with 
ÀiÜ>À`­ÛÃ°ÀiÜ>À`®>ÀV}ÌÛi«iÀvÀ>Vi°vÜiw`ÃÕ««ÀÌvÀÌÃ
hypothesis, it would mean that reward-related distractors are capable of dis-
rupting not just visual search (i.e., quick saccades away from goal-relevant in-
formation, that are corrected immediately), but, in turn, may have more severe 
consequences for subsequent cognitive processes.
Present research
To test our hypothesis, we used our original paradigm (Rusz et al., 2018a) – 
without the motivation manipulation in the test phase – which was originally 
designed based on research on value-driven attention (Anderson et al., 2011b) 
and on research on distraction during math performance (Beilock & Carr, 2005; 
Beilock et al., 2004). First, in a training phase, participants learned to associate 
earning high vs. no monetary rewards with two different colors. Later, in a test 
phase, participants performed a mental arithmetic task (they had to add up 
four numbers), while the previously rewarded colors reappeared as distractors. 
So, participants had to prioritize the arithmetic task, while ignoring distractors, 
even though these were sometimes associated with reward. As simple men-
tal additions can take up to 800-900 ms (Ashcraft, 1992; Ashcraft & Battaglia, 
1978), we expected that the rather fast presentation of the numbers (700 ms 
«iÀÕLiÀ®ÜÕ`>iÌiÃ«iV>Þ`vwVÕÌÌ«iÀvÀÌiÃiiÌ>>``-
tions while trying to ignore distractors. Therefore, we expected that distrac-
tors associated with reward (vs. no reward) will disrupt cognitive performance, 
which we operationalized as the percentage of accurate responses.
To explore the circumstances under which reward-based disruption – if we can 
detect it at all – is strongest, we designed three variations of our task described 
above. In these variations, we tested whether distractors associated with re-
ward impede cognitive performance more when they were previously always 
associated with rewards (Experiment 1A) vs. when they were randomly associ-
ated with rewards on 80% of trials (Experiment 1B), or when they were located 
further away from task-relevant cues (Experiment 1C).
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METHOD
Preregistration and data availability
7i «ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀi` ÕÀ ÃÌÕ`Þ  ƂÃ*Ài`VÌi` ­https://aspredicted.org/3j7gw.
pdf). Unless otherwise noted, inclusion criteria and statistical analyses were 
pre-registered. The experimental task, data, and analysis scripts can be found 
via https://osf.io/dwa89/. This research was approved by the Ethics Committee 
vÌi-V>-ViVi>VÕÌÞ­
-7Óä£Çänäxxä®°
Participants
*>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ ÜiÀi ä ÃÌÕ`iÌÃ vÀ ,>`LÕ`1ÛiÀÃÌÞ°7i ÀiVÀÕÌi` yÕiÌ
Dutch speakers, who were 25 years old or younger, slept at least 6 hours the 
night before the experiment, and were not colorblind. After data collection, 2 
participants nevertheless reported to have slept less than 6 hours, so they were 
iÝVÕ`i` vÀ Ìi w> >>ÞÃÃ°ÀiÛiÀ]Üi iÝVÕ`i`Ç«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜ
«iÀvÀi`LiÜÈä¯>VVÕÀ>VÞ°/iw>Ã>«iVÃÃÌi`vn£ÃÌÕ`iÌÃ­ÓÇ
participants per task variation; 59 females and 22 males; Mage = 22.35 years, 
SDage = 1.96). Participants received compensation in cash based on their per-
formance (maximum 6 €).
Procedure
Participants were seated in a cubicle in front of a computer. First, participants 
gave their written informed consent to participate in the study. Next, they re-
ported their demographics (age, sex), hours of sleep the night before, and their 
need for money on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale (“To what extent are 
ÞÕii`vÀiÞ>ÌÌiiÌ¶»®°ƂvÌiÀÜ>À`Ã]ÌiÞV>ÀÀi`ÕÌÌiÌ>Ã
(see below). Then, they reported how motivated and fatigued they were, and 
Ü`i>`}>``vwVÕÌÌiÞviÌÌiÌ>ÃÜ>Ã>£­Ì>Ì>®ÌÇ­ÛiÀÞ
ÕV®ÃV>i°>Þ]ÌiÞwi`ÕÌÌiÕÌVÛiÀÃvÌi	>ÀÀ>ÌÌ«ÕÃÛi-
ness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995; see Table 4.1 for descrip-
ÌÛiÃÌ>ÌÃÌVÃv>ÃÕLiVÌÛii>ÃÕÀiÃ®°7iViVÌi`ÌiÃiÃÕLiVÌÛii>Ã-
ures in order to explore whether current states and traits affect reward-based 
distraction (based on results of Anderson et al., 2011). The experiment took 
>ÀÕ`Îx{äÕÌiÃÌwÃ°ƂÌÌii`]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜiÀiÌ>i`]«>`]
and debriefed.
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of Subjective Measures
Subjective Measures M SD Range
Sleep (hours) 7.72 .73 3.5
Task demands (1-7) 5.17 1.5 6
6CUMFKHƂEWNV[
 4.06 1.66 6
(CVKIWG
 4.48 1.57 6
/QVKXCVKQP
 5.35 1.18 6
BIS 2.07 .32 1.47
0GGFHQTOQPG[
 4.33 1.52 6
General overview of the task
The task consisted of two parts, a training and a testing phase. In the training 
«>Ãi­Ãii}ÕÀi{°£®]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃwÀÃÌÃ>Ü>wÝ>ÌVÀÃÃ]ÌivÕÀÌiÃ>
ÕLiÀ³iÌÌiÀVL>Ì«ÀiÃiÌi`i>vÌiÀi>VÌiÀ­i°}°]n7]8x]9]
and Z7; see Figure 4.1). Their task was to report whether the letters were in the 
VÀÀiVÌ>«>LiÌV>À`iÀ­i°}°]7]8]9]<®°/iÞÀiÃ«`i`LÞ«ÀiÃÃ}º+»
vÀVÀÀiVÌ>`º*»vÀVÀÀiVÌÌÀ>Ã°">vvÌiÌÀ>Ã]ivÌiiÌÌiÀÃ>`
a different color. If this letter was blue (or red, counterbalanced across all par-
ticipants, N = 90), participants could earn a monetary reward (8 cents). If it was 
red (or blue, counterbalanced), participants could earn no monetary reward. 
On no-reward trials (e.g., red), responses were followed by visual feedback in-
`V>Ì}º`»À º>Ãi»°}ÀiÜ>À` ÌÀ>Ã ­i°}°]LÕi®ÜiÀi>``Ì>Þ
followed by reward feedback (+ 8 cents) and the total amount that has been 
earned during the task so far. Participants were not informed about the reward 
contingency beforehand. In total, participants completed 4 practice trials and 
150 training trials.
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Figure 4.1. Training phase. Example of (A) no reward and (B) high reward trials.
 
 Ìi ÌiÃÌ«>Ãi ­Ãii}ÕÀi{°Ó®]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ Ã>Ü>wÝ>Ì VÀÃÃ >` vÕÀ
times a number + letter combination presented one after each other (e.g., 
n7]8x]9]>`<Ç®]>`>ÃÌÞ]>ÌÜ`}ÌÕLiÀÌ>ÌÜ>Ã³É£ÌÌiÃÕv
these numbers (e.g., 28). Their task was to add up the four numbers and report 
whether the sum of the presented numbers (e.g., 8 + 5 + 9 + 7 = 29) was higher 
or lower than the number presented in the last display (e.g., 28). They respond-
i`LÞ«ÀiÃÃ}º+»vÀÃ>iÀ>`º*»vÀ>À}iÀÃÕÃ­ÓÃL}}iÀÌ>Ón]
ÃÌiVÀÀiVÌÀiÃ«ÃiÜÕ`Liº*»®°`iÌV>ÌÌiÌÀ>}«>Ãi]>v
of the trials, one letter was always red and the other half of the trials one letter 
was always blue. In this case, the letters served as distractors, previously associ-
ated with monetary (vs. no monetary) rewards. Importantly, because the spatial 
location of the distractor (left vs. right) was randomized, participants could not 
«Ài`VÌÌiV>ÌvÌi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ]ÜV>`i`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ`vwVÕÌÌ}Ài°
In total, participants completed 10 practice and 64 test trials.
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Figure 4.2. Testing phase. Example trial with a distractor associated with (A) no rewards 
and with (B) high rewards.
Task variations
As mentioned above, we designed three variations of the experiment (be-
tween-subject factor), to which we randomly assigned participants (N = 30/var-
iation). All three variations were in line with the general task description above, 
with only slight differences. In Experiment 1A, reward contingency in the train-
ing phase was 100%. That is, high-reward distractors were previously associat-
ed with earning money on all trials. To test whether a variable ratio schedule 
(Thorndike, 1898) makes the hypothesized disruption effect stronger, Experi-
ment 1B used an 80%-20% reward contingency. That is, high-reward distractors 
were previously associated with earning money on 80% of the trials (vs. all tri-
als). Finally, Experiment 1C was identical to Experiment 1A with one difference: 
LÌÌiÌÀ>}>`ÌiÃÌ«>ÃiÃ]Ì>À}iÌ­i°}°]n®>`` ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ­i°}°]7®ÜiÀi
located spatially further away from each other (8.5 mm vs. 34.2 mm difference 
between target and distractor/1680x1050 display). In this version, the goal was 
to test whether reward-based disruption is stronger when it takes longer to 
`ÀiVÌiÞiÛiiÌÃvÀ`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ­i°}°]Ài`VÀi`7®ÌÌ>À}iÌ­i°}°]n®°
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If indeed eye movements are rapidly captured by reward-related distractors, it 
should take longer to direct attention back to task relevant cues (Henderson & 
>VµÕÃÌ>]£ÎÆ>LiÀ}iE	ÀÜ]£nÈÆ-Õ>]7Ã]E-iiÞ]£nx®]
which may result in even worse performance on the math task (for an alternative 
perspective, see Gaspar & McDonald, 2014; Hickey & Theeuwes, 2011).
RESULTS
Training phase analyses (not pre-registered)
7iÃÕ`ÌiÌ>ÌÜi``Ì«ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀÌiÃi>>ÞÃiÃÆÌÕÃ]ÌiÃiÀiÃÕÌÃ
should be interpreted with caution. As we had no a priori hypotheses about 
the learning phase, we mainly rely on effect sizes when we interpret the results 
(Forstmeier et al., 2017; Greenland et al., 2016; Nosek et al., 2018). Addition-
ally, the p-values that are related to exploratory analyses in this paper are not 
corrected for multiple comparisons.
In order to examine reward learning, we ran a GLM analysis with reward (high 
ÛÃ°®>`LV­wÀÃÌÛÃ°ÃiV`®>Ã`i«i`iÌÛ>À>LiÃ]Ãi«>À>ÌiÞvÀ>V-
curacy and response time (RT) as dependent variables. Based on prior research 
­i°}°]Ƃ`iÀÃ]Óä£ÈLÆ->E>}]Óä£È®]ÌiwÀÃÌ}>vÌÃ>>ÞÃÃÜ>Ã
to explore whether participants are more accurate and/or faster when there is 
a reward (vs. no reward)-predictive color in the sequence. In line with analyses 
from previous studies (Anderson, Laurent, et al., 2014; Bourgeois et al., 2015; 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2015), the second goal was to test whether this difference 
ÜÕ`V>}iÛiÀÌi°ÀiÃ«iVwV>Þ]vÌiÀiÃ>`vviÀiViÀiÃ«ÃiÃ
to reward predictive vs. non-predictive trials, this difference should be espe-
cially pronounced by the end of the training phase (e.g., in the second block) – 
when participants had enough time to pick up on stimulus-reward associations. 
7iÀ>ÕÀ]wÀÃÌ]ÌiÜiÃ>«i>`ÃiV`]Ãi«>À>ÌiÞvÀi>V
experiment. Results are summarized in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3A-D.
Inspection of Table 4.2 shows that high (vs. no) reward predictive colors did 
ÌyÕiVi>VVÕÀ>VÞÀ,/ÜiVÃ`iÀ}Ìi«i``>Ì>vÀ>iÝ«iÀ-
iÌÃ°7iiÝ>}ÌiiÝ«iÀiÌÃÃi«>À>ÌiÞ]ÜiÛiÀ]ÜivÕ`Ì>Ì
reward learning seemed more pronounced in Experiment 1A and Experiment 
1B (80-20% random reward) compared to Experiment 1C (increased distance). 
In Experiment 1A, participants seemed to be more accurate on high-reward tri-
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als, though this was not accompanied by faster response times. In Experiment 
1B, participants became faster in the second half of the experiment, particularly 
on high-reward trials, but they did not become more accurate. So, while there 
were indications of reward learning in both Experiments 1A and 1B, these indi-
cations were not entirely consistent.
Table 4.2. Analyses of the learning phase.
Accuracy RT
All experiments dfs F p ɻp2 F p ɻp2
1. Reward 1,80 2.79 .098 .03 < 1 .478 < .01
2. Block 1,80 2.55 .115 .03 2.98 .088 .04
3. Reward × Block 1,80 < 1 .646 < .01 < 1 .983 < .01
Experiment 1A
1. Reward 1,26 2.91 .099 .10 .22 .641 .01
2. Block 1,26 2.08 .160 .07 1.15 .293 .04
3. Reward × Block 1,26 2.47 .127 .09 3.10 .089 .101
Experiment 1B
1. Reward 1,26 .04 .527 .02 .02 .875 < .01
2. Block 1,26 1.49 .232 .05 9.27 .005 .26
3. Reward × Block 1,26 8.91 .006 .26 5.29 .029 .17
Experiment 1C
1. Reward 1,26 .33 .568 .01 .85 .364 .03
2. Block 1,26 .04 .842 < .01 .15 .701 .01
3. Reward × Block 1,26 < 1 .957 < .01 .10 .753 < .01
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Figure 4.3. (a) Accuracy scores and response times in high and no reward predictive trials 
ÌiwÀÃÌ>`ÃiV`LVvÌiÌÀ>}«>Ãi>iÝ«iÀiÌÃ°(b) Accuracy scores 
>`ÀiÃ«ÃiÌiÃ}>`ÀiÜ>À`«Ài`VÌÛiÌÀ>ÃÌiwÀÃÌ>`ÃiV`LVv
the training phase in Experiment 1A. (c) Accuracy scores and response times in high and 
ÀiÜ>À`«Ài`VÌÛiÌÀ>ÃÌiwÀÃÌ>`ÃiV`LVvÌiÌÀ>}«>ÃiÝ«iÀiÌ
1B. (d) Accuracy scores and response times in high and no reward predictive trials in the 
wÀÃÌ>`ÃiV`LVvÌiÌÀ>}«>ÃiÝ«iÀiÌ£
°
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7ivÕÀÌiÀiÝ«Ài`ÜiÌiÀÌ>ÃÀi>Ìi`ÃÕLiVÌÛii>ÃÕÀiÃ­ÌÛ>Ì]`v-
wVÕÌÞ]`i>`Ã®]VÕÀÀiÌÃÌ>ÌiÃ­ii`vÀiÞ]v>Ì}Õi®]>`ÌÀ>Ì«ÕÃÛÌÞ
ÜiÀiÀi>Ìi`Ì«iÀvÀ>ViÌiÌÀ>}«>Ãi°7ivÕ`Ì>ÌÌÀ>Ì«ÕÃÛ-
ty was negatively related to accuracy scores on reward predictive trials (r = -.34, 
p = .002). It could be that for participants who score high on this trait, reward 
predictive colors triggered some impulsive responses that were less likely to be 
accurate. Furthermore, self-reported motivation was positively related to accu-
racy scores in both no-reward (r = .26, p = .017), and high-reward conditions 
(r = .37, p°ää£®°ƂÌiÀVÀÀi>ÌÃÜiÀiÌÃ}wV>Ì­«Ã°äx®°
Main analyses (pre-registered)
Responses that were three standard deviations faster or slower than the partici-
pant’s mean and responses faster than 300 ms (which were considered guesses) 
were deleted, which resulted in the exclusion of 1.4 % of trials. To test our hy-
pothesis, we performed a GLM analysis with the reward value of the distractor 
(high vs. no) as a within-subject independent variable, and accuracy scores (per-
ViÌ>}ivVÀÀiVÌÀiÃ«ÃiÃ®>ÃÌi`i«i`iÌÛ>À>Li°/iÀiÜ>ÃÃ}w-
cant difference in accuracy scores between high vs. no distractor reward trials, 
F(1,80) = 0.26, p = .608, ɻp
2 = .00. Thus, contrary to our hypothesis, we found 
no evidence that reward-related distractors impede cognitive performance.
To test whether different task variations had any effect on performance in high 
(vs. no) reward distractor trials (see Table 4.3 for descriptive statistics), we ran 
the same GLM as before, now adding task variation as a between subject fac-
tor. Crucially, the distractor reward × task variation interaction was also not 
Ã}wV>Ì]F(2,78) = 0.15, p = .864, ɻp
2r°ää°/VVÕ`i]Üi``Ìw`iÛ-
idence that reward-related distractors harm more when reward contingency is 
random (no difference between Experiment 1A and Experiment 1B) and when 
the distractor is located further away from the target (Experiment 1C).
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Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Accuracy and Response Times in High vs. No Distractor 
trials in All Task Variations.
Accuracy (percentage of correct responses)
Experiment 1A Experiment 1B Experiment 1C
Within-subject condition: M SD M SD M SD
No reward-related distractor 81.2 % 11 % 84.4 % 13.9 % 82.3 % 12.2%
Reward-related distractor 80.7 % 12 % 84.5 % 12.6 % 81.0% 10.9%
Response Times (ms)
M SD M SD M SD
No reward-related distractor 2141 1699 1559 920 2113 2108
Reward-related distractor 2141 1683 1571 1088 2210 2380
To further explore these null results, visually inspecting individual accuracy 
scores in high vs. no reward distractor conditions might be helpful. Figure 4.4 
shows each participants’ difference score (i.e., high-reward accuracy minus 
no-reward accuracy scores) across task variations. A difference score below 0 
would mean that our manipulation worked, that is, participants had lower ac-
VÕÀ>VÞ ­°i°]«iÀvÀi`ÜÀÃi®  Ìi}ÀiÜ>À``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀV`Ì°7i
inspecting Figure 4.4, it is clear that participants did not clearly score below 0.
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Figure 4.4. Difference scores for accuracy, for all task variations. Negative difference scores 
indicate that people performed worse during high-reward distractor trials. Small, blue dots 
ÀiyiVÌi>`vviÀiViÃVÀiÃvÀ `Û`Õ>«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ°>À}i]L>V`ÌÃÀiyiVÌi>
`vviÀiViÃÃVÀiÃvÀ>«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ°ÀÀÀL>ÀÃÀiyiVÌx¯Vw`iViÌiÀÛ>Ã>ÀÕ`Ìi
group means.
As a secondary analysis, we tested whether high (vs. no) reward-related distrac-
tors had an impact on people’s speed. To this end, we ran another GLM with 
distractor reward (high vs. no) as within subject independent variable and RT 
>Ã`i«i`iÌÛ>À>Li°7ivÕ`Ã}wV>Ì`vviÀiVi,/ÃLiÌÜii}
vs. no distractor reward trials, F(1,80) = 0.90, p = .346, ɻp
2 = .01. The distrac-
ÌÀÛ>ÕiÌ>ÃÛ>À>ÌÌiÀ>VÌÜ>ÃÌÃ}wV>ÌiÌiÀ]F(2,78) = 0.57, 
p = .563, ɻp
2 = .01. In sum, we found no evidence that reward-related distrac-
tors slow down people’s responses on a math task.
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Bayesian analyses (not pre-registered)
To provide more conclusive evidence for this null effect, we tested our predic-
tions with a Bayesian approach (Dienes, 2014) in JASP (JASP Team, 2018). A 
Bayesian paired-samples t-test with distractor reward (high vs. no) as independ-
ent and accuracy scores as dependent variable yielded a BF01 = 6.68, which 
is considered moderate evidence for the null hypothesis (see Figure 4.5A). 
Another Bayesian paired-samples t-test with distractor reward (high vs. no) as 
independent variable and RTs as dependent variable also showed moderate 
evidence for the null hypothesis, i.e., BF01 = 5.26 (see Figure 4.5B). In sum, 
ÌiÃiÀiÃÕÌÃÃÌÀi}Ìiw`}ÃvÀÕÀ«ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀi`>>ÞÃiÃ\ÌiÞ`ÀiVÌÞ
support the idea that reward-related distractors do not harm cognitive perfor-
mance.
Figure 4.5. Sequential Bayesian analysis separately for (A) accuracy and for (B) RT. The plot 
shows whether the observations coming in sequence (i.e., as N grows) are in favour of the 
null (BF01 > 1) or the alternative hypotheses (BF01 < 1), as. Inspection of Figure 4.5 suggests 
that there is moderate evidence for the null hypotheses, i.e., that reward-related distractors 
do not harm cognitive performance. As BF01 does not grow towards the direction of the null 
hypothesis after reaching N = ~30, it becomes clear that we would have gotten evidence 
for the null hypothesis after collecting approximately 30 participants in total.
To test whether different task variations had an effect on performance in high 
(vs. no) reward distractor trials, we ran a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA 
with distractor reward and task variation as independent variables, and sepa-
rately for accuracy and RTs as dependent variables. The distractor reward × task 
variation interaction on accuracy as dependent variable yielded a BF01 = 91.29 
– and on RTs as dependent variable yielded a BF01 = 52.68. These results show 
strong evidence against the idea that different task variations moderated per-
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formance in high vs. no distractor reward trials.
Further exploratory analyses (not pre-registered)
7iiÝ«Ài`ÜiÌiÀÌ>ÃÀi>Ìi`i>ÃÕÀiÃ­ÌÛ>Ì]`vwVÕÌÞ]`i>`Ã®]
current states (need for money, fatigue), and trait impulsivity were related to 
the amount of reward-related capture (calculated as RT when a high-reward 
distractor was present minus RT when no-reward distractor was present; based 
Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°Óä££L®°vwVÕÌÞÜ>Ã«ÃÌÛiÞÀi>Ìi`ÌÌi>ÕÌvÀi-
ward-related capture (r = .25, pr°äÓn®°/Ã«iÃÌ>ÌÌiÀi`vwVÕÌi
felt like the task was, the more they got distracted (i.e., in this case, became 
ÃÜiÀ®vÀ}ÀiÜ>À``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ°"ÌiÀVÀÀi>ÌÃÜiÀiÌÃ}wV>Ì­«Ã
> .05).
Finally, we further explored whether performance in the training phase was re-
lated to the distractor effects in the test phase. For this purpose, we computed 
a reward learning score for each participant (i.e., the difference between RTs 
ÛÃ°} ÀiÜ>À`ÌÀ>Ã ÌiwÀÃÌ«>ÀÌv Ìi ÌÀ>}«>ÃiÕÃ Ìi
difference between no vs. high reward trials on the second part of the training 
phase). The higher the score is, the bigger the RT difference in between no 
ÛÃ°}ÀiÜ>À`«Ài`VÌÛiÌÀ>ÃÌiÃiV`ÛÃ°ÌiwÀÃÌ«>ÃivÌii>À-
ing phase and, thus, the more successful reward learning. This reward learning 
score was not related to the amount of reward-related capture (r = .06, p = .58); 
thus, we found no evidence for a relationship between reward learning and 
reward-based distraction.
Note: in our previous paper (Rusz et al., 2018a), in Experiment 2, we found 
that reward-related distractors impaired performance only when they appeared 
early vs. late during the trial. To be consistent, we performed that same analysis 
(GLM with distractor reward and timing as within subject independent meas-
ures and accuracy as dependent measure) on the current data too. This analysis 
yielded no meaningful effect (F < 1). This means that unlike in our previous 
study, distractor timing did not moderate reward-based distraction.
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DISCUSSION
The goal of the present research was to test whether reward-related distractors 
>ÀV}ÌÛi«iÀvÀ>Vi°*>ÀÌV«>ÌÃwÀÃÌi>Ài`Ì>ÃÃV>ÌiÀiÜ>À`­ÛÃ°
no reward) to different colors in the training phase via a deterministic (Exper-
iment 1A and 1C) or a random reward schedule (Experiment 1B). After, they 
«iÀvÀi` >>Ì Ì>Ã] ÜV ÛÛi` `vwVÕÌ «iÀ>ÌÃ ­i°}°] Ìi >VÌÛi
maintenance and updating of task-relevant information), while they were ex-
posed to reward-related, but task-irrelevant cues. Task-irrelevant and task-rel-
evant stimuli appeared spatially close together (Experiments 1A and 1B) or far 
apart (Experiment 1C).
"ÕÀ>VwÀ>ÌÀÞÌiÃÌÃÕ}}iÃÌi`Ì>ÌLi}iÝ«Ãi`ÌÀiÜ>À`Ài>Ìi`
distractors do not necessarily thwart cognitive performance on a mental arith-
iÌVÌ>Ã°/Ãw`}ÃÕiÝ«iVÌi`]}ÛiÌ>Ì> >À}iL`Þv«ÀÀÜÀ
showed that reward-related distractors do capture visual attention (e.g., An-
derson et al., 2011; Bucker & Theeuwes, 2017; Le Pelley et al., 2015). Further-
Ài] ÌÃw`} ÃÌ vÕÞ  iÜÌÕÀÜ«ÀiÛÕÃw`}Ã>Ì
performance. In particular, in our previous study (Rusz et al., 2018a), we found 
only weak evidence for reward-driven distraction; in the current study, we found 
evidence against reward-based distraction. Although the current study’s meth-
od was somewhat different from the studies in Rusz et al. (2018), the studies 
collectively suggest that reward-related distractors do not harm math perfor-
>Vi° Ü]ÜiÜ`ÃVÕÃÃÌÀii«ÃÃLiiÝ«>>ÌÃvÀw`}iÛ`iVi
against our hypothesized effect.
ÀÃÌ]ÌÃ«>ÕÃLiÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À`Ài>Ìi``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃÃ«Þ>ÛiyÕiVi
task performance that relies on cognitive control processes. As discussed in 
the introduction of this chapter, the rapid visual capture effect of reward-relat-
ed cues may deteriorate in later processing stages. Supporting this possibility, 
Theeuwes and Belopolsky (2012) showed that distractors associated with re-
ward rapidly captured visual attention (i.e., saccades), but did not affect eye 
movements after this capture. Along these lines, recent research showed that 
ÀiÜ>À`Ài>Ìi``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃÀiiÞyÕiVii>ÀÞ­ÛÃ°>Ìi®ÃÌ>}iÃvÛÃÕ>
processing (Failing et al., 2015; Lee & Shomstein, 2014; Maclean & Giesbrecht, 
Óä£x®°
ÀÀLÀ>Ì}ÌÃw`}]i*iiÞ]-i>LÀi]ii`Þ]*i>ÀÃ]E
Most (2017) found that the negative effect of reward-related distractors was 
rather short-lived on a temporal attention task (but see Failing & Theeuwes, 
2015). Based on these studies, one could speculate that reward-related distrac-
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tors impede early cognitive processes, leading to misguided saccades. How-
iÛiÀ]ÃÕVi>ÀÞº`ÃÀÕ«ÌÃ»>Þ>ÛiÞÌi`ivviVÌ>ÌiÀ«ÀViÃÃ}
stages, because people may be able to quickly correct for their impact.
Indeed, results from Experiment 1C seem consistent with the possibility that 
reward-related distractors rapidly capture visual attention, but do not affect 
later cognitive operations. In this version of our task, we increased the distance 
between target and distractor, assuming that this would increase the chance for 
visual attentional capture by the distractor associated with reward – thus maxi-
mizing the chance for reward-driven disruption. Surprisingly, this manipulation 
had no effect on how accurate participants were in high vs. no distractor reward 
conditions. Nevertheless, participants were somewhat slower on trials where a 
high (2210 ms) vs. no (2113 ms) reward-related distractor appeared. This effect 
Ü>Ã Ã> ­`r °Ó® >`Ã}wV>Ì] Ã Ì ÃÕ`Li ÌiÀ«ÀiÌi`ÜÌiÝ-
ÌÀiiV>ÕÌ°-Ì]L>Ãi`ÌÃw`}]i}ÌÃ«iVÕ>ÌiÌ>Ì>ÌÕ}
people showed misguided saccades to reward-related cues, they might have 
been able to overcome this initial shift (within 700 ms) as they were still able to 
respond accurately on the math task.
As we did not measure people’s gaze during our study, we cannot conform nor 
`ÃVwÀÌi>ÌÌiÀ«ÃÃLÌÞ]LÕÌÜi`viiÌÃÜÕ`Li>«ÀÃ}vÕÌÕÀi
direction. Such a design—i.e., a design that combines eye tracking measures 
with math performance—would help to better understand whether optimal 
performance on the math task is still possible, even if attention is initially rapid-
ÞV>«ÌÕÀi`LÞÀiÜ>À`Ài>Ìi``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ°-«iVwV>Þ]ÌÜÕ`LivÀ>ÌÛi
ÌÃiiÜ>Ì>Ã«iVÌÃv}>âiLi>ÛÀ­i°}°]ÜiÌiÀÌiwÀÃÌwÝ>ÌÃÌi
distractor vs. the target; how quickly people can disengage from the distractor; 
ÜiÌiÀ«i«iV>>Û`wÝ>Ì}Ìi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ>Ì>®ÃÃÌiÞÌ-
pair performance (Failing et al., 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015).
Second, it is possible that reward-related distractors do impair cognitive pro-
cesses beyond visual capture, but that our task was not sensitive to detect-
ing such an effect. After inspecting the results, one may argue that our task 
was too easy; overall, participants were quite accurate (i.e., above 80%). Thus, 
even if participants were initially disrupted by reward-related distractors, they 
may have managed to protect goals from these interfering stimuli: they could 
quickly (i.e., within 700 ms) correct for this and apparently were still able to 
process the targets (e.g., 8) and to perform mental operations on these targets 
­i°}°]³n®°  iÜÌ ÌÃiÝ«>>Ì]iÝ«À>ÌÀÞw`}Ã ÀiÛi>i` Ì>Ì
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«iÀViÛi`Ì>Ã`vwVÕÌÞÜ>ÃÀi>Ìi`ÌÌiÃÕÃVi«ÌLÌÞvÀÀiÜ>À`L>Ãi``Ã-
ÌÀ>VÌ°-«iVwV>Þ]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜÌÕ}ÌÌ>ÌÌiÌ>ÃÜ>ÃÀi`vwVÕÌ]
were slowed down more by high reward-related distractors. This explanation 
is in line with previous research that shows that under high working memory 
load, people are more susceptible to distractions (for a review, see Lavie, 2010). 
-«iVÕ>ÌÛiÞ]vÕÌÕÀiÀiÃi>ÀVÃÕ`>iÌiÌ>ÃÀi`vwVÕÌ­i°}°]LÞ-
creasing the pace), or take into account individual differences, such as working 
memory capacity (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011).
/i«ÌiÌ> >Vv `vwVÕÌÞ}Ì >Ã iÝ«>ÜÞÕÀ ÀiÃÕÌÃ >Ài Ì 
line with Krebs et al. (2011, 2010), who reported that irrelevant-reward associa-
ÌÃÌiÀviÀiÜÌVyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}°ÀÌÜÀi>ÃÃ]Ìi-ÌÀ«Ì>ÃÕÃi`
Krebs’ studies is different from the current task. First, in the Stroop task, distrac-
tor colors are always associated with a competing response, so in those studies, 
`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀivviVÌÃ>ÞÀiyiVÌÀiÃ«ÃiÌiÀviÀiVi]ÌÕÃÌ>ÌÌiÌ>V>«ÌÕÀi°
In our task, such response competition was absent, as participants never had to 
respond to the colors themselves. Second, in the Stroop task, the concept color 
Ã>Ü>ÞÃÌ>ÃÀiiÛ>Ì]ÜV>iÃVÀÃ`vwVÕÌÌÃÌÀ>Ìi}V>Þ}Ài°
In our task, it may have been easier for people to categorically ignore the color 
dimension during the test phase, thus preventing distraction before it began. 
The latter issue could be addressed in future research, e.g., by introducing mi-
ni-blocks of learning and testing phases (e.g., Lee & Shomstein, 2014). Such a 
design could prevent people from strategically only focusing on numbers, not 
colors, thus making distractors even harder to ignore.
Third, although we found some indications that participants learned reward as-
sociations in the training phase (especially in Experiment 1B), these stimulus-re-
ward associations may have been too subtle to disrupt performance during the 
test phase. Indeed, our learning phase was different from most previous studies 
in this area in three ways. First, in previous studies, the learning phase often 
employed instrumental learning—where action towards a certain cue (e.g., 
w`}>Ài`VÀVi®Ü>Ã`ÀiVÌÞ>ÃÃV>Ìi`ÜÌi>À}iÞ°ÕÀÃÌÕ`Þ]
ÜiÛiÀ]ÀiÜ>À`i>À}Ü>Ã>À}Õ>LÞiÃÃÃÌÀÕiÌ>>ÌÕÀi°-«iVwV>Þ]
ÜiÃÌÕ­i°}°]>LÕi8®«Ài`VÌi`Ìi>Û>>LÌÞvÀiÜ>À`VÌ}iÌ
people’s action (indicating the correct order of the letters), people were never 
required to approach this cue, or actively search for it. Second, our training 
task required more focused attention, and perhaps greater working memory 
capacity, than learning tasks in prior studies (which often used visual search 
procedures). This strong attentional focus may have caused people to readily 
4
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suppress task-irrelevant dimensions (in this case, color), impairing acquisition of 
stimulus-reward associations. Third, our training phase was shorter than train-
ing phases in previous studies (e.g., 240 in Anderson et al. 2011), which may 
>Ûi}ÛiÃ«Þ iÃÃÌivÀ«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÌ i>ÀÀiÜ>À`>ÃÃV>ÌÃ°7i
should note, though, there are existing studies that used training phases with 
less instrumental reward learning (Bucker & Theeuwes, 2016b; Le Pelley et al., 
2015; Pool, Delplanque, et al., 2014), more focused attention learning tasks 
(Anderson, 2016c; Mine & Saiki, 2015) and shorter training sessions (e.g,. 144 
trials in Sali et al., 2014); these prior studies have shown reward-based atten-
tional capture in a test phase, suggesting that our learning phase, in principle, 
ÃÕ`LiV`ÕVÛi Ì ÀiÜ>À` i>À}°7i ÀiVi`Ì>Ì vÕÌÕÀiÃÌÕ`iÃ
use a more established reward learning procedure, to facilitate interpretation 
of results.
7ivÕÀÌiÀiÝ>i`Ü`vviÀiÌÛ>À>ÌÃvÕÀÌ>Ã>vviVÌi`«iÀvÀ>Vi
in high vs. no distractor reward conditions. First, we introduced a random re-
ward schedule in Experiment 1B (Ferster & Skinner, 2015; Thorndike, 1898), but 
VwÀ>ÌÀÞÀiÃÕÌÃvÀÝ«iÀiÌ£	­nä¯À>`ÀiÜ>À`®ÜiÀiÃ>ÀÌ
those of Experiment 1A (100% reward). Second, we located the distractor fur-
ther away from the target in Experiment 1C. In this version of the task, misguid-
ed saccades towards the distractor should have had the strongest detrimental 
effects for performance. Nevertheless, by contrast to mounting evidence from 
ÛÃÀiÃi>ÀV­Ƃ`iÀÃ]Óä£ÈÆ>}E/iiÕÜiÃ]Óä£Ç®]Üi``Ìw`
evidence for such an effect. It could be that even if participants’ eye move-
ments were initially captured by reward-related distractors, they could quickly 
disengage from these cues and still perform the math task well. To conclude, 
Ì>ÃÛ>À>ÌÃ` `ÌyÕiViÌi>}ÌÕ`iv` ÃÀÕ«Ìv«iÀvÀ>ViLÞ
reward-related distractors.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the current research, we found no evidence that reward-related distractors 
>À«iÀvÀ>Vi` ÕÀ}>iÌ>>ÀÌiÌVÌ>Ã°ÕÀÛiÜ]ÌÃw`}Ã-
ÌiÀiÃÌ}>ÃÌVÌÀ>`VÌÃw`}ÃvÀÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀVÌ>ÃÃ­LÕÌÃii->E>}]
Óä£È®]vÀVyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}Ì>ÃÃ­ÀiLÃiÌ>°]Óä££]Óä£ä®]>`vÀÕÀ
previous research on mental arithmetic tasks (Rusz et al., 2018a). All in all, our 
research suggests that reward-related distractors may not harm performance 
on all types of tasks that require cognitive control.
4
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ABSTRACT
Smartphones have been shown to distract people from their main tasks (e.g., 
studying, working), but the psychological mechanisms underlying these dis-
tractions are not clear yet. In a preregistered experiment (https://osf.io/g8k-
bu/?view_only=9551866a2cc143ad8246e0245826b480), we tested whether 
the distracting nature of smartphones stems from their high associated (social) 
reward value. Participants (N = 117) performed a visual search task while they 
ÜiÀi` ÃÌÀ>VÌi`LÞ­>®}ÃV>ÀiÜ>À`>««Ã­i°}°]>ViL>««V³Ìw-
cation sign), (b) low social reward apps (e.g., Facebook app icon), and (c) no so-
V>ÀiÜ>À`>««Ã­i°}°]7i>ÌiÀ>««V®°7iiÝ«iVÌi`Ì>Ì}ÃV>ÀiÜ>À`
app icons would slow down search, especially when people were deprived of 
their smartphones. Surprisingly, high social reward (vs. low or no social reward) 
apps did not impair visual search performance, yet in a survey (N = 158) partici-
pants indicated to perceive these icons as more rewarding. Our results demon-
strate that even if people perceive social smartphone apps as more rewarding 
than nonsocial apps, this may not manifest in behavior.
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SOCIAL SMARTPHONE APPS DO NOT CAPTURE ATTEN-
TION DESPITE THEIR PERCEIVED HIGH REWARD VALUE
->ÀÌ«iÃ>ÀiÌÕ}ÌÌLi«iÀÛ>ÃÛiÃÕÀViÃv`ÃÌÀ>VÌÃ]`iwi`>Ã
performance decrements after the onset of task-irrelevant stimuli (Rusz et al., 
2019, 2018a). Indeed, increasing experimental evidence shows that smart-
«iÃ «>À V}ÌÛi«iÀvÀ>Vi ­7iÀE
i] Óä£È®° À ÃÌ>Vi]
i>À}>«iÀ}­-iÌiÌ>°]Óää®]ÀiViÛ}ÌwV>ÌÃ­-ÌÌ>ÀÌiÌ
al., 2015), or even the mere presence of a smartphone (Thornton et al., 2014; 
7>À`]Õi]iiâÞ]E	Ã]Óä£Ç®>`>i}>ÌÛiivviVÌÃÕÃÌ>}>ÌÌiÌ
on a main task (but see Johannes, Veling, Verwijmeren, & Buijzen, 2018). In line 
with such an impairment in maintaining attention, Kushlev, Proulx, and Dunn 
­Óä£È®vÕ`Ì>Ì«i«iÀi«ÀÌÀi`vwVÕÌiÃÌVViÌÀ>ÌiÌiÀÌ>ÃÃ
ÜiÌiÞi>Li­ÛÃ°`Ã>Li®ÌwV>ÌÃ°/>iÌ}iÌiÀ]ÌiÀiÃ}ÀÜ}
experimental evidence that smartphones appear to harm productivity. Howev-
er, the underlying psychological mechanism of these performance decrements 
remains unknown. Understanding this mechanism is crucial, as it can advance 
theory on the effects of smartphones on performance and inform policy makers 
on how to deal with smartphone use, for instance in school or work contexts.
Previously, smartphone distractions have predominantly been explained as 
a stimulus-driven mechanism. From this perspective, impairments in perfor-
mance happen because people are distracted by an external source (e.g., noti-
wV>ÌÃ]À}}«i®°ÜiÛiÀ]ÃÕV>«iÀÃ«iVÌÛi`iÃÌiÝ«>ÜÞ>
Ã>ÀÌ«iÌwV>ÌÃÕ`>Ûi>ÃÌÀ}iÀivviVÌÌ>>ÞÌiÀiÝÌiÀ>
ÃÌÕÕÃ­i°}°]>Õ`Ìi®°ÃÌi>`]«i«i>ÀiÌÞyÕiVi`LÞiÝÌiÀ>
cues, but also driven by current motivational states (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). 
Therefore, beyond external sources, smartphone distractions can be explained 
by a motivational drive to seek social rewards.
In line with this idea, it is plausible that smartphones distract people from their 
tasks because they carry social reward to the user and the user is motivated 
to attain that reward despite disengaging from another task (Oulasvirta et al., 
2012). According to Bayer, Campbell, and Ling (2016), because people have an 
innate need for social contact and belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci 
& Ryan, 2000), they use the predominantly social features of smartphones such 
>Ã7>ÌÃƂ««À>ViL°/ÀÕ}Ài«i>Ìi`ÞiiÌ}ÌiÀÃV>ii`Ã
those apps, users form an association between social reward and their smart-
«iÃ°/ÕÃ]ÕÃiÀÃ>ÀiwÀÃÌÌÛ>Ìi`Ì>ÌÌ>ÃV> ÀiÜ>À`ÃÌÀÕ}ÌiÀ
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smartphones. Once this connection is established, smartphone cues, such as 
ÀiViÛ}>ÌwV>Ì]>Þ>ÕÌ>ÌV>Þ>ÌÌÀ>VÌ>ÌÌiÌ>`ÌÀ}}iÀViV-
ing habits. In sum, Bayer and colleagues (2016) assume that the distracting 
potential of smartphones is due to their rewarding nature.
Although this account appears plausible, there are no direct tests of a smart-
phone cue-reward association. As of now, most research relies on indirect tests. 
For instance, there is evidence that smartphone symbols are associated with 
positive affect (G. M. van Koningsbruggen, Hartmann, Eden, & Veling, 2017) 
and can prime relationship-related concepts (Kardos, Unoka, Pléh, & Soltész, 
2018). Additionally, there is ample cross-sectional evidence demonstrating that 
ÕÃiÀÃ ÌiÃiÛiÃÀi«ÀÌ Ì>Ì ÌiÞLÌ>ÃV>}À>ÌwV>Ì vÀÃV>>««Ã
(Ishii, Rife, & Kagawa, 2017; Jung & Sundar, 2018; Karapanos, Teixeira, & Gou-
veia, 2016). Thus, even though several studies have addressed the idea that 
smartphones are associated with high social rewards, there is no direct empiri-
cal test of this mechanism.
On a fundamental level, value-driven attention (for a review, see Anderson, 
2016) provides a well-established cognitive framework that can explain reward 
associations, including those with one’s smartphone. As people, by nature, are 
reward-seeking organisms (Braver et al., 2014), attention prioritizes information 
that signals reward (Chelazzi et al., 2013). Recent work shows that this prioriti-
zation process operates even when information is entirely task-irrelevant, which 
leads to disengagement from the task at hand (Anderson et al., 2011b; Rusz et 
al., 2018a). In a series of studies (Anderson et al., 2011a, 2011b; Le Pelley et al., 
Óä£xÆ/iiÕÜiÃE	i«ÃÞ]Óä£Ó®]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃwÀÃÌi>Ài`Ì>ÃÃV>Ìi>
arbitrary stimulus feature (e.g., color) with high or low monetary rewards. Later, 
they engaged in a visual search task where these colored stimuli appeared as 
nontargets that needed to be ignored. Results show that distractors associated 
ÜÌ}­ÛÃ° Ü®iÌ>ÀÞÀiÜ>À`ÃÃ}wV>ÌÞÃÜi``ÜÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀV°
This means that reward-associated distractors gain high attentional priority 
(i.e., become more salient) and therefore capture visual attention (Hickey et al., 
2010a). This mechanism of learning to associate rewards with certain stimuli 
could explain how reward associations take place in smartphone settings.
Value-driven attention and smartphone app icons
Applying a value-driven attentional mechanism to a smartphone scenario, it is 
plausible that certain smartphone features (e.g., app icons) have been associat-
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ed with social rewards through repeated use. Consequently, these features gain 
attentional priority and therefore attract attention and eventually harm visual 
search performance. As the major part of social interaction on smartphones 
happens via apps, we assume that app icons carry social reward to the user. For 
ÃÌ>Vi]ÃV>>««Ã­i°}°]>ViL]7>ÌÃƂ««®]«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞÜÌ>ÌwV>-
ÌÃ}]ÃÕ`Li>ÃÃV>Ìi`ÜÌ}ÃV>ÀiÜ>À`]>ÃÌwV>ÌÃÕÃÕ>Þ
convey social validation, such as friends liking a picture or friend requests (Re-
V]-Vi`iÀ]Ei}]Óä£n®°
ÛiÀÃiÞ]ÃV>>««Ã­i°}°]7i>ÌiÀ]
>-
culator) should not carry social rewards as they are not used for social purposes. 
So, analogous to the value-driven attention account, we expect that social app 
icons should similarly attract attention and therefore slow down visual search. 
Therefore, we predict that low social reward distractors (social app icons) and 
}ÃV>ÀiÜ>À`` ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ­ÃV>>««VÃÜÌ>ÌwV>Ì®ÀiÃÕÌÃÜ-
er reaction times compared to no reward distractors (neutral app icons; H1a-b), 
and that high social reward distractors result in slower reaction times than low 
social reward distractors (H1c).
In addition, it is well-established that deprivation of rewarding experienc-
es strengthens the motivation to obtain these experiences (Seibt, Häfner, & 
Deutsch, 2007). For example, depriving participants of food led to a higher 
reinforcing value of the food compared to not hungry participants (Epstein, 
/ÀÕiÃ`>i]7V]*>ÕV]E,>ÞÀ]ÓääÎ®°->ÀÞ]ÌÃV«À>VÌViÌ
assess the true value participants assign to food after a fasting period (e.g., 
Chen, Veling, Dijksterhuis, & Holland, 2016). In the case of smartphones, if so-
cial apps truly are rewarding, the appeal of social apps, similar to food, should 
be stronger for those who have been deprived of using these apps. Evidence 
for such a position comes from studies showing that phone separation is asso-
ciated with strong emotional reactions (Hoffner & Lee, 2015), leads to anxiety 
(Cheever, Rosen, Carrier, & Chavez, 2014), impairs cognitive control (Hartan-
to & Yang, 2016), and results in physiological stress reactions (Clayton et al., 
2015). Consequently, the reward value associated with app icons should be 
particularly high, and hence distracting, when participants are motivated to use 
ÌiÃi>««Ã°7iÌÕÃÞ«ÌiÃâiÌ>Ì>>ivviVÌÃv`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ>ÀiÃÌÀ}iÀ
for users who have previously been deprived of their phones compared to a 
control group (H2).
/ÃÃiÌÕ«i>LiÃÕÃÌiÝVÕ`i>ÌiÀ>ÌÛiiÝ«>>ÌÃ\ vÜi `ii`w`
the expected pattern for distractor, (a) low and high social reward distractors 
might capture attention merely because the social apps are more familiar to 
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participants, given that they are used more; (b) high social reward distractors 
might capture attention more than low social reward distractors because of the 
Ài`VÀvÌiÌwV>ÌÃ}°/iÀivÀi]ÞvÌiivviVÌÃ>«wi`Ìi
deprivation condition can we conclude that apps indeed carry reward for users, 
above and beyond the possible effects of familiarity and color.
To test our hypotheses, we adapted the visual search task introduced in Ander-
ÃiÌ>° ­Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°]Óä££L®°7iVÃiÌÃ«>À>`}vÀÌÜÀi>ÃÃ°
First, it is a well-established method to assess the effect of reward-associated 
distractors on attention (Anderson, 2013, 2016b; Failing & Theeuwes, 2017; Le 
Pelley et al., 2016). Second, the visual search task represents a good approxi-
mation of smartphone distractions in real life scenarios. For instance, consider a 
ÃÌÕ`iÌÜ>ÃÌÜÀÌi>«>«iÀ]LÕÌÌi>ViLÌwV>ÌÃ}Ài«i>Ìi`Þ
captures their attention.
7i` iÛ>Ìi`vÀÌiÀ}>«>À>`}ÌÜ>À>Ã«iVÌÃ°ÀÃÌ]ÜiÌÌi`
the reward learning phase from the current study because we assumed that 
people learned to associate social rewards with smartphone app icons through 
repeated exposure in everyday life. Therefore, we only used the testing phase 
of the original paradigm. Second, in order to increase ecological validity, we 
used smartphone app icons as distractors. By using real-life icons, we followed 
recent studies which show that more complex visual information, such as pic-
tures of people or scenery, can also be associated with rewards (Failing & Th-
eeuwes, 2015; Hickey et al., 2015).
/ÕÃ]ÌiVÕÀÀiÌÃÌÕ`Þ]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜiÀiÃÌÀÕVÌi`Ìw`ÌiÌ>À}iÌÜi
they were distracted by app icons that were associated with high social re-
wards, low social rewards, or no social rewards. In the original paradigm, the 
ÀiÜ>À`}>ÌÕÀivÃÌÕÃÀiyiVÌi`«>Ài`ÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀV°
ÃiµÕiÌÞ]
the visual search task paradigm provides us with a test of the proposed smart-
phone-reward association: If social smartphone cues are indeed more reward-
ing than neutral smartphone cues, they, like other rewarding stimuli, should 
impair visual search. In other words, impaired visual search performance serves 
as an indicator of the reward associated with smartphone cues.
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STUDY 1
Method
*ÀiÀi}ÃÌÀ>Ì>`>Ì>æÛ>>LÌÞ
7i«ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀi`Þ«ÌiÃiÃ]Ã>«iÃâi]VÕÃ>`iÝVÕÃVÀÌiÀ>]>`
statistical analyses (https://osf.io/36yqe/?view_only=9e2e62f8f2954ebc92f-
585d00266afb1). Our preregistration, experimental materials, data, and analy-
sis are available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/g8kbu/?view_
only=9551866a2cc143ad8246e0245826b480).
Participants
As power calculations are not entirely straight-forward for linear mixed-effects 
models (Scherbaum & Ferreter, 2008), we preregistered a rather conservative 
Ã>«iÃâi°/iÀivÀi]ÜiÀiVÀÕÌi`£ÓäÃÌÕ`iÌÃvÀ>ÕÌVÕÛiÀÃÌÞ°7i
had four inclusion criteria: First, participants needed to have normal or correct-
ed to normal vision. Second, students needed to own an iPhone. This ensured 
the icons we used as distractors would be identical to those that participants 
use on their iPhones every day. Icons are standardized across iOS compared 
to Android, where icons often differ between devices due to the open source 
nature of the Android OS. Third, as people under 25 report the highest smart-
phone use (PewResearchCenter, 2018), our participants had to be younger than 
ÓxÞi>ÀÃ°ÕÀÌ]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ>`Ì>ÛiÌiwÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ>««Ã>ViL]
>ViLiÃÃi}iÀ] ÃÌ>}À>]->«V>Ì]>`7>ÌÃƂ««ÃÌ>i`ÌiÀ
iPhone and they had to be frequent users of these apps for at least two years. 
These criteria were meant to ensure that reward learning had taken place, that 
is, stimulus features had been paired with the delivery of (social) rewards (Le 
*iiÞiÌ>°]Óä£È®\1Ã}ÌiÃiwÛiÃV>>««ÃvÀiµÕiÌÞ«>ÕÃLÞ>Ãi`Ì
an established association of social rewards with visual features of these apps.
Following our preregistered exclusion criteria, we excluded three participants 
>ÃÌiÞ``Ì Ài>VÇä¯>VVÕÀ>VÞÌiÌ>Ã°/ÕÃ] Ìiw>Ã>«iV-
sisted of 117 students (59 in the control and 58 in the deprivation condition; 
106 females, Mage = 20.85, SDage = 1.88). Participants were compensated with 
monetary rewards in the form of a gift voucher (€5 or €10) or course credits. The 
study had IRB approval and all participants gave informed consent.
Design
7ii«Þi`>Ýi`` iÃ}ÜÌ` i«ÀÛ>Ì>Ã>LiÌÜiiÃÕLiVÌ`i«i`-
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ent variable (2 levels: deprivation group vs. control group), app distractor icon 
as a within-subject independent variable (3 levels: high social reward vs. low so-
cial reward vs. no social reward) and response time (RT) as dependent variable.
Procedure
7iÀ>`Þ>ÃÃ}i`«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÌiÌiÀÌi` i«ÀÛ>ÌÀÌiVÌÀV-
dition. In the deprivation condition, we asked participants to come to the lab 
one hour before the experiment to hand in their iPhone, which we locked away 
in a drawer. Then, we told participants that they were free to go about their day 
within the next hour, but asked them not to engage in any social media activity 
until the experiment started. After one hour, they came back and performed 
the task (see below). After the task they received their phone. In the control 
condition, participants came to the lab at their assigned time slot and directly 
performed the task.
Before starting the task, participants reported demographics (age and gen-
der). In order to assess whether our deprivation manipulation indeed led to an 
increased motivation to use their smartphones, participants then answered a 
short manipulation check on a 1 (not at all) to 100 (extremely) visual analogue 
ÃV>i­º,}ÌÜ]ÌÜ>ÌiÝÌiÌ`ÞÕvii>ÕÀ}iÌViVÞÕÀ«i¶»®°
/i]ÌiÞ«iÀvÀi`ÌiÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀVÌ>Ã°>Þ]>vÌiÀwÃ}ÌiÌ>Ã]«>À-
ticipants reported a second manipulation check, namely whether they had seen 
20 apps (ten of which were used in the experiment) during the course of the 
ÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀVÌ>Ã°7ÌÌÃµÕiÃÌ]ÜiÌiÃÌi`ÜiÌiÀ«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ>VÌÕ>Þ
processed the distractor app icons throughout the visual search task.
Visual Search Task
7i` iÃ}i`>ÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀVÌ>ÃL>Ãi`Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°­Óä££L®°*>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ
were seated about 50 cm from a monitor with a resolution of 1920x1080 pixels. 
"i>VÌÀ>]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃwÀÃÌÃ>Ü>wÝ>ÌVÀÃÃÜÌ>ÛÃÕ>>}ivä°xc]
ÌiÃÝÃ>«iÃÀ}>âi`>>}>ÀÞVÀViÜÌ>ÛÃÕ>>}iv£äcÆi>V
Ã>«i>`>ÛÃÕ>>}ivÎ°{xcÆ>ÃÌ]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜiÀi«ÀiÃiÌi`ÜÌ>«iÀ-
formance feedback display (see Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1. Trials in the experiment. Examples of (A) high social reward distractor trial, (B) 
low social reward distractor trial, and (C) no social reward distractor trial.
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Among these six shapes, there was always one unique shape, which was de-
wi`>ÃÌiÌ>À}iÌ­°i°]>VÀVi>}`>`ÃÀ>`>`>}VÀViÃ®°
>VÌ>À}iÌÃ>«iVÌ>i`>L>V iÌÌi`LÞ{xc°/iÌ>À}iÌÃ>«i
always contained either a horizontal or vertical black line. On all trials, there 
Ü>Ã>`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ>««ViLi``i`­£°ÇÎcÛÃÕ>>}i®ivÌ>À}iÌ
shapes, on top of the tilted lines.
These distractor app icons represented three levels of social rewards (high, 
low, and no social rewards, see Figure 5.2). On the high social reward distrac-
ÌÀÌÀ>Ã­Ãii}ÕÀix°ÓƂ®]ÌiÀiÜ>Ã>ÃV>>««VÜÌ>ÌwV>ÌÃ}
­>ViL]>ViLiÃÃi}iÀ]ÃÌ>}À>]7>ÌÃƂ««]>`->«V>Ì®ÜÌ
ivÌiÌ>À}iÌÃ>«iÃ°7iVÃiÌiÃi>««ÃLiV>ÕÃiÌiÞ>ÀiÌiÃÌ
VÞÕÃi`ÃV>>««Ã°/iÀi`ÌwV>ÌÜ>Ã`iÌV>ÌÌiiÕÃi`
on iOS. On the low social reward distractor trials (Figure 5.2B), there was a 
ÃV>>««V­°i°]Ã>iVÃÜÌÕÌÌiÌwV>ÌÃ}®ÜÌivÌi
nontarget shapes. As stated above, these apps are mainly used for social pur-
poses – so we assumed they represent social reward to people, but less than 
ÌiÃiÃ>i>««ÃÜÌÌiViÀÌ>ÌÞv>ÌwV>ÌÃ}°>Þ]ÌiÃ-
V>ÀiÜ>À``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÌÀ>Ã­}ÕÀix°Ó
®]ÌiÀiÜ>Ã>iÕÌÀ>>««V­7i>ÌiÀ]
-iÌÌ}Ã] ÌiÃ]
V]>`
>VÕ>ÌÀ®ÜÌÌiÌ>À}iÌÃ>«iÃ°7iVÃi
ÌiÃiÃ«iVwVVÃ>ÃÌiÞ>Ài«ÀiÃÌ>i`iÛiÀÞ*i]Ã*iÕÃiÀÃ
most likely encounter them often enough; yet, they are never used for social 
purposes, so we assumed that participants could not have possibly associated 
social rewards with any of the neutral app icons. The target shape never includ-
ed any distractors (i.e., icons). Target and distractor location were randomly 
determined; distractor app icon and the unique shape were counterbalanced.
*>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜiÀiÃÌÀÕVÌi`ÌÃi>ÀVvÀÌiÌ>À}iÌ]ÜVÜ>Ã>Ü>ÞÃ`iwi`
as the unique shape in the search display, and report whether the line within 
ÌiÌ>À}iÌÃ>«iÜ>ÃÀâÌ>ÀÛiÀÌV>]LÞ«ÀiÃÃ}Ìiºâ»>`º»iÞÃ
(counterbalanced). The experiment consisted of 480 trials: 120 trials (25%) con-
tained a high social reward distractor, 120 trials (25%) contained a low social 
reward distractor, and 240 trials (50%) contained a no social reward distractor. 
Before the task, participants did 24 practice trials. After each 96 experimental 
ÌÀ>Ã]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃVÕ`Ì>i>ÃÀÌLÀi>°/iÌ>ÃÌHÎxÕÌiÃÌwÃ°
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Figure 5.2.-ÌÕÕÃi`ÌiiÝ«iÀiÌ°­Ƃ®ÃV>>««VÃÜÌ>ÌwV>ÌÃ}
represent high social rewards. (B) social app icons represent low social rewards. (C) 
neutral app icons represent no social rewards.
>Ì>æ>ÞÃÃ
7iV`ÕVÌi`>vÕÀ>>ÞÃiÃ,­ÛiÀÃÎ°x°äÆ,
ÀiÌi>]Óä£x®°i
with our preregistration, we tested our hypotheses using a linear mixed-effects 
modeling approach using the lmer function (lme4 package; version 1.1.17; 
	>ÌiÃ]BViÀ]	iÀ]E7>iÀ]Óä£x®°7i>i`vÀ>¼>Ý>½À>`iv
fects structure as advocated by Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013) to avoid 
y>Ìi`/Þ«i£iÀÀÀÃ°ƂVVÀ`}Þ]ÕÀ`i«Ài`VÌ}ÀiÃ«ÃiÌiVÕ`
ed two random intercepts; a per-participant random intercept to account for 
the repeated-measures nature of the data and a per-app icon random intercept 
to account for any additional variance in response time caused by the specif-
V>«« VÃ VÕ`i` ÕÀÃÌÕ`Þ°7i`ii`ÌiÜÌÃÕLiVÌ«Ài`VÌÀ
`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ>ÃwÝi`ivviVÌ>`>ÃÀ>`Ã«iÛ>ÀÞ}>VÀÃÃ«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ°7i
`ii`ÌiLiÌÜiiÃÕLiVÌ«Ài`VÌÀV`Ì>ÃwÝi`ivviVÌ>`>ÃÀ>
dom slope varying across app icons.
To determine p-values, we preregistered to compute Type III bootstrapped 
Likelihood Ratio Tests using the mixed function (Singmann et al., 2016). How-
ever, this analysis led to several convergence warnings that persevered after 
the recommended troubleshooting steps. Thus, we followed recent recom-
mendations by Luke (Luke, 2017). Based on simulations, he compared several 
>««À>ViÃÌiÛ>Õ>Ì}Ã}wV>Vi Ýi`ivviVÌÃ`iÃ]>`VVÕ`
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ed that F-tests with Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of freedom are 
the most appropriate to control Type 1 error rates. Thus, we opted for this 
approach instead (also using the mixed function), which resulted in no conver-
gence warnings.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Directly before starting the visual search task, participants in the depriva-
tion condition reported a higher urge to check their smartphone (M = 51.81, 
SD = 21.20) than participants in the control condition (M = 32.28, SD = 27.15), 
t(111.44) = -4.39, p < .001, d = .80. At the end of the experiment, participants 
VÀÀiVÌÞV>ÃÃwi`ÜiÌiÀÀÌÌiÞ>`ÃiiÓä`vviÀiÌ>««VÃ­Ìiv
which we used as distractors) with an accuracy of 84%, indicating that they did 
process the distractors during the search task.
Preregistered Analyses
In line with our preregistration, we excluded any trial on which (a) the RT was 
below 300ms (< 0.01%) and (b) the RT was ± 3 SDs from the participant’s 
mean (0.01%). For the analysis, we also excluded all inaccurate trials. Partic-
ipants were accurate on 92% of the experimental trials. Across all remaining 
experimental trials from all participants (N = 51083) mean response time was 
676.46ms (SD = 81.17).
/i>ivviVÌv`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÜ>ÃÌÃ}wV>Ì]F(2, 13.49) = 0.90, p = .428. 
*>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ½ ÀiÃ«Ãi Ìi `` Ì Ã}wV>ÌÞ `vviÀ LiÌÜii } Ã-
cial reward distractors (M = 678.82, SD = 83.11), low social reward distrac-
tors (M = 676.52, SD = 82.06), or no social reward distractors (M = 675.26, 
SDrn£°Ón®°/ÕÀÃÕÀ«ÀÃi]Ìi>ivviVÌvV`ÌÜ>ÃÃ}wV>Ì]F(1, 
114.99) = 4.00, p = .048. Overall, participants in the deprivation condition 
(M = 661.61, SD = 76.17) responded faster than participants in the control 
condition (M = 691.06, SD = 83.88), irrespective of the type of distractor pre-
sented on any given trial. Last, the interaction effect of distractor and condition 
Ü>ÃÌÃ}wV>Ì]F(2, 348.63) = 2.59, p = .076. To investigate whether there 
was indeed no interaction effect and to better understand our data, we tested 
the main effect of distractor in both conditions separately. The main effect of 
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`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÜ>ÃiÌiÀÃ}wV>Ì  ÌiVÌÀV`Ì]F(2, 16.54) = 1.18, 
p = .33, nor in the deprivation condition, F(2, 16.18) = 2.56, p = .11. Taken 
Ì}iÌiÀ]ÌiivviVÌv`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ``ÌÃ}wV>ÌÞ`vviÀLiÌÜiiÌi`i«-
rivation condition and the control condition. A visualization of the raw data 
associated with our analysis can be found in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3. Violin plots of response times per distractor and condition. Triangles represent 
mean response times (in ms).
Bayesian Follow-Up Analyses
A major limitation of our frequentist model is that it cannot quantify evidence 
for the null hypothesis. Therefore, to investigate to what extent our data sup-
port the lack of an effect, we conducted a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA 
with the anovaBF command (BayesFactor package; version 0.9.12.2; Morey & 
Rouder, 2015). The model employed the default Cauchy distribution for the pri-
5
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or. The Bayes Factors associated with our predictors can be found in Table 5.1. 
Comparing a model with the main effect of condition to the null model yield-
ed inconclusive evidence, as the data were 1.63 times more likely under the 
null model without the effect of condition (BF10 = 0.61). On the one hand, the 
	>ÞiÃ>Ƃ "6Ƃ`iÃÌ>Ü>>>ÞÃÃ>Ãwi}À>i`>ÃÌivÀiµÕiÌÃÌ
mixed model, as it does not include a per-icon random intercept and random 
slope of condition. On the other hand, p-values close to the cut-off of ɲ = .05 
often do not represent much evidential value (Benjamin et al., 2018), which is 
further illustrated by the Bayes Factor we obtained. The Bayesian analysis of 
Ìi>ivviVÌÌÕÃÃÜÃÌ>ÌÜiÃÕ`ÌiÀ«ÀiÌÌiÃ}wV>Ì>ivviVÌ
of deprivation with caution.
>``Ì]ÃÕ««ÀÌ}ÌiÃ}wV>ÌivviVÌv`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀ]ÌiÀiÜ>ÃÃÌÀ}
evidence that the data were much more likely under a null model compared 
to a model with the effect of distractor (BF01 = 755). The same holds for the 
interaction effect, which was not supported compared to a model with the two 
main effects (BF01 = 155).
Table 5.1. Results of Bayesian follow-up analysis
Effect BF
Condition 0.612712
Distractor 0.001325
Condition + Distractor 0.000777
Condition + Distractor + Interaction 0.000005
 
Exploratory Analyses
In order to follow up on the unexpected main effect of condition, we investi-
gated whether there was a speed-accuracy tradeoff. A maximal generalized 
Ýi``iÜÌ>VVÕÀ>VÞ>ÃÌi`i«i`iÌÛ>À>Li``ÌÃÜ>Ã}w-
cant effect of condition (ʖ2(1) = 0.0, p = .99). Supporting the lack of an effect, a 
Bayesian contingency table showed strong support for the lack of a difference 
between the conditions (BF01r£ÈÇ®°7iVVÕ`iÌ>ÌÌiÀiÜ>ÃÃ«ii`>V-
curacy tradeoff, and that participants in the deprivation condition indeed per-
formed better (faster while equally accurate).
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DISCUSSION
Contrary to our expectations, high social reward apps did not slow down visual 
search compared to low or no social reward apps, neither in the smartphone 
deprived, nor in the control condition. Based on prior work we assumed that 
different apps would have different levels of reward associated with them (Bay-
er et al., 2016; G. M. van Koningsbruggen et al., 2017). However, one possible 
explanation for this null effect is that social apps were not perceived as more 
rewarding than neutral apps. In fact, unlike in the original study series on val-
ue-driven attention (Anderson et al., 2011b), we did not directly manipulate 
stimulus-reward associations. In the original task, participants go through an 
extensive reward training, in which arbitrary stimuli, such as color, become as-
sociated with the delivery of monetary rewards. Consequently, these reward-as-
sociated stimuli slow down visual search; that is, impairment of visual search 
is an indicator of attentional capture by the reward of the stimuli. However, in 
our application of this paradigm we did not manipulate reward, but assumed 
the reward value of apps had been established in real life, through repeated 
use prior to the experiment. The lack of an effect on visual search speed might 
ÌiiÌiÀÀiyiVÌÌ>ÌÌiÃÌÕ>ÀiÌÀiÜ>À`}]ÀÌ>ÌÌiÞ>ÀiÀiÜ>À`}]
but not rewarding enough to cause differences in attentional capture. Due to 
the design of Study 1, we cannot be certain that participants indeed perceived 
social apps as more rewarding than nonsocial apps. Therefore, we need to 
establish whether our reward manipulation was effective after all to rule out 
the alternative explanation that the app categories were not different in their 
associated reward.
To address this possible alternative explanation for the null effect of reward-as-
sociated distractors, we conducted a survey where participants rated all 15 
>««ÃÜiÕÃi``ÕÀ}ÌiiÝ«iÀiÌÜÀiÜ>À`}ÌiÞvÕ`Ìi°7i
expected that, if the three levels were truly to manipulate social reward, we 
should at least be able to detect a difference on how people themselves per-
ceive these different apps. Accordingly, we hypothesized that high social re-
ward apps would be rated higher than both low social reward apps and no 
social reward apps. In addition, we expected low social reward apps to receive 
higher ratings than no social reward apps.
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STUDY 2
Method
*ÀiÀi}ÃÌÀ>Ì>`>Ì>æÛ>>LÌÞ
7i «ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀi` Þ«ÌiÃiÃ] Ã>«i Ãâi] VÕÃ >` iÝVÕÃ VÀÌiÀ>]
and statistical analyses (https://osf.io/s3npg/?view_only=9360f2b6a98f49d-
ca71b0ee32ea43cbb). The preregistration, experimental materials, data, and 
analysis are available on the Open Science Framework project of this article 
(https://osf.io/g8kbu/?view_only=9551866a2cc143ad8246e0245826b480).
Participants
Because we expected an experimental manipulation to induce at least a me-
dium-sized effect (ɻp
2 = .05) on a manipulation check, we aimed to obtain 95% 
power to detect an effect of at least that size at ɲ = .05 for the main effect in a 
repeated-measures ANOVA. Thus, we preregistered to recruit 160 (150 need-
ed for 95% power plus ten to account for exclusions) valid responses on the 
i«>ÌvÀ*ÀwV°7iVÕÌi`ÌÃiÃÕLÃÃÃ>ÃÛ>`Ì>Ì«>ÃÃi`>
>ÌÌiÌViV­ÃiiLiÜ®]>Ã*ÀwViÌÃÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃÀiÃ>«i«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃv
a participant fails an attention check.
7i>i`ÌLÌ>>Ã>«i>ÃÃ>À>Ã«ÃÃLiÌÕÀÃ>«i-ÌÕ`Þ£°
Overall, 252 participants from the UK between the ages of 18 and 25 opened 
the survey. All participants were screened and had to currently own an iPhone 
and have used an iPhone for at least the past two years. Furthermore, partici-
«>ÌÃ>`Ì>ÛiÌiwÛiÃV>>««ÃvÀ-ÌÕ`Þ£ÃÌ>i`>`>`Ì>Ûi
used them for at least the past two years. In addition to these inclusion criteria, 
we preregistered several exclusion criteria. First, 52 participants were excluded 
LiV>ÕÃiÌiÞ``ÌwÃÌiÃÕÀÛiÞ°-iV`]vÌiÀi>}Óää]{ä``
not pass an attention check (see Procedure). Third, we excluded two partic-
«>ÌÃÜ `V>Ìi` Ì>Ì ÌiÞÜiÀi `iÀ Ì> «ÀiÃVÀiii` LÞ *ÀwV° 
«>ÀÌV«>ÌvÕwi`ÕÀvÕÀÌiÝVÕÃVÀÌiÀv>Û}>Û>À>VivâiÀ
>VÀÃÃ>À>Ìi`>««Ã]ÀÕÀwvÌiÝVÕÃVÀÌiÀvÃ«i`}iÃÃÌ>Îä
total seconds on the 15 apps to rate (Mseconds = 72, SDsecondsrÎ£®°/ÕÃ]Ìiw>
sample consisted of 158 participants (Mage = 21.56, SDage = 2.40) of which 110 
were female (70%).
Procedure
*>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜiÀivÀi`Ì>ÌÌi>vÌiÃÌÕ`ÞÜ>ÃÌw`ÕÌÜ«i«i
129
Social Smartphone Apps Do Not Capture Attention Despite Their Perceived High Reward Value
experience different apps. In particular, participants were informed that they 
ÜiÀiÌÀ>Ìi`vviÀiÌ>««ÃÜÀiÜ>À`}ÌiÞw`Ìi°/>iVi>À
Ü>ÌÜii>ÌÜÌÀiÜ>À`}]Üi«ÀÛ`i`ÃiÛiÀ>V>ÀwV>ÌÃ­i°}°]vii}
happy when using the app, feeling a strong need to use it, liking the app). To 
avoid participants overthinking their responses, we instructed them to respond 
promptly, based on their immediate thoughts about each app. To avoid con-
fusion about the difference between a high social reward app (i.e., a social 
>««ÜÌ>ÌwV>ÌÃ}®>`>ÜÃV>ÀiÜ>À`>««­°i°]ÌiÃ>iÃV>
>««ÜÌÕÌ>ÌwV>ÌÃ}®]ÜiÃÌÀÕVÌi`«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÌ>ÌÌi>««ÃÜÕ`
ÃiÌiÃ>Ûi>ÌwV>ÌÃ}>`Ì>ÌÌiÞÃÕ`ÌÀi>ÌÌi>««>ÃvÌiÞ
saw it in that form on their own phone. Because understanding the task instruc-
tions was crucial to accurately rate the apps, we implemented two measures to 
ensure participants properly read the instructions. First, going to the next page 
was only possible after 20 seconds. Second, at the end of the task description, 
ÜiÃÌÀÕVÌi`«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÌÃiiVÌº »Ì«ÀVii`ÌÌiÌ>Ã>Ã>>ÌÌiÌ
check.
Participants then proceeded to rate all 15 stimuli used in Study 1 on the ques-
ÌºÜÀiÜ>À`}`ÞÕw`ÌÃ>««¶»>ÛÃÕ>>>}ÕiÃV>iÀ>}}
from -100 (not at all) to 100 (very much). Presentation order of the apps was 
randomized. The entire survey, on average, took about three minutes (Msec-
onds = 185, SDseconds = 71) and participants received £0.50. The study had IRB 
approval and all participants gave informed consent.
Results
7iV`ÕVÌi`>Ài«i>Ìi`i>ÃÕÀiÃƂ "6ƂÜÌ>««V>Ìi}ÀÞ­ÜÌ\}
social reward vs. low social reward vs. no social reward) as predictor and ratings 
of how rewarding participants found those apps as outcome. As the assump-
tion of sphericity was violated (W = .30, p < .001), we report the F-statistic with 
ÀiiÕÃiiÃÃiÀVÀÀiVÌ°/i>ivviVÌvV>Ìi}ÀÞÜ>ÃÃ}wV>Ì>`
large, F(1.18, 184.75) = 150.77, p < .001, ɻG
2 = .32. The strength of evidence 
for an effect of category was further supported by a Bayesian repeated-meas-
ures ANOVA with the standard Cauchy prior (BF10 = 1.63e+107). To test our 
predicted contrasts we conducted three post-hoc two-tailed paired t-tests 
without correction for multiple testing, as correction for multiple testing is not 
iViÃÃ>ÀÞvÀ`iÃ}ÃÜÌÞiv>VÌÀÜÌÌÀiiiÛiÃ°7i«ÀiÃiÌ«>Ài`
Bayesian t-tests alongside the frequentist results.
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In line with our predictions, high social reward apps (M = 36.99, SD = 33.18) 
ÀiViÛi`Ã}wV>ÌÞ}iÀÀ>Ì}ÃÌ>ÜÃV>ÀiÜ>À`Ã>««Ã­M = 25.46, 
SD = 34.31), t(157) = 7.61, p < .001, BF10 = 3.06e+09, dz = 0.61, and signif-
icantly higher ratings than no social reward apps (M = -22.00, SD = 43.48), 
t(157) = 13.20, p < .001, BF10 = 1.15e+24, dz = 1.05. In addition, low social 
ÀiÜ>À`>««ÃÀiViÛi`Ã}wV>ÌÞ}iÀÀ>Ì}ÃÌ>ÃV>ÀiÜ>À`>««Ã]
t(157) = 11.64, p < .001, BF10 = 7.36e+19, dz = 0.93. The residuals within each 
condition were roughly normally distributed and the results were robust to re-
moval of outliers. A visualization of the raw data associated with our analysis 
can be found in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4. Distribution of how rewarding participants rated the three categories of apps. 
Triangles represent mean ratings.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of the current study was to test whether smartphone distractions stem 
from the high social rewards associated with smartphone apps. Participants 
engaged in a visual search task while they were distracted by smartphone app 
icons. Although we show that participants perceive social apps as more re-
warding than neutral apps, that perceived reward did not impair performance 
in a visual search task. Also, depriving participants of their smartphone did not 
amplify such an effect. However, surprisingly, participants who were deprived 
of their smartphones performed better. In short, these results suggest that even 
if people perceive social apps as more rewarding than nonsocial apps, being 
iÝ«Ãi` Ì ÌiÃi >««Ã >Ã `ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ `iÃ Ì yÕiVi «iÀvÀ>Vi  >
visual search task. However, there are several alternative explanations, both 
ÌiÀiÌV>>`iÌ`}V>]vÀÕÀw`}Ã°
One possible alternative explanation for the lack of an effect of the three app 
groups is that participants did not perceive social apps as more rewarding than 
neutral apps. Instead of manipulating reward, as is common with the visual 
search paradigm, we assumed that users repeatedly obtain social validation 
>`}À>ÌwV>ÌvÀÃV>>««Ã­>À>«>ÃiÌ>°]Óä£ÈÆ,iViÌ>°]Óä£n®]
such that they would learn to associate social reward value with these apps. 
/iÀivÀi]ÜiiÝ«iVÌi`Ì>ÌÃV>>««VÃ]«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞÌÃiÜÌ>ÌwV>-
tion sign, gained their reward value in everyday life and should be as powerful 
as a controlled reward training phase in the lab. To provide evidence for this 
line of reasoning, Study 2 showed that people themselves report social apps to 
LiÀiÀiÜ>À`}Ì>iÕÌÀ>>««Ã]iÃ«iV>ÞvÃV>>««Ã>Ûi>ÌwV>-
tion sign. Importantly, the effect we obtained was large. As a consequence, we 
V>LiÀiVw`iÌÌ>ÌÌi>Vv>ivviVÌÃÌ`ÕiÌ>v>i`>«Õ-
lation of reward.
That being said, there are several caveats to this objection which do not al-
low to draw a clear conclusion from our behavioral data regarding the reward 
value of apps. First, Study 1 and Study 2 were run on different samples, albeit 
matched on demographics. Technically, insights from the ratings in Study 2 
might not apply to participants in Study 1. In addition, although we show a 
difference in how the different app sets (i.e., high, low, and no social reward) 
>Ài«iÀViÛi`]ÌiÃiÀ>Ì}Ã>ÀiÀi>ÌÛiÌi>VÌiÀ°7iV>ÌLiViÀÌ>
>ÃV>>««ÜÌ>ÌwV>ÌÃ}`iÃÌÀÕÞ viiÀiÜ>À`}À ÕÃÌÀi
rewarding compared to a neutral app, which might not feel rewarding at all. As 
5
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such, the relative difference in perceived reward value might not manifest itself 
on a behavioral level because, in absolute terms, the reward associated with 
apps is not large enough to attract attention (Potter, 2011).
Furthermore, we did not have a no-app control condition. Such a control con-
dition would be informative by testing whether all apps, regardless of their 
perceived value, slow down visual search. Similarly, implementing a control 
condition with an arbitrary symbol (e.g., a symbol similar in shape to app icons) 
as distractor could provide a test whether app icons attract attention above 
and beyond any other distractor. This view aligns with the lack of an inter-
>VÌ LiÌÜii >«« VÃ >` Ìi `i«ÀÛ>Ì>«Õ>Ì°7i «Ài`VÌi`
that social apps would be particularly distracting if users had been deprived 
to access them (Epstein et al., 2003; Seibt et al., 2007). Yet our data show that 
deprivation did not affect whether participants were more or less distracted 
by different apps. The lack of an interaction provides additional evidence for 
the explanation that perceived reward did not manifest itself on a behavio-
ral level. Future research could consider using a no-reward control condition, 
an arbitrary symbol control condition, or even contrast apps with the low and 
high monetary reward condition used in the original paradigm (Anderson et al., 
2011b) to test such a proposition.
"ÕÀw`}ÃiVÜÀ`iÃÌÀ>Ì}Ì>Ì«i«i½Ã«iÀVi«Ì>LÕÌÃ>ÀÌ-
phones do not necessarily translate to behavior. For instance, Johannes et al. 
­Óä£n® vÕ` Ì>Ì ÀiViÛ}>ÌwV>Ì`ÕÀ}>V}ÌÛiVÌÀ Ì>Ã``
Ì«>À«iÀvÀ>Vi`iÃ«Ìi«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÀi«ÀÌ}Ìw`ÌiÌwV>Ì
highly distracting. In a similar vein, other studies found that people are not 
good estimators of their own smartphone or internet use (Ellis, Davidson, Shaw, 
EiÞiÀ]Óä£nÆ-V>ÀÜ]Óä£È®°/>iÌ}iÌiÀ]ÌiÃiw`}ÃÃÕ}}iÃÌÌ>Ì
there might be a gap between what people themselves report about the dis-
tractions of their smartphones and the actual behavioral impairment these de-
vices exert on them.
"ÕÀÕw`}Ã>Ûi>ÌiÀ«ÌiÌ>iÝ«>>Ì°ÀÃÌ>Vi]ÕÀiÝ«iÀ-
iment, we presented app icons in complete isolation from their usual context, 
which may have reduced their reward value altogether. Drawing from the the-
ory of grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2009), experiences are stored in people’s 
mind within a complex structure of sensory input, cognitions, affective states, 
>`ÃÌÕ>Ì>VÕiÃ°ÌÃ«ÃÃLiÌ>Ì`À>Ü}>Ã«iVwVVÕivÀÃÕV>ÀV]
situated experience reduces the value of that cue. It is likely that it is only in their 
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real-life context that smartphone apps represent social reward, because con-
text is part of the reward value-association. Consequently, participants might 
explicitly evaluate app icons as rewarding if there is no time pressure and they 
can imagine the icons within the context of their own phones, as in Study 2. In 
contrast, when these app icons get isolated from their real context in the lab, 
they may not affect attention (Best & Papies, 2017). Thus, the lab situation may 
not be appropriate for behaviorally measuring reward associations with smart-
phone apps. Supporting this reasoning, it has been shown that other types of 
rewards, such as food, are often stored in memory in terms of situations, for 
instance, where people eat them (e.g., popcorn is associated with cinema) and 
whom people eat those foods with (e.g., family events; Papies, 2013). Future 
research could address this issue by measuring smartphone distractions in their 
natural context, for example, on people’s own smartphones.
In sum, our results suggest that social app icons do not impair visual search. 
Given that social apps are rated as more rewarding outside of the lab, the lack 
of an effect of these apps on attention could be due to a loss of associated 
ÀiÜ>À`ÜiÌ>iÕÌvVÌiÝÌÀÃÕvwViÌ>LÃÕÌiÀiÜ>À`iÛiÃ°
To our surprise, we found that participants who had locked away their phone 
an hour prior to the experiment were overall faster on the visual search task 
than participants who had not locked their phone away. However, this effect 
should be interpreted with caution for several reasons. First, we did not predict 
nor preregister a main effect of the deprivation condition. As such, the effect 
needs to be regarded as exploratory until independently replicated. Second, 
the p-value for the main effect of deprivation was extremely close to the al-
pha-level and many scholars argue that p-values of that size have limited ev-
idential value (Benjamin et al., 2018). Our Bayesian analysis supports a need 
for caution regarding the effect, as the Bayes Factor in favor of the effect was 
inconclusive. Third, given the complexity to calculate power for our analysis, 
ÜiV>ÌLiViÀÌ>Üi>` ÃÕvwViÌ«ÜiÀ Ì`iÌiVÌ >>ivviVÌ°ƂÃ>
consequence, it is possible that our design was underpowered for the main 
effect, which is problematic for several reasons. Most important, underpow-
iÀi`ÃÌÕ`iÃÌ>ÌÞi`>Ã}wV>ÌiÃÌ>ÌiÜiViÃÃ>ÀÞÛiÀiÃÌ>ÌiÌi
true effect size (Vasishth, Mertzen, Jäger, & Gelman, 2018). Thus, we can only 
reiterate that the surprising main effect of deprivation requires high-powered, 
preregistered replication.
Last, we cannot exclusively attribute the effect to phone deprivation, as there 
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was more than one difference between the non-deprived and the deprived 
}ÀÕ«°7iÀi>Ã«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ Ìi`i«ÀÛi`}ÀÕ«V>iÌÌi>L>`
immediately did the visual search task, participants in the deprived group came 
to the lab one hour earlier to lock away their phone and were free to do as they 
pleased during the one hour of deprivation, except for checking social media. 
Consequently, those deprived participants had one more contact point with 
the researchers and there was no control over what they did during the hour 
of deprivation. This difference might present an alternative explanation for the 
main effect: For instance, all participants were informed in the recruitment text 
for Study 1 that some of them might have to lock away their phone. Thus, at 
the point of locking away their phones participants in the deprived group could 
easily deduct that they were in the experimental condition. This knowledge 
might have induced reactance in the form of motivation to show that they could 
still perform well without their phones. Future research employing such a depri-
vation manipulation should consider having all participants come to the lab an 
hour prior to the task.
/>ÌLi}Ã>`]vÜi>ÃÃÕiÌ>ÌÌiivviVÌÀiyiVÌÃ>ÌÀÕi`vviÀiViLiÌÜii
the conditions, regardless of possible confounding factors, it is plausible that 
locking participants’ smartphones away increased their motivation, which re-
sulted in better performance. The idea that participants could get their smart-
phone back and access its social rewards when they were done with the task 
may have motivated them to perform faster. In other words, being able to check 
their social media and their messages after 1.5 hours may have acted as an in-
centive that they could receive at the end of the experiment (Aarts, Custers, & 
Veltkamp, 2008). In line with such a view, participants in the deprivation condi-
tion indeed reported a higher urge to check their phones. Interestingly, this im-
provement in speed did not come at the cost of performance, as accuracy was 
almost identical across the two conditions. Such an interpretation corroborates 
the well-established idea that incentives boost cognitive performance (Botvin-
ick & Braver, 2015). Another account suggests that removing the smartphone 
as a distractor may have resulted in better performance, as smartphones have 
been shown to impede attention (Stothart et al., 2015; Thornton et al., 2014; 
7>À`iÌ>°]Óä£Ç®°
Regardless of whether our data support a positive effect of deprivation or no 
ivviVÌ]>ÌÌiÛiÀÞi>ÃÌÕÀw`}ÃÃÌ>`VÌÀ>ÃÌÌ«ÀiÛÕÃiÝ«iÀiÌÃ]
where participants who were separated from their phones performed worse on 
cognitive tasks (Hartanto & Yang, 2016). These studies argue that smartphone 
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separation increases anxiety (Cheever et al., 2014), which in turn leads to worse 
Ì>Ã«iÀvÀ>Vi°}ÌvÌiÃiw`}Ã]ÕÀÀiÃÕÌÃ>ÀiµÕÌiÃÕÀ«ÀÃ}>`]
when replicated, may have important implications. On the one hand, this ap-
parent discrepancy might result from the difference in manipulations between 
ÃÌÕ`iÃ°7iÀi>Ã«ÀiÛÕÃÜÀ`i«ÀÛi`ÃÌÕ`iÌÃvÌiÀ«iÃÃÌÀVÌÞ`ÕÀ-
ing the tasks, participants in our experiment were deprived both before and 
during the task. On the other hand, previous work also showed that anxiety 
due to phone separation rose with time (Cheever et al., 2014); if anything, in-
creasing the deprivation duration should have had an even stronger negative 
effect on performance. Even taking into account our methodological concerns 
surrounding the effect of deprivation, there is a clear need for more research 
addressing this inconsistency. Doing so is of importance, as many policy mak-
iÀÃ] vÀ iÝ>«i  ÃVÃ] L>Ãi ÌiÀ «ViÃ w`}Ã`iÃÌÀ>Ì} >
detrimental effect of smartphones.
"ÛiÀ>]>VVÀ`}ÌÕÀw`}Ã]>««VÃ>Ài«iÀViÛi`>ÃÀiÜ>À`}]LÕÌ
they do not capture attention and therefore do not distract participants from 
their task. Moreover, being deprived of access to these apps might not al-
ways be detrimental. However, these conclusions are constrained to our spe-
VwVÃÌÕ`Þ`iÃ}]ÜVÃÃÕLiVÌÌÃiÛiÀ>«ÃÃLi>ÌiÀ>ÌÛiiÝ«>>ÌÃ°
"ÕÀw`}Ã}}ÌÌ>ÌÛiÃÌ}>Ì}i`>ivviVÌÃÃV«iÝ>`ÀiµÕÀiÃ
thorough designs that take the context of smartphone stimuli into account. As 
such, we believe that the current inconsistencies in the literature warrant more 
highly powered, preregistered research before making recommendations to 
policy makers.
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ABSTRACT
Recently, experimental psychologists have been thinking a lot about how to 
`ÀiÃi>ÀVÃÕV>Ü>ÞÌ>ÌÌiÀw`}ÃV>LiÀi«V>Ìi`°ƂÃ>ÀiÃÕÌ]Ì
is becoming more and more common (a) to preregister one’s own hypotheses 
and analysis plan online and (b) to conduct direct replications of one’s own 
studies. In this Research Methods Case, we discuss our personal experiences 
with preregistration and direct replication. Illustrated by two projects from our 
Ü >LÀ>ÌÀÞ]ÜiÀiyiVÌ ÌiVÃÌÃ>`LiiwÌÃvÕÃ}«ÀiÀi}ÃÌÀ>Ì
and direct replication. Also, we discuss how preregistration and direct replica-
tion attempts may seem to harm personal career development, but at the same 
time can be inspiring and productive.
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STRIVING FOR SOLID SCIENCE: PRE-REGISTRATION AND 
DIRECT REPLICATION IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
Solid science in theory
7iÃViÌÃÌÃÌÀÞÌ>ÃÜiÀÌiÀÀiÃi>ÀVµÕiÃÌÃ]ÌiÞ>ÀiÕÃÕ>ÞÀi>Þ
excited about this. They feel that their topic of interest is extremely important; 
they are genuinely motivated to discover new pieces of knowledge; and, they 
ÛiÃÌL`] ÃÜi>Ì]>` Ìi>ÀÃ Ì`iÃ}} ÌiÀ ÃÌÕ`iÃ°7i>ÃViÌÃÌ
makes a new discovery, maybe after months or even years of work, this tends to 
makes them really happy. After all, their discovery helps science —and helping 
science is what their job is all about.
9iÌ]ºÌi«ÃViVi»ÃÌÌiÞ}>ÃViÌÃÌÃ>Ûi\ÃÌV>ÃiÃ]ÃVi-
tists are also trying to make a career of their own. They dream of having their 
work published in prestigious journals, of giving talks for huge audiences, and 
of getting cited frequently by other researchers—in a sense, to be a rock star 
in science. To accomplish such star status, a scientist, of course, needs to do 
«ÀÌ>Ì]Ã}wV>Ì`ÃVÛiÀiÃ°/LiVi>ÀVÃÌ>À]>ÃViÌÃÌii`ÃÌiÀ
w`}ÃÌLiÌÕÃÌ«ÀÌ>Ì>`iÜ]LÕÌwÀÃÌ>`vÀiÃÌ]ÃÌ>ÌÃÌV>Þ
Ã}wV>Ì­p < .05). To become the Ariana Grande or the Justin Bieber of sci-
iVi]ÞÕLiÌÌiÀ«À`ÕViÃ}wV>ÌÀiÃÕÌÃ°
This situation has been causing some concern in psychology (Nosek et al., 
2015). The problem seems to be that most psychology journals accept only 
ÌÃi w`}Ã Ì>Ì >Ài ÃÌ>ÌÃÌV>Þ Ã}wV>Ì°ƂÃ ÃViÌÃÌÃ >ÀiÌÛ>Ìi` Ì
«ÕLÃ] ÌiÞ >Ài >ÃÌÛ>Ìi` Ì w` ÃÌ>ÌÃÌV> Ã}wV>Vi° 9iÌ] ÕvÀÌÕ-
>ÌiÞ]ÌiÀi>Ài>ÞÜ>ÞÃÌÃÌÕLiÕ«Ã}wV>Ìw`}Ã]vÀÃÌ>Vi]
by trying out different types of analyses, by looking at different subsets of data 
(e.g., only examining right-handed participants, or only taking into account 
female participants) or simply by examining a large number of variables. Al-
though these practices may seem harmless (after all, to explore data is part of 
the job of almost any scientist), using these practices in an intransparent way 
causes trouble (Nuzzo, 2015). A recent study revealed that out of 100 studies 
published in three psychology journals, only about one third could be rep-
licated (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). This means that there are many 
w`}ÃÕÌÌiÀiÌ>ÌÜiÃ«ÞV>Ì>ÃÃÕiÌLiÌÀÕi°ƂÌ}iÌiÀ]>Þ
psychologists are concerned that this problem stems, at least in part, from our 
ÌÛ>ÌÌw`Ã}wV>ÌÀiÃÕÌÃ]ÜVÜiii`Ì«ÕLÃ]ÜVÜiii`
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to make a career.
As a response to these concerns, pioneers of an open science culture (see Box 
6.1) came up with some suggestions that could improve the way we do science 
­Õ>v¢iÌ >°] Óä£Ç®° /iÞ vii Ì>Ì] ÃÌi>`v vVÕÃ}Ü Ã}wV>Ì
or novel results are, journals should care more about whether the study was 
`i>ÌÀ>Ã«>ÀiÌÜ>Þ°7À}>ÌÀ>Ã«>ÀiÌÜ>ÞÛÛiÃ]vÀiÝ>«i]
pre-registration (see Box 6.1), which means that researchers make their hypoth-
eses, experiments, and data analysis plans available to others before they start 
collecting data (Nosek et al., 2015). This is done to make sure that researchers 
do not change the hypotheses after already knowing the results, and to make 
sure that they are not trying many different analyses on the same data just to 
}iÌÃ}wV>ÌÀiÃÕÌÃ°7À}>ÌÀ>Ã«>ÀiÌÜ>Þ>ÃÛÛiÃ`ÀiVÌÞÀi«-
V>Ì}­Ãii	ÝÈ°£®i½ÃÜ­>`ÌiÀ½Ã®w`}Ã°vÃiÌ}ÃÀi«V>Li]
Ìi>ÃÌ>ÌÜiV>ÌÀÕÞÀiÞÌÃiw`}Ã­"«i-ViVi
>LÀ>Ì]
2015). In sum, working in a transparent way might help science by producing 
results that we can actually believe in.
My research team and I really like the idea of working in this transparent way—
i.e., we like the idea of using both pre-registration and direct replication. So, we 
adopted this way of working during my PhD.
Box 6.1. Glossary
Open science culture: refers to a culture where all scientist make their research 
ideas and processes available to others (Nosek et al., 2015).
Preregistration: making the hypotheses, methods, and data analysis plans 
accessible to others before collecting data. Researchers can do this on a website 
(e.g., Open Science Framework, OSF) by uploading their research plans in a 
document that cannot be changed from the moment it is uploaded (Munafò et 
al., 2017).
Direct replication: the process of repeating experiments to see if the results are 
the same across different situations (Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015).
Solid science in practice
In this section, I guide you through two research projects of my PhD, in which 
ivÞ>}>ÃÜ>ÃÌÜÀ>ÌÀ>Ã«>ÀiÌÜ>Þ°>ÃÀiyiVÌÜ
>`ÜiÌÃÜ>ÞvÜÀ}Ü>Ã`vwVÕÌ>`V>i}}]LÕÌ>ÃÜiÌ
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was productive and inspiring, both in a personal and in a professional sense.
Case study 1: Designing a new computer task
Coming up with a research question
At the time I started my PhD, I became very interested in why people (including 
myself) constantly check their smartphones, even when they actually need to 
`ÃiÌ}iÃi]iÃÌÕ`Þ}ÀÜÀ}°Ü>ÃÌÛ>Ìi`Ìw`ÕÌÀi
about the psychological processes that drive this repetitive phone checking, 
which eventually leads to distraction from that which people are currently do-
ing (e.g., studying a textbook). To investigate this question, I came up with a 
research proposal to examine the reason why people get distracted. I came up 
with a theoretical model that suggests that people become distracted, because 
they have an inherent tendency to seek rewards in their environment (see Box 
6.2). So, people look at their smartphones – instead of focusing on studying 
or working – because it carries high social rewards to them (e.g., probably, it is 
ÀiÀiÜ>À`}Ì}iÌ>iÞÕÀiÜ>ViL«Àwi«VÌÕÀiÌ>Ài>`}
>LÀ}ÌiÝÌL®°7i«i«i>Ài`}Ãi`vwVÕÌiÌ>Ì>Ã­ÃÕV>Ã
reading, studying, working), do they get distracted especially by things that 
V>ÀÀÞÛ>ÕiÌÌi¶/ÃÃÌiµÕiÃÌÜiÜiÀiÌÀÞ}Ì>ÃÜiÀ°7iiÝ«iVÌ-
ed that people will get more distracted by things that carry high value to them 
than things that carry low value to them.
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Box 6.2. Theoretical Background
Distractions stemming from reward seeking behavior
7i«i«iV>ÀÀÞÕÌV}ÌÛiÌ>ÃÃ]ÌiÞvÌi}iÌ`ÃÌÀ>VÌi`LÞ ÀÀiiÛ>Ì
information (e.g., their smartphone ringing). In past research, these distractions 
have been thought of stemming from people’s capacity limitations (Theeuwes, 
2004). That is, people are, sometimes, unable to distinguish between what is 
relevant and irrelevant to the task, and mistakenly allocate attentional resources 
to irrelevant information.
However, people are not only driven by external information in the environment, 
but have motivational states too, which also play an important role in which 
information people attend to (Cohen et al., 2007). These motivational states are 
responsible for regulating attention and action towards rewarding outcomes in 
the environment (e.g., food, money, likes on social media; Botvinick & Braver, 
2015; Braver et al., 2014). Sometimes, these rewarding outcomes can be irrelevant 
to the task at hand (e.g., when you are doing your homework, but you get a 
Facebook invite for a party), so if people attend to them, it could lead to distraction 
from the task. In sum, it is possible that people do not get distracted from their 
tasks because they have capacity limitations, but because they constantly pursue 
rewards, which sometimes happen to be irrelevant to their tasks at hand.
This is the idea that we based on our experiments and we tested in Case Study 1. 
To be able to work on this project, I wrote a research proposal that needed to be 
accepted by a science committee in the university. After the committee accepted 
Þ«À«Ã>]VÕ`ÃÌ>ÀÌÀÕ}ÞwÀÃÌiÝ«iÀiÌÃ°
Implications
Distractions are highly prevalent, especially with current technological 
developments – people often get distracted at work (Jett & George, 2003), at 
school (Cheever et al., 2014), or even during driving (Caird et al., 2014), which can 
have fatal consequences. Yet, the psychological mechanisms underlying these 
distractions are not entirely clear yet. Our research could help to get a better 
understanding of the potential causes of distractions. This could inform policy 
>iÀÃ>`i«`iÃ}}ÌiÀÛiÌÃ>ÌÜÀ]ÌiV>ÃÃÀ]ÀÌÀ>vwV°
Designing a new computer task
7i`iÃ}i` > iÜ V«ÕÌiÀ Ì>Ã Ì>Ì VÕ` i« ÕÃ >ÃÜiÀ ÕÀ ÀiÃi>ÀV
µÕiÃÌ­Ãii}ÕÀiÈ°£®°/ÃV«ÕÌiÀÌ>Ã>`ÌÜ«>ÀÌÃ° ÌiwÀÃÌ«>ÀÌ]
participants learned that a certain color (e.g., blue) was associated with reward. 
More concretely, whenever they would see that color (e.g., blue), they earned 
some money. In the second part of our task, participants were asked to add up 
ÕLiÀÃ°/ÃÜ>ÃµÕÌi`vwVÕÌ]>`«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÀi>Þii`i`ÌVViÌÀ>Ìi
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in order to do this well. Yet, sometimes, they would again see the color they 
>`«ÀiÛÕÃÞi>Ài`ÌLiÀi>Ìi`Ìi>À}iÞ°7Õ`ÌÃVÀ`Ã
ÌÀ>VÌÕÀ«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ¶7Õ`ÌÃVÀ>iÕÀ«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜÀÃi>Ì>``}
up the numbers? This is what our new task allowed us to test. 
Figure 6.1 ­Ƃ®/iwÀÃÌ«>ÀÌvÌiÌ>ÃÜ>Ã>i>À}«>Ãi°-iÌiÃ]LÕÌÌ>Ü>ÞÃ]
iiÌÌiÀ­i°}°]8®Ü>ÃVÀi`LÕi°/Ãi>ÌÌ>Ì«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃVÕ`i>ÀiÞ°ÌÃ
way, participants learned that seeing a blue letter means earning money, so they learned 
to associate the color blue with high rewards. (B) In the second part of the task participants 
were adding up the numbers (8+5+9+3). Sometimes, one of the letters was blue, just like in 
Ìii>À}«>Ãi]LÕÌÌÃÌiÌiÞii`i`ÌLi}Ài`]ÃÌiÞÜiÀi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ°7i
expected that these blue letters will make people less able to concentrate on their task.
"ÕÀwÀÃÌ`ÃVÛiÀiÃ
7iÜi>`wÃi`VÀi>Ì}ÕÀÌ>Ã]Üi>`>ViV«ÕÌiÀ«À}À>Ì>Ì
showed people all the stimuli, exactly as we wanted. So, we invited 41 partic-
«>ÌÃÌÕÀ>LÀ>ÌÀÞ]>`>vÌi``ÕÀiÜÌ>Ã]ÌiwÀÃÌiÝ«iÀiÌ
(Study 1).
"ÕÀw`}ÃÜiÀiÌiÀiÃÌ}]LÕÌ>ÌÌiLÌÝi`°"Ìii>`]ÜivÕ`
that people were indeed distracted by the color they had learned to associate 
6
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with rewards. So, when they saw a letter in that color, they more often made a 
ÃÌ>i>``}Õ«ÌiÕLiÀÃ°/Ãw`}Ü>ÃÃ}wV>Ì>`ViÞi
ÜÌÕÀÞ«ÌiÃÃ°"ÌiÌiÀ>`]Üi``Ìw`ÌÃivviVÌÀ}Ì>Ü>Þ°
It was only present among people who felt that adding up the numbers was 
`vwVÕÌ°*>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÜviÌÌÃÜ>Ãi>ÃÞ]ÜiÀiÌLÌiÀi`LÞÌiVÀi`
letters at all. These people were still very well able to add up the numbers.
Making improvements to our task
Based on what we found, we thought that our task might have been too easy. 
After all, a large part of our participants was not really bothered by distractors; 
ÛiÀ>]ÌiÞ«iÀvÀi`Ài>ÞÜi°7iÌÕ}ÌÌ>Ì>ÞLiÌÜÕ`Li«Ã-
ÃLiÌw`>ivviVÌvÌiVÀi`iÌÌiÀÃvÀ>«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ°
iÀÌ>Þ]ÌÃ
ÜÕ`Li>ÃÌÀ}iÀÃÕ««ÀÌvÀÕÀÞ«ÌiÃÃ°ƂvÌiÀ>]ÜÜi` `w`Ãi
support, but we really had to search for it in our data. 
ƂÃ>iÝÌ ÃÌi«] Ìi]Üi>`i Ìi Ì>ÃÀi`vwVÕÌ\ «>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ >` iÃÃ
time to add up numbers, so they had to be faster and they needed to add 
up more numbers than before. After these changes in our computer task, we 
invited 47 participants to our lab to take part in our second experiment (Study 
Ó®°/ÃÌi]Ìiw`}ÃÜiÀiÃÌÀ>}ÌvÀÜ>À`\iÜÌÜ>ÌÜiiÝ«iVÌi`]
we found that all participants made mistakes when they saw the color they had 
learned to associate with rewards. It seemed like that making the task more 
`vwVÕÌ>VÌÕ>Þ«ÀÛi`ÕÀ«>À>`}\ÜiVÕ`w`ÌiivviVÌÌÞ
some, but, this time, in a clear majority of participants. Looking at these results 
was, of course, very nice and made us very enthusiastic about the project. Yet, 
we needed to decide how to proceed.
/ÀÞÌ«ÕLÃÀÌÀÞÌÀi«V>Ìi¶
At this point, there were two possible ways to go: either (a) try to publish these 
}`}ÀiÃÕÌÃÀ­L®«ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀ>`ÌÀÞÌ`ÀiVÌÞÀi«V>ÌiÕÀw`}Ã°
/iwÀÃÌ«ÌÃÕ`i`>««i>}>Ã«ÕLÃ}ÞÕÀÀiÃÕÌÃ>Ì>ÛiÀÞi>ÀÞ
stage of your career is pretty cool – it makes you feel like your work is valuable 
to others, which works as a positive reinforcer that motivates you to produce 
iÛiViÀw`}Ã°ÜiÛiÀ]Ü>ÌvÌiÃiÀiÃÕÌÃÜÕ`ÌLiÀi«V>Li¶9Õ
might harm science by putting something out there, which could confuse other 
researchers in the future. 
Doing a preregistration
Because we did not want to harm science, and because we were simply very 
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VÕÀÕÃ>LÕÌÜiÌiÀÕÀw`}ÃÜiÀiÀi«V>Li]Üi`iV`i`Ì`ÀiVÌÞÀi«-
licate our study. To be transparent, we also preregistered our next experiment. 
Also, we hoped that the preregistration and replication attempt would help the 
publication process; we expected that other people, including journal editors 
and reviewers, would appreciate our solid science approach.
-]Üi«ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀi`ÕÀÃÌÕ`ÞLivÀi`>Ì>ViVÌ°7i``ÌÃ>ÜiLÃÌi
called Open Science Framework. On this website, researchers can make their 
materials openly accessible to everyone (you can check out my preregistration 
by clicking on https://osf.io/y74kx/). In the preregistration document, we out-
lined
• a short description of the study, 
• the hypotheses,
• the design (independent and dependent variables), 
• the planned sample, 
• the computer task, and 
• the analysis plan. 
/i]ÜiÕ«>`i`>`ºvÀâi»ÌÃ`VÕiÌÌiÜiLÃÌiLivÀiÜiÃÌ>ÀÌ-
i`ÌViVÌ`>Ì>°/ÃºvÀiiâ}»ÃÌ>iÃÕÀiÌ>ÌvÀ>ÌÌi
document is changed during data collection and after, so that others can make 
sure that we did everything according to what we had planned before doing 
the study. 
/ÀÞ}ÌÀi«V>ÌiÕÀw`}
Then, we invited 93 participants in our lab to take part in the third experiment 
(Study 3). This time, however, the results were not in line with what we ex-
pected: people were not bothered by those colors that they associated with 
rewards. This was very surprising, as we did not change anything in the meth-
`Ã>`Ìiw`}ÃÜiÀiÛiÀÞÃÌÀ}Ìi«ÀiÛÕÃÃÌÕ`Þ° ÌÜ>Ã>ÃÛiÀÞ
disappointing to see these results, as it raised a lot of questions: Is my research 
reliable and important? Am I going to be able to publish inconsistent results? 
How much this situation will slow me down in my progress? All in all, this was 
quite a stressful situation to deal with. 
Dealing with a non-replication
The biggest problem was that we did not know which results to believe in. 
Should we trust the second experiment, which showed that people got dis-
6
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tracted by colors that they associated rewards with? Or should we trust the 
third experiment that did not show this effect? In other words, we still did not 
really know if our idea made sense or not.
To answer this question, we decided to try to understand our results better 
by using an alternative approach on our existing data from two experiments 
(Dienes, 2014). This approach revealed that in our data there is indeed evi-
dence for our hypothesis that people get more distracted by things that carry 
some reward to them (colors associated with rewards). This gave us some more 
Vw`iVi>LÕÌÕÀ`i>]Ã]`iÃ«ÌiÕÀVÃÃÌiÌÀiÃÕÌÃ]ÜiÃÌ`iV`i`
ÌÌÀÞÌ«ÕLÃÌ°7i``>ÌV«>ÌiÌ>ÌÌÃ}ÌLi`vwVÕÌ]>ÃÌÃÃÌÌi
V>ÃiÌ>ÌÃViÌwVÕÀ>ÃVÕÀÀiÌÞ«ÀiviÀÃÌÀ}]VVÕÃÛi]>`Ã}wV>Ì
w`}Ã°9iÌ]ÜiÃÌ«iÌ>ÌÌiÌiÀiÌV> vÕ`>ÌÃvÕÀ `i>Ã]>`
the quality and transparency of our methods will help us in publishing our work. 
-Õ>ÀÞ
• 7iVÕ`>Ûi ÌÀi` Ì«ÕLÃÕÀ ÀiÃi>ÀV>vÌiÀÜi vÕ`ÌiwÀÃÌ
Ã}wV>ÌÀiÃÕÌÃ]
• However, we chose to do research in a more transparent way (i.e., to 
use preregistration and direct replication) because we think that this is 
the correct way of doing science. 
• 	iiwÌÃ\Üi``ÕÀÀiÃi>ÀV>ÌÀÕ}Ü>ÞÆÜiVÌÀLÕÌiÌÌi
advance of open science culture
• 
ÃÌÃ\ÌÌÀiÌiÌ`ÌiÃÌÕ`ÞÆÌi«>«iÀÜLiÀi`vw-
cult to publish.
Case study 2: Dealing with inconsistent results
Distractions in real life
As you have seen it in Case Study 1, I am generally interested in how people 
get distracted by things that carry some sort of reward to them. At one point 
during my project, I became curious whether this reward-driven distraction also 
exists in real life situations, with real life things that are rewarding, such as food. 
-]ÃÌ>ÀÌi`>ÌiÀ«ÀiVÌ]ÜVÜ>Ìi`Ìw`ÕÌÜ«i«i}iÌ`Ã-
tracted by food that are rewarding, such as a piece of strawberry cheesecake, 
>`v`Ì>Ì>ÀiiÃÃÀiÜ>À`}]ÃÕV>Ã	ÀÕÃÃiÃÃ«ÀÕÌÃ°7iiÝ«iVÌi`Ì>Ì
Üi«i«iii`Ì`Ãi`vwVÕÌÌ>Ã]ÌiÞÜÕ`LiÀiLÌiÀi`LÞ
a picture of a piece of delicious food popping up on the screen (e.g., a piece of 
cheesecake)—simply because it carries more value to them.
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Creating a computer task with food distractions
/ÌiÃÌÕÀ`i>]Üi`iÃ}i`>iÜV«ÕÌiÀÌ>Ã­Ãii}ÕÀiÈ°Ó®°ÌiwÀÃÌ
part of the task, participants saw pictures of different sorts of food on the screen 
(e.g., a cheesecake, some Brussels sprouts, etc.). Their task was to tell how 
much they liked each food items. The computer program selected the most 
delicious and the least delicious items, based on the participant’s own ratings. 
In the second part of the task, participants saw a matrix of letters and numbers 
on the screen. Their task was to read this matrix and indicate for each character 
whether it was a number or a letter. To be successful in this task, participants 
had to continuously pay attention, as it was easy for them to lose track of where 
they were (see Figure 6.2, bottom). At random moments, a food picture ap-
«i>Ài`iÝÌÌÌi>ÌÀÝ°7iiÝ«iVÌi`Ì>Ì«i«iÜÕ`«iÀvÀÜÀÃip
because of a lapse of attention—more often when this food item was delicious 
(i.e., cheesecake) compared to when it was not (e.g., Brussels sprouts).
Figure 6.2. ÌiwÀÃÌ«>ÀÌvÌiÌ>Ã]ÕÀ«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ`V>Ìi`ÜiÌiÀÌiÞw``vviÀiÌ
food items, such as a cheesecake (1A) or Brussel sprouts (1B) delicious. They could do it by 
clicking on the visual analogue scale under the food items. In the second part, their task was 
to go through the matrix of letters and numbers and press key 1 when they see a number 
and press key 2 when they see a letter. Sometimes, in random moments, the previously 
rated food items appeared below the matrix. Sometimes, this food item was the most liked 
Ìi­i°}°]ÓƂ\ViiÃiV>i®]ÃiÌiÃÌii>ÃÌi`Ìi­i°}°]Ó	\	ÀÕÃÃiÃ«ÀÕÌÃ®°7i
expected that participants will make more mistakes and respond slower when they see a 
cheesecake than when they see Brussel sprouts.
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Three experiments – confusing results
First, we wanted to try out our new task, so we invited 21 people to our lab 
(Study 1). The results looked quite promising: in line with our expectations, we 
found that people made more mistakes on the task (i.e., they lost focus) when 
they saw something delicious appearing on the screen. This was very motivat-
ing – but because we had only a few participants, we did not want to publish 
ÌiÃiÀiÃÕÌÃ`ÀiVÌÞ°ÀÃÌ]ÜiÜ>Ìi`ÌÃiiÜiÌiÀÜiVÕ`w`ÌiÃ>i
results again. So, we invited 51 participants to the lab and ran the same study 
again (Study 2). 
This time, surprisingly, we found the exact opposite: people actually performed 
better (made less mistakes) when they saw a delicious food item appearing 
on the screen. These results were unexpected, but could have some plausible 
explanation. For instance, it could be that these delicious food items—even 
though they were irrelevant to the task—made people more motivated to per-
form well. In sum, so far, two experiments showed contradicting results; nev-
ertheless, the second experiment had more participants, so we trusted these 
results better than the results from the pilot study.
Ƃ}>] ÌiÀiÜiÀi ÌÜ«ÃÃLiÜ>ÞÃ Ì}\ ­>®«ÕLÃÕÀw`}Ã`ÀiVÌÞ]
À­L®ÌÀÞÌÀi«V>ÌiÌiÀiÃÕÌÃvÌiÃiV`ÃÌÕ`Þ°/iwÀÃÌ«ÌÃÕ`i`
tempting, as the results from the second experiment were somewhat new: to 
our knowledge, not so many previous studies had shown that task-irrelevant 
stimuli can make people perform better. However, we knew that the possibility 
existed that our results would not be replicable. So, publishing them like that 
VÕ`] ÌivÕÌÕÀi]VvÕÃiÌiÀÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃ]>`ÌiÀivÀi]>ÀÃViÌwV
progress. So, before publishing, we wanted to see if we could really trust our re-
sults, so we decided to go for the more solid option: trying to replicate Study 2.
As a next step, we preregistered a direct replication of the second experiment. 
Similarly to Case Study 1, we registered our third experiment at the Open Sci-
ence Framework before data collection. Then, we invited another 64 people to 
participate in our task (Study 3). The results, again, were quite shocking: this 
time participants were not bothered by the delicious food items at all; they 
always performed well on the task. This was unexpected and disappointing: all 
three experiments showed different results, which was basically impossible to 
make sense of. So, the situation was worse than in Case Study 1, in which at 
least we found some consistency in our results across experiment (Study 1 and 
2 showed similar results). Even though we worked in a transparent and open 
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way, this research project was not going well.
Solution
>}>`iVÃÜ>ÃµÕÌi`vwVÕÌ>«iÀÃ>Ü>Þ]>ÃÜi>`ÛiÃÌi`Ã
much time and effort in this project. On the professional side, however, it was 
µÕÌii>ÃÞÌ>i>`iVÃ°7iVÕ`Ì>iÃiÃiv>ÌiÃiVÃÃÌ-
ent results, and we did not learn a lot from these studies. Also, we knew that it 
ÜÕ`Li`vwVÕÌ]«iÀ>«Ã«ÃÃLi]Ì«ÕLÃÃÕVVÃÃÌiÌÀiÃÕÌÃ°-]
in the end, we decided to leave this project behind.
-Õ>ÀÞ
• 7iVÕ`>ÛiÌÀi`Ì«ÕLÃÕÀÀiÃÕÌÃ>vÌiÀi>ViÝ«iÀiÌ°ƂvÌiÀ
all, Study 1 was in line with the expectations and Study 2 showed a 
w`}Ì>ÌÜ>ÃÀ>ÌiÀÛi°
• 7iVÃiÌ`Ã`ÃViViÃÌi>`vÌÀÞ}Ì«ÕLÃ«Ài>ÌÕÀi
w`}Ã°
• 	iiwÌÃ\Üi«ÀiÛiÌi`Ài«V>Liw`}ÃvÀiÌiÀ}ÌiÃV-
iÌwVÌiÀ>ÌÕÀiÆ
• Costs: we spent time and effort with nothing to show for it.
Take Home Messages
A good deed for science
There are a lot of advantages of registering your research plans, starting with 
the most important one: you do something good for science (Markowetz, 
2015). Despite that we had limited success so far, we still believe that working 
in a transparent way can contribute to a good collective outcome. For instance, 
ÜiiÝ«iÀiVi`wÀÃÌ>`Ì>ÌiÛiÜiÞÕÃiip < .001, you cannot be sure 
ÌÀi«V>ÌiÞÕÀw`}Ã­
>Ãi-ÌÕ`Þ£®°/ÃÃ`Ã>««Ì}>`>Þ}°
It feels like wasting a lot of effort. Despite this, we still feel that it was worth 
Ì\ÃViViLiiwÌÃvÀÌiÃiÀi«V>Ì>ÌÌi«ÌÃÀi}>À`iÃÃvÌiÕÌVi
(Munafò et al., 2017). If the replication is successful, it means that your results 
might be trustworthy. If the replication is unsuccessful, you make sure that your 
results are not trustworthy, which prevents the literature to become distorted by 
v>Ãi«ÃÌÛiw`}Ã°ÌiÀÜ>Þ]ÞÕ>ÀiVÌÀLÕÌ}Ì}`ÃViVi°ƂvÌiÀ
>]Üi>ÜÕ`iÌL>ÃiÕÀÀiÃi>ÀV`i>Ã«ÀiÛÕÃw`}ÃÌ>ÌÜi
can truly believe in.
6
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>ÃiÞÕÀÜÀ
On the more self-serving part, preregistering our plans saved some time later, 
when we were writing up the results. Also, we expect that it will save some time 
in the future, when we wish to follow up on our past experiments. Finally, when 
editors, and reviewers, and other readers study our paper, they might gain 
more insight about the whole research process and line of reasoning by looking 
at our preregistration materials.
No strings attached
Some people believe that when they pre-register their analysis plan, they are 
no longer allowed to explore their data in other (non-preregistered) ways. 
In our view, this is a misunderstanding. Of course, you can do every analysis 
that you think makes sense, as long as you report in your paper which analysis 
was pre-registered, and which one was not. So, we have never felt that doing 
pre-registration put us in chains.
-`ÃViVi>`«iÀÃ>Ài>ÌÞ
Researchers who promote an open science culture often say that working in 
a transparent way is good for you and your reputation. However, as you have 
seen in Case Study 1 and 2, this does not seem to be always true. Sometimes, 
the decision to work in a transparent way lead to unfortunate outcomes. For in-
ÃÌ>Vi]ÌÌ>}ÌiÌÃÕLÌÕÀwÀÃÌ«>«iÀvÀ«ÕLV>Ì­
>Ãi-ÌÕ`Þ
£®q>Ã]ÌÃ«>«iÀVÌ>ÃVÃÃÌiÌw`}Ã]ÜVÃ>Ü>ÞÃ`vwVÕÌÌ
sell to journal editors and reviewers. These can be problematic for my future 
career: ideally, as a researcher, you would like to publish a couple of articles 
at an early stage in your career (during your PhD that usually takes 3–5 years), 
which will help you to get a good job in academia. However, it seems like that 
Ìi`iVÃÌvVÕÃÌÀ>Ã«>ÀiÌÜÀ}À>ÌiÀÌ>«À`ÕV}Ã}wV>Ì
ÀiÃÕÌÃ}Ì>Ûi>``i`ÃiiÝÌÀ>iÛiv`vwVÕÌÞvÀiÌVLÕ«
the academic career ladder. 
Yet, we are very optimistic and motivated to work in a transparent way. Al-
though the older generation still remains unaware or skeptical (Bishop, 2017; 
Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011)—perhaps, this is because they already 
have steady jobs—more and more (especially younger) researchers started to 
iLÀ>Vi«iÃViViVÕÌÕÀi°ÀiÝ>«i]ÃiÃViÌwVÕÀ>Ã>ÛiÃÌ>ÀÌ-
ed publish studies that have transparent methods, regardless of whether the 
ÀiÃÕÌÃ>ÀiiÜÀÃ}wV>Ì­Õ>v¢iÌ>°]Óä£Ç®°vÀi«i«i>`«ÌÌi
same attitude, a new generation of scientists can create a culture in which solid 
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science is the norm, rather than the exception.
CONCLUSION
This research method case shows that working in a transparent way sometimes 
seems to hinder your progress in science; for instance, one can spend a lot of 
time on doing replications that in the end turn out to be unsuccessful. Also, it 
can be demotivating if you put a lot of effort in something that has no tangible 
result. Nonetheless, we still believe that this is the correct way to go and ret-
rospectively we are happy with all decisions we made throughout the research 
«ÀViÃÃ°7iÌÌ>ÌvÀi>`Ài«i«i`«ÀiÀi}ÃÌÀ>Ì>`Ài«V>-
tion that will eventually lead to a better science. 
Exercises and discussion questions
• Explain why direct replications are important to science.
• How can preregistration help science?
• Discuss the potential drawbacks of preregistration and replications.
• Imagine that you analyze your data for your bachelor thesis, which you 
are about to write. You have not found support for your hypotheses, 
so you explore the data out of curiosity. In this data exploration, you 
w`Ì>ÌvÞÕ>>ÞâiÞvi>i«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃ]ÞÕÀÞ«ÌiÃiÃ>Ài
VwÀi`°Ü`ÞÕÀi«ÀÌÌÃÞÕÀL>ViÀÌiÃÃ¶7Þ¶
• Imagine the following scenario: one of your classmates tells you that he 
investigated how mood affects mathematical performance. He expect-
ed that negative mood leads to worse performance. He found support 
for his hypotheses only when he excluded participants who were tired 
on the day of the experiment. His supervisor tells him that he could 
«ÕLÃ ÌiÃiÃ}wV>Ìw`}Ã > ÃViÌwV ÕÀ>°7>Ì Ã ÞÕÀ
advice to your classmate?
6
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Chapter 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Most people are familiar with the feeling that their mind sometimes drifts away 
from their current activities, either towards external stimuli, or towards internal 
mental content. This familiar feeling raises a classic, ever-intriguing, question: 
7Þ`iÃÌvÌi>««iÌ>Ì«i«i}iÌ`ÃÌÀ>VÌi`vÀÌiÀ}}>V-
tivities? In this dissertation, I report several attempts to address this question. 
In particular, I examined the cognitive mechanisms that underlie everyday dis-
tractions. Building on recent insights from cognitive psychology (Anderson et 
al., 2011b; Cohen et al., 2007; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 
2012), I proposed that distractions stem from people’s adaptive tendency to 
explore the world around them for rewarding outcomes, such as food, money, 
or social feedback. This adaptive tendency, then, sometimes leads to disen-
gagement from the current task, which eventually impairs performance. I call 
this mechanism reward-driven distraction.
/Ã`ÃÃiÀÌ>Ì>`ÌÀii>À}>Ã°/iwÀÃÌ}>Ü>ÃÌÌiÃÌÌiViÌÀ>
hypothesis of the reward-driven distraction model. I investigated whether the 
ÀiÜ>À`Û>Õiv`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ`wiÃÌi«>VÌvÌÃi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃV}-
tive performance. The second goal was to explore the real-life relevance of 
ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°>Þ]ÌiÌÀ`}>Ü>ÃÌÛiÃÌ}>Ìi>`ÀiyiVÌ
ÀiÃi>ÀV«À>VÌViÃÌÃwi`vÀiÃi>ÀV°ÌÃw>V>«ÌiÀ]ÀiyiVÌ
i>VvÌiÃiÌÀii}>Ã]LÞ`ÃVÕÃÃ}>`Ìi}À>Ì}Ìii«ÀV>w`}Ã
from all individual chapters of this dissertation.
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GOAL 1: TEST THE REWARD-DRIVEN DISTRACTION MODEL
The central hypothesis of the reward-driven distraction model was that people 
perform worse on a task when they are exposed to stimuli associated with high 
reward, compared to when they are exposed to neutral stimuli or stimuli asso-
ciated with low reward. This central hypothesis was tested in two ways.
First, Chapter 2 presents a meta-analysis, which integrated evidence from 
«ÀiÛÕÃÀiÃi>ÀV­£ÃÌÕ`iÃ®°/i>w`}ÃvÀÌiiÌ>>>ÞÃÃÜiÀi
straightforward: reward-associated distractors consistently harmed perfor-
mance compared to less rewarding distractors. The overall estimated effect 
size was small (Standardized Mean Change = .347), but clearly larger than zero. 
Apart from that it produced this summary effect size, the meta-analysis con-
tributed to the existing literature in several other ways as well. For example, it 
demonstrated that reward-driven distraction occurs during many different tasks. 
That is, when exposed to reward-associated distractions, participants seemed 
equally likely to perform poorly on visual search tasks, but also on rapid serial 
ÛÃÕ>«ÀiÃiÌ>Ì­,-6*®Ì>ÃÃ>`V}ÌÛiVÌÀÌ>ÃÃ°/Ãw`}Ã-
portant because previous research on this topic usually relied on visual search 
tasks. Therefore, before my meta-analysis, it was not yet fully clear whether 
reward-driven distraction has implications for cognitive mechanisms other than 
ÛÃÕ> Ãi>ÀV° ƂÌiÀ «ÀÌ>Ì w`} Ü>Ã Ì>Ì ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi `ÃÌÀ>VÌ
seemed to be independent from methodological choices researchers made 
in their experiments. For example, reward-associated distractors appeared to 
be equally harmful after long (e.g., 1000 trials) or short (e.g., 240 trials) reward 
i>À}ÃiÃÃÃ°/}iÌiÀ]LÌw`}ÃÃÕ}}iÃÌÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À`>ÃÃV>Ìi``Ã-
tractors harm performance in many different settings in which people are trying 
to perform well.
Second, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present a novel experimental paradigm that 
directly tested whether reward-associated distractors impact performance on 
a task that does not rely on visual search, but on cognitive control processes 
­,ÕÃâiÌ>°]Óä£]Óä£n>®°ÌÃiÜ«>À>`}]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃwÀÃÌi>Ài`Ì>Ã-
sociate colors with monetary rewards. After this reward-learning phase, partici-
pants were exposed to a testing phase. This testing phase consisted of a math 
task, in which participants had to add up four numbers that were presented 
quickly, one after another. During this math task, the previously reward-asso-
ciated colors reappeared as distractors. So, participants had to ignore these 
colors. Overall, the task was demanding: while participants had to concentrate 
7
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on adding up numbers (store them in working memory and update that with 
the following number), they also had to ignore reward-associated distractor 
colors.
 ÌiwÀÃÌÛiÀÃv ÌÃ«>À>`} ­
>«ÌiÀÎ®]ÕÀ Ì>ÃVÌ>i`>iÝÌÀ>
manipulation of task motivation. During the math task, participants could earn 
money on some trials, but not on others. This manipulation was designed to 
test the idea that high task motivation shields people from distraction (Müller 
et al., 2007).
`}Ã vÀÌÃiÜ«>À>`}ÜiÀi iÃÃVi>À Ì>w`}Ã vÀÌii-
Ì>>>ÞÃÃ°/iwÀÃÌÃÌÕ`ÞÃÜi`iÛ`iVivÀÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ\«>À-
ticipants indeed performed worse on the math task when they were exposed 
to high (vs. low) reward-associated distractors (Chapter 3, Experiment 1). Sur-
prisingly, this effect was not replicated in the next study (Chapter 3, Experiment 
2). Also, contrary to our expectations, task motivation non-selectively increased 
«iÀvÀ>ViÌi>ÌÌ>Ã]LÕÌ Ì``ÌÃ«iVwV>ÞÃi`«iÀvÀ>Vi
from distractors.
ƂÃ>iÝÌÃÌi«]Ì>iÃiÃivÌiÃiÝi`w`}Ã]Üi`iÃ}i`>ÃÌÕ`Þ
(Chapter 4) with a more focused test of reward-driven distraction. This time, we 
did not include a task motivation manipulation. Even though this study (Chap-
ter 4) involved three different versions of the task, it showed no evidence for 
ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°/ÕÃ]w`}ÃvÀÌiÃii«ÀV>V>«ÌiÀÃ­
>«-
ÌiÀÎ>`
>«ÌiÀ{®>ÀiÌvÕÞiÜÌw`}ÃvÀÌiiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ
­
>«ÌiÀ Ó®° /i w`}Ã ÃÕ}}iÃÌ Ì>Ì ÀiÜ>À`>ÃÃV>Ìi` `ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ ` Ì
necessarily harm cognitive control operations across all circumstances—they 
may not impair performance on math tasks.
 Ü]ÌÃÃiÌvw`}ÃÀ>ÃiÃ>«ÀÌ>ÌµÕiÃÌ\7ÞÜiÀiÌiÀiÃÕÌÃv
the new lab experiments different from the results of the meta-analysis? One 
possible explanation is that, while it is clear that task-irrelevant reward stimuli 
have a strong impact on visual attention, the impact of these stimuli on other 
cognitive processes is less straightforward. Indeed, as mentioned before, the 
meta-analysis strongly relies on studies that used visual search tasks, where re-
wards direct saccades and thus immediately harm performance, but we know a 
lot less about reward-driven distraction during complex task performance (i.e., 
when people have to do complex operations with stimuli, such as maintenance 
or updating in working memory). Among all studies included in the meta-anal-
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ysis, approximately one fourth (N = 24) used non-visual search tasks (e.g., con-
yVÌ «ÀViÃÃ} Ì>ÃÃ] Ìi«À> >ÌÌiÌ Ì>ÃÃ®° ƂÌÕ} ÌiiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ
showed clear evidence for reward-driven distraction among these 24 studies, 
these studies are still heterogeneous and it may well be that reward-driven 
distraction affects performance on some cognitive control tasks (e.g., Flanker 
tasks), but not on others (e.g., math tasks).
ƂÌiÀiÝ«>>ÌvÀÌiVÃÃÌiVÞLiÌÜiiÌiw`}ÃvÀÌii-
ta-analysis (Chapter 2) and my experiments (Chapters 3 and Chapter 4) is that 
my experiments used a novel performance task. The purpose of this new para-
digm was to try to mimic the complexity of real life: participants had to add up 
numbers in a fast pace, while they had to ignore reward-associated distractors 
that appeared in unexpected locations. This performance situation resembles 
modern work activities, which often require complex cognitive operations (for 
example maintaining information in working memory, shielding it from exter-
nal disruptions, performing operations on this information), while dealing with 
noise or incoming text messages and emails. By contrast, previous studies of-
ten used well-established paradigms, such as Stroop and Flanker tasks. These 
tasks may be a bit more controlled in terms of what cognitive operations are 
targeted, and therefore, it may be easier to detect a performance decrement. 
Chapter 4 provides a more extensive discussion about how our new paradigm 
was different from such standard cognitive tasks.
Adding another layer of depth to the latter issue, the meta-analysis showed 
that reward-driven distraction was twice as strong when it was assessed with 
a direct measure (eye tracking), as compared to an indirect measure (manual 
response times). This suggests that reward-related distractors are processed 
early, when attentional selection works in a largely involuntary fashion (Theeu-
wes, 2010). Only in later stages of processing (e.g., when people prepare a 
skeletal muscle response, e.g., to manually respond to some stimulus), the im-
pact of reward-associated distractions can be suppressed by a voluntary con-
trol process (Failing et al., 2015). Reward-associated distractors, then, seem 
most harmful when they can impact early visual selection processes; in later 
stages, their impact may be weakened. Thus, performance situations exist, in 
which the impact of reward-associated distractors remains strong (e.g., visual 
search or even a Stroop task), but in other performance situations the im-
pact of such distractors may have already faded out when people are ready 
to respond, such as when people are doing math task (see evidence for 
this explanation in Le Pelley, Seabrooke, Kennedy, Pearson, & Most, 2017). 
7
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Conclusion
/iw`}ÃÀi>Ìi`ÌƂ£>Ûi«ÀÌ>ÌÌiÀiÌV>«V>ÌÃ°ÀÃÌ]ÌiÞ
`iÃÌÀ>ÌiÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À`Ã>Ûi>Vi>ÀyÕiVi­i>ÀÞ®V}ÌÛi«ÀViÃÃ-
es, regardless of whether these rewards are relevant to the current task. Thus, 
in addition to the well-established facilitating effect of rewards on cognitive 
processes (Bijleveld et al., 2012b; Bijleveld, Schafer, & Rusz, 2019; Botvinick & 
Braver, 2015; Braver et al., 2014; Ferster & Skinner, 2015; Hull, 1944; Pessoa, 
ÓääÆ/À`i]£nn®]w`}ÃvÀÌÃ`ÃÃiÀÌ>ÌÃÜÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À`ÃV>
ºL>VwÀi»]Ì>ÌÃ]ÀiÜ>À`ÃV>«>À«iÀvÀ>ViÃiÃÌÕ>ÌÃ­Ãii>Ã
Beilock et al., 2004; Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011; Kerr, 1975). Second, for 
ÌiwÀÃÌÌi]iÌ>>>ÞÌVÃÕ««ÀÌ`iÃÌÀ>Ìi`Ì>ÌÌ}>LÕÌV}-
tive processes in the traditional top-down and bottom-up theoretical dichotomy 
may be outdated (for a review, see Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; for a 
broader discussion of this issue, see Chapter 2). The meta-analysis showed that 
cognitive processes can be modulated by rewards, independently of current 
goals (top-down) and independently of physical salience (bottom-up). Third, 
>ÃÌLÕÌÌi>ÃÌ]w`}Ã`iÃÌÀ>ÌiÌ>Ì`ÃÌÀ>VÌV>LiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi
in some, but not all tasks. Though future research is clearly necessary, the me-
ta-analysis does support the idea that momentary disengagements from the 
task at hand could stem from people’s adaptive tendency to pursue rewarding 
outcomes – rather than cognitive failures during task performance.
Box 7.1.Ƃ£\>w`}Ã>`ÌiÀiÌV>«V>ÌÃ°
• Meta-analysis: when reward-related stimuli are not relevant to the current task, 
they harm performance.
/Ãw`}ÃÕ««ÀÌÃÌiiÝÃÌiVivÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°
/Ãw`}`Ã>VÀÃÃ>Þ`vviÀiÌÌ>ÃÃ°
/Ãw`}ÃÃÌÀ}iÃÌÜii>ÃÕÀ}iÞiÛiiÌÃ°
• 	ÞVÌÀ>ÃÌÌÌiiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ]ÕÀiÝ«iÀiÌÃÞi`i`Õw`}Ã°-]
ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÃÌ>ÃÃÌÀ>}ÌvÀÜ>À`>ÃÌÃiiÃwÀÃÌÃ}Ì°
• Rewards can hurt, instead of help, people’s cognitive performance.
• The traditional dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up attentional 
selection seems too simplistic.
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GOAL 2: EXPLORE THE REAL-LIFE RELEVANCE OF REWARD- 
DRIVEN DISTRACTION
The second major goal of this dissertation was to explore whether reward-driv-
en distraction has potential practical implications. On the one hand, basic re-
search on reward-driven distraction is important, because it examines the core 
cognitive mechanisms of how and why distractions occur. On the other hand, 
this basic research area is largely disconnected from the real-life settings in 
which distractions are usually situated. Conversely, applied research on distrac-
tions mainly focuses on the outcome of distractors, but often neglects the core 
mechanisms that drive distractions. As a result, we do not know much about 
whether reward-driven distraction has implications for real life. To address this 
gap, this dissertation took some preliminary steps in exploring the real-life im-
plications of reward-driven distraction.
First, the meta-analysis (Chapter 2) examined the scope of reward-driven dis-
traction by synthetizing previous research. In several ways, the meta-analysis 
can help to explore whether reward-driven distraction is, in principle, a phe-
nomenon that is important for real life. For example, as discussed above, it 
showed that reward-driven distraction is a robust phenomenon: reward-associ-
ated distractors harmed performance consistently across many different types 
of tasks. Thus, reward-driven distraction seems to have a broad scope.
/iiÌ>>>ÞÃÃ Þi`i`>ÌiÀw`} Ì>Ì ÃÕ««ÀÌÃ ÌiLÀ>` ÃV«iv
ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°7i vÕ` Ì>ÌÜi«i«i i>À Ì>ÃÃV>Ìi Ài-
wards to certain stimuli, those associations transferred across contexts. This 
means that those stimuli harmed performance even in new task situations. This 
w`}Ã«ÀÌ>ÌLiV>ÕÃiÌ«iÃÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À`ÃÌÕÕÃ>ÃÃV>ÌÃ>ÀiÌ
necessarily tied to one context, as was previously believed (Anderson, 2015b). 
It may thus be the case that when people learn about rewards in one context 
(e.g., at home), these reward associations, in turn, may cause distractions in 
other contexts (e.g., at work, at school), potentially impairing performance. This 
w`}]Ì]Ã«i>ÃvÀÌi`i>Ì>ÌÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ>Ã«V>ÌÃ
for real life.
ƂÌiÀw`}vÀÌiiÌ>>>ÞÃÃÌ>ÌÕ`iÀiÃÌi}iiÀ>â>LÌÞv
reward-driven distraction is that people seem to be distracted by reward-as-
sociated cues even if they are explicitly told to ignore those distractors. This 
w`}`iÃÌÀ>ÌiÃÌ>ÌiÛi>ÃÌÀ}]Ì«`Ü«Ài«>À>ÌvÀ`ÃÌÀ>VÌ}
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events may not be able to shield performance from reward-driven distractors 
­	À>ÛiÀ]Óä£Ó®°/ÌÀ>Ã>ÌiÌiÃiw`}ÃÌÀi>vi]iÛiv«i«i>Ài>Ü>Ài
and entirely prepared for potentially-distracting events (e.g., colleagues knock-
ing on the door, emails coming in), reward-driven distraction may still happen. 
/Ãw`}]Ì]ÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÌ>ÌÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÃÌÞ>ÌiÀ-
esting theoretical phenomenon, but that it may well have real-life implications.
 ÌÜÌÃÌ>`}ÌiÃi«ÀÃ}w`}Ã]>vÕÀÌiÀÃ}ÌvÀÌiiÌ>>>-
ysis downplays the idea that reward-driven distraction has real life implications. 
7ivÕ`Ì>ÌÃÌÕ`iÃÌ>ÌVÌ>Ài>viÀiÜ>À`ÃÌÕ­i°}°]VV>ÌiÃi]
pictures of attractive food and alcohol; see also Chapter 6) were less likely to 
detect reward-driven distraction. This may indicate that reward-driven distrac-
tion may emerge within controlled lab situations, but it may be overruled or 
diminished in strength as soon as real-life stimuli get introduced in a task. This 
w`}ÃÕ}}iÃÌÃÌ>ÌÌiÀi>ÞLiÃiÃÞÃÌi>ÌVÌ>ÌÌÌiÜ>ÞÜi
try to study real-life reward distractions. Overall, then, it is not yet fully clear to 
what extent reward-driven distraction has real-life implications.
My second approach to explore real-life relevance of reward-driven distraction 
was to use a well-established distraction paradigm to examine how distractors 
that carry social reward value in real life impact performance. This approach ex-
amines the case of smartphones. Recent studies from media psychology pose 
that the reason why people cannot resist checking and get distracted so often 
by their smartphones is that those devices carry high social value (Bayer et al., 
2016; Oulasvirta et al., 2012). Currently, however, there is no direct examination 
vÜiÌiÀÌÃÃÌÀÕi°/wÌÃ}>«]ÌiÃÌÕ`Þ
>«ÌiÀxÌiÃÌi`ÜiÌiÀ
smartphones are indeed associated with high social reward value and whether 
this could be the reason why people get distracted by them (Johannes, Dora, 
& Rusz, 2019).
The results from this study were mixed. Even though people perceived social 
>««ÃVÃ­i°}°]>ViL]7>ÌÃƂ««®ÀiÀiÜ>À`}Ì>ÌiÀ>««VÃ
­i°}°]
>VÕ>ÌÀ]-iÌÌ}Ã®]iÃ«iV>ÞÜÌ>ÌwV>ÌÃ}]ÌiÃiÃV>>««
icons did not slow down visual search when they were distractors in the task. 
These results suggest that even if social app icons carry high reward to people, 
they do not necessarily harm performance on the task. In other words, their 
reward effect is not necessarily manifested in task performance. In conclusion, 
this study found no evidence that the reward value of smartphones may be 
Ìi`ÀÛ}vÀViv`ÃÌÀ>VÌÃ°/Ãw`}«iÃÌÜVVÕÃÃ°ÀÃÌ]Ài-
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ward-driven distraction may not be able to explain why people get distracted 
by their smartphones. Second, and most important, smartphones may not be 
as distracting as previously thought, contrary to common beliefs in society (El-
lis, 2019).
Speculations about how to handle distractions in everyday life 
Although the conclusions for Aim 2 are not entirely straightforward, life is still 
full of distractions, and thus I take the liberty to speculate about ways to deal 
with distractions in everyday life. On a societal level, as a response to a grow-
ing concern about distractions, people came up with several ways to try to 
reduce their impact. For instance, the concept of mindfulness (and mindfulness 
trainings) became extremely popular and it seems to be successful in dealing 
with repetitive smartphone checking behavior (Bauer, Loy, Masur, & Schneider, 
Óä£Ç®°/iVVi«Ìvº`iVÕÌÌiÀ}»i½ÃiÛÀiÌ}>i`««Õ>ÀÌÞ
past years too: there are hundreds of books (e.g., Flanders, 2018; Kondo, 2014; 
7Ìi]Óä£n®]` VÕiÌ>ÀiÃ>`9Õ/ÕLiÛ`iÃ` i`V>Ìi`ÌÌi>V«i«iÌ
get rid of useless things that they own – working towards a minimalist lifestyle 
(Nicodemus & Fields Millburn, 2011). Additionally, recent developments in the 
smartphone industry now allow people not only to monitor their daily use (i.e., 
check how much time they spent on an app), but also to set time restrictions on 
>««ÕÃi­i°}°]7>ÌÃƂ««V>ÌLiÕÃi`ÀiÌ>ÎäÕÌiÃ«iÀ`>Þ®°/ÕÃ]
in everyday life, people seem to think that the best way to deal with distractions 
is to be mindful about them or reduce the sources of distraction altogether.
In theory, removing the sources of distractions can work well. Evidence from 
law and policy interventions shows that restricting access to unhealthy options 
or undesired behaviors (e.g., banning smoking, sugar and alcohol taxes, high 
fees for driving in the city) have successfully reduced use or practice of those 
behaviors (Campbell et al., 2009; Colchero, Rivera, Popkin, & Ng, 2017; Sar-
}iÌ] -i«>À`]E>Ìâ] Óää{Æ /i] 	iiÛiÀÃ] ƂÀÃÌÀ}] iÞ]E7-
Ã] Óään®°7i ÌiÀi >Ài  ÃÕV Ì«`Ü ÌiÀÛiÌÃ vÀ Ã>ÀÌ«i
(although smartphones are forbidden to use while driving a car or riding a bike) 
or Internet use, people do consciously try to set restrictions for themselves 
(e.g., decluttering their environment, restrict their own phone use). However, 
ÌiÃiVÃVÕÃÌiÌÃ>ÀiÌ>Ü>ÞÃivwViÌ°/iÌiÌLi>ÛÀ}>«
suggests that even if people formulate the intention to reduce use, they end up 
not following these intentions in busy and stressful everyday situations (Papies, 
2017). Thus, reducing the sources of distractions may work well when it is reg-
7
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Õ>Ìi`LÞ>ÌÀ`«>ÀÌÞ­i°}°]>}ÛiÀiÌ®]LÕÌÌÃiÞiÃÃivwViÌÜi
people create intentions on their own.
An alternative way to handle distractions is not to completely rule out the 
sources but try to reduce the reward associations of distractors. Indeed, recent 
insights from interventions suggest that it may be more fruitful to target basic, 
implicit mechanisms to deal with undesired behaviors or unhealthy choices. 
Interestingly, this strategy has been proven to be useful in different domains. 
For instance, Lawrence et al (2015) found that training motor responses for 
unhealthy foods led to weight loss and reduction in snacking among obese 
«i«i­LÕÌÃii	iViÀ]ÃÌ>]7iÀÃ]E>`]Óä£x®°->ÀÞ]ÌÀ>}
automatic responses to alcohol has been effective in reducing alcohol intake 
­ÕLi]>ÛiÀ>Ã] i`iÀÀ]E>Ãi]Óä£ÓÆ7iÀÃ]LiÀ],V]	iV-
er, & Lindenmeyer, 2011). So, this strategy may be effective in the smartphone 
domain as well. If people indeed associate high social rewards to their smart-
phones, it is likely that those associations drive automatic behavior, such as 
repetitive checking and excessive use (Oulasvirta et al., 2012), which can result 
in distractions. Consequently, these reward-driven, automatic responses may 
be targeted in an intervention. For instance, this could be done with inhibition 
training, in which people learn to inhibit their responses to rewarding smart-
«iVÕiÃ]ÃÕV>Ã>ViLÀ7>ÌÃƂ««>««VÃÜÌ>ÌwV>ÌÃ}°
Conclusion
In sum, there are clear reasons to suspect that reward-driven distraction has 
practical implications. Mounting evidence from basic research (Chapter 2) 
suggests that task-irrelevant rewards penetrate cognitive performance inde-
pendently of the cognitive operations involved in the task, independently of 
where the stimulus-reward associations were acquired, and independently of 
whether people consciously prepare for distracting events. At the same time, 
there are also reasons to doubt that reward-driven distraction has practical im-
plications. Most notably, our lab experiment (Chapter 5) showed no evidence 
that reward-associations explain distractions that stem from smartphone icons 
and the meta-analysis showed that reward-driven distraction from stimuli that 
acquired reward value in real life, outside the lab (e.g., smell, food), was absent.
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Box 7.2.ƂÓ\>w`}Ã>`«À>VÌV>«V>ÌÃ°
• Reward-driven distraction has a broad scope. Potentially, it affects perfor-
mance in real life: 
o Meta-analysis: reward-associated distractors harm cognitive perfor-
mance across tasks, contexts, and instructions.
• Yet, future research is needed to pinpoint the implications of reward-driven 
distraction:
o Lab study: no evidence that real-life reward-associated stimuli (smart-
phone cues) harm performance on a cognitive task – even if people 
perceive them as rewarding.
o Meta-analysis: studies with real-life reward stimuli do not yield re-
ward-driven distraction.
• Overall, reward-driven distraction is clear within controlled laboratory set-
tings, but it is less straightforward what happens when real-life stimuli get 
introduced in a task in the lab. 
• vvÕÌÕÀiÀiÃi>ÀVV>wÀÞiÃÌ>LÃÌ>ÌiÛiÀÞ`>Þ`ÃÌÀ>VÌÃÃÌivÀ
stimulus-reward associations, interventions should target these automatic 
associations. 
GOAL 3: INVESTIGATE AND REFLECT ON RESEARCH PRAC-
TICES 
Ìi>ÃÌVÕ«ivÞi>ÀÃ]Üii>Ài`Ì>ÌÌiÀi>Ài>ÞÀiÃi>ÀVw`}ÃÕÌ
there, which we cannot simply assume to be true (Open Science Collaboration, 
2015). Accordingly, the third goal of this dissertation was to examine the gen-
iÀ>ÃÌ>ÌivÌiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÌiÀ>ÌÕÀi]>ÃÜi>ÃÀiyiVÌ«i
science practices from an early-career researcher point of view.
The general state of the reward-driven distraction literature
First, the meta-analysis (Chapter 2) assessed evidence for publication bias in 
the reward-driven distraction literature with a funnel plot. The results show that 
the funnel plot of the reward-driven distraction literature was symmetrical. This 
suggests that there is no evidence for publication bias in the reward-driven 
`ÃÌÀ>VÌÌiÀ>ÌÕÀi°/Ãi>ÃÌ>ÌÌÃ`>]i}>ÌÛiÀÕw`}Ã
>ÀiiµÕ>ÞiÞÌLi«ÕLÃi`Ì>«ÃÌÛiw`}Ã°ƂÃÕÀ>i`ÌÀÃ>`
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ÀiÛiÜiÀÃÃÌÀ}Þ«ÀiviÀÃ}wV>Ìw`}Ã­-ÃiÌ>°]Óä£{L®]w`}
no publication bias is rare (Egger et al., 1997; Rosenthal, 1979). For instance, 
recent meta-analyses showed strong publication bias for literature on atten-
tional bias for positive emotional stimuli (Pool et al., 2016), and ego depletion 
­>}]Óä£nÆ>}}iÀ]7`]-Ìvv]E
>ÌâÃ>À>ÌÃ]Óä£ä®° iÛiÀÌiiÃÃ]Üi
we used the same criterion, the reward-driven distraction literature shows no 
sign of publication bias, and thus seems to be in a good state.
Second, to assess evidential value for reward-driven distraction, the meta-anal-
ysis in Chapter 2 presents a p-curve analysis (Simonsohn et al., 2014a, 2015). 
The p-curve of reward-driven distraction was right skewed, which implies that 
w`}Ã>Ûi}iÛ`iÌ>Û>Õi°Ƃ``Ì>Þ] Ìi ÌiÀ>ÌÕÀi]ÌiÀi Ã
apparent sign of p-hacking. That is, researchers do not seem to try multiple 
analyses or data exclusions in order to reach the conventional milestone of 
Ã}wV>Vi]p < .05. Together, results from the funnel plot and results from the 
«VÕÀÛi>>ÞÃÃ«ÞÌ>ÌÌiÌiÀ>ÌÕÀiÃiiÃÌLi>}`ÃÌ>Ìi]w`}Ã
>ÀiÀLÕÃÌ>`Ài>Li°/Ã>i>ÃÌ>ÌÜiV>L>ÃiVw`iViÌiw`-
ings from our meta-analysis.
Although the literature seems to be in a healthy state at this point, there is a 
special researcher degree-of-freedom in this literature that might not be appar-
iÌ>ÌwÀÃÌÃ}Ì°ÌÃwi`]ÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃÕÃÕ>Þi>ÃÕÀi«iÀvÀ>ViÌÀii
conditions: when participants are exposed to (a) high reward distractors, (b) 
low reward distractors, and (c) no distractors. The most appropriate test of re-
ward-driven distraction is comparing (a) to (b), that is, performance in the high 
reward to low reward distractor conditions. However, there are other possible 
comparisons too, such as comparing (a + b) to (c), (a) to (c), or comparing all 
three conditions in an omnibus test. The problem is that if any of these tests 
Þi`ÃÃ}wV>Vi]ÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃÌi`ÌV>ÃÕ««ÀÌvÀÌiÀÞ«ÌiÃÃ°/Ã
ÃiÃ«iV>Þ«ÀLi>ÌVÃViÌiÃiV«>ÀÃÃV>ÀiyiVÌ`vviÀiÌiV-
anisms (for a review, see Chapter 2 and Le Pelley et al., 2016). Clearly, the 
option of having multiple tests at one’s disposal that all lead to the support of 
the same hypothesis is problematic: researchers simply have more chance to 
>ViÛiÃÌ>ÌÃÌV>Ã}wV>Vi>`]VÃiµÕiÌÞ]ÜiV>ÌLiÃÕÀiÌ>ÌÌi
effect is as reliable and solid as it seems (Gelman & Loken, 2013; Munafò et al., 
2017; Nosek et al., 2015; Simmons et al., 2011; Simonsohn et al., 2014a).
This problem could easily be solved, for instance, with preregistration (Forst-
iiÀiÌ>°]Óä£ÇÆÕ>v¢iÌ>°]Óä£ÇÆ ÃiiÌ>°]Óä£nÆ7>}i>iÀÃE
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Dutilh, 2016). Publicly stating one’s hypotheses before data collection can pre-
vent people from p-hacking and HARKing (Hypothesizing After the Results are 
Known). Preregistration is also a useful tool to motivate researchers to pay more 
attention to statistical power. In the reward-driven distraction literature, sample 
sizes are small on average (Nmean = 25) with more than 75% of studies having 
Ã>iÀÃ>«iÃâiÃÌ>ÌÃ>ÛiÀ>}i°Ü«ÜiÀÀi`ÕViÃÌiV>ViÌw`>
true effect and increases the rate of false-positives (Button et al., 2013).
Interim conclusion
The reward-driven distraction literature is in good health: there is no evidence 
vÀ«ÕLV>ÌL>Ã] Ìiw`}Ã>Ûi}iÛ`iÌ>Û>Õi]>` ÌiÀi Ã
iÛ`iVivÀ«>V}°/iÀi>Ài]ÜiÛiÀ]ÌiÀÃÃÕiÃÌiwi`Ì>ÌÃÕ`
LiÃÛi`°/>ÌÃ]ÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃ>ÛiÕÌ«iÜ>ÞÃÌw`ÃÕ««ÀÌvÀÌiÀÞ-
potheses, and studies are likely underpowered. The solution for both of these 
problems would be preregistration of hypotheses and analyses plan (of the 
proper comparison of high vs low reward distractor conditions).
4GƃGEVKQPQPGCTN[ECTGGTTGUGCTEJKPVJGVKOGQHVJGQRGPUEKGPEG
movement
ƂÌiÀ}>vÌÃ`ÃÃiÀÌ>ÌÜ>ÃÌÀiyiVÌÀiÃi>ÀV«À>VÌViÃvÀÞ
ÜiÝ«iÀiVi°ƂÃÌi«ÀiÛÕÃV>«ÌiÀ­
>«ÌiÀÈ®Ã>Ài>`ÞiÀiÞ>ÀiyiV-
tion piece (Rusz, Bijleveld, & Kompier, 2018b), I will not discuss that chapter 
at length here. However, I will give a short introduction of the context that in-
spired me to write about being a young researcher in the time of open science 
changes.
Throughout this dissertation, I often referred to questionable research practices 
ÀºwÃ}iÝ«i`ÌÃ»]ÃÕV>ÃÌÀÞ}ÕÌÃiÛiÀ>>>ÞÃiÃ>`Ài«ÀÌ}Þ
ÌiÃ}wV>Ìi°viiÌ>ÌÌÃ«ÀÌ>ÌÌiÌÌ>ÌÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃvÌi
i}>}i ÃÕVwÃ}iÝ«i`ÌÃÜÌÕÌLi}>Ü>ÀiÌ>Ì ÌÃi«À>VÌViÃ
are harmful for science (Gelman & Loken, 2013). Thanks to the open science 
movement, it is now better understood and communicated how such practices 
are harmful for science (Frankenhuis & Nettle, 2018).
Yet, the pace of this transition is slow. On the one hand, there are collective 
ivvÀÌÃÌ«ÀÛiÕÀwi`°ÀÃÌ>Vi]ÕÀ>Ã>ÀiÃÌ>ÀÌ}Ì«ÕLÃÀi}-
istered reports, funders are promoting pre-registration, and researchers are 
7
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self-organizing to conduct large, collaborative replication attempts. On the 
other hand, the current incentive system has not yet fully adapted to an open 
ÃViViVÕÌÕÀi\>Þ}«ÀwiÕÀ>ÃÃÌÃiiÌ«ÀiviÀÌ«ÕLÃÃÌÕ`iÃ
Ì>ÌÞi`Ã}wV>ÌivviVÌÃ°ÃÕV>ÃÞÃÌi]ÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃ>ÀiÌÛ>Ìi`Ìw`
Ã}wV>ÌÀiÃÕÌÃ]ÜVi>ÃÌ>ÌÌiÞ>ÞLiÌi«Ìi`Ìi}>}iµÕiÃ-
tionable practices. But again, on the positive note, more and more journals 
(e.g., Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, Psychological Science, Nature Human 
Behaviour) adopt registered reports: a system in which peer review happens 
before the results are known (Chambers, 2013). The strength of registered re-
ports lies in the change it imposes to the current incentive system: instead 
of evaluating and accepting papers based on their results, registered reports 
accept papers based on their theoretical value and methods, before the data 
are collected. Recent statistics about such Registered Reports are interesting. 
Among studies that were accepted based on their methods, 61% led to null 
ÀiÃÕÌÃ ­7>ÀÀi] Óä£n®° /Ã ÃÌ>ÌÃÌV ÃÜÃ Ì>Ì ÃÌÕ`iÃ Ì>Ì«ÀiÀi}ÃÌiÀ ÌiÀ
«ÀÌVÃ«ÕLÃÃÕLÃÌ>Ì>ÞÀii}>ÌÛiw`}ÃÌ>ÃÌÕ`iÃÌ>Ì`Ì°
Ƃ}>]ÌÃw`}µÕiÃÌÃÌiÀi>LÌÞ>`Û>`ÌÞv>Þ«ÀiÛÕÃw`-
ings in psychology, highlighting the need for further change in the direction of 
open science.
Box 7.3.ƂÎ\>w`}Ã>`iÌ`}V>«V>ÌÃ°
• The reward-driven distraction literature is in a healthy state. 
o   No evidence of publication bias in the reward-driven distraction literature.
o   Findings in the reward-driven distraction literature have high evidential   
value and there is no sign of p-hacking.
• Yet, there are limitations:
,iÃi>ÀViÀÃ>ÛiºÕÌ«iÃÌÃ»­>>ÞÃiÃ®Ìw`ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°
o   Sample sizes are low; studies are likely underpowered.
• Adopting open science practices, such as preregistration, could solve these 
limitations.
• The open science movement is changing the landscape of psychology, but the 
change is slow and can be challenging for (early career) researchers.
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Above, I have already touched upon some of this dissertation’s limitations. In 
this section, I elaborate on these limitations and suggest some directions for 
future research.
The literature is biased towards the visual domain
ƂÃiÌi` >LÛi] Ìi wi` v ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi `ÃÌÀ>VÌ Ã ÛiÀÞ L>Ãi`
towards the visual domain. Thus, the most prominent issue is whether re-
ward-driven distraction is generalizable across all different cognitive operations 
and performance scenarios (Anderson, 2016b). Strong evidence exists that re-
Ü>À`>ÃÃV>Ìi``ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃyÕiVii>ÀÞÃÌ>}iÃvÛÃÕ>«ÀViÃÃ}>`ÌÕÃ
rapidly grab people’s eye movements (for reviews, see Anderson, 2013, 2016; 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2017; Le Pelley et al., 2016). A real-life illustration of this 
w`}ÜÕ`LiÌ>Ì`ÕÀ}ÃÌÕ`Þ}vÀ>iÝ>]>``ÕÀ}ÜÀ]ÃÌÕ`iÌÃ½
>`i«ÞiiÃ½iÞiÃV>Li>ÕÌ>ÌV>ÞV>«ÌÕÀi`LÞ>Ã>ÀÌ«iÌw-
cation, which represent a spatial form of distraction. But the question is: what 
happens after this rapid attentional capture? Does performance on the exam 
À`ÕÀ}ÜÀ`iVi¶ƂÃÞiÌ]Ìiwi`vÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌVÕÀÀiÌÞ
cannot provide clear answers to these questions. 
To investigate this issue further, research on reward-driven distraction should 
go beyond visual cognitive paradigms. In the past couple of years, there were 
a handful of attempts investigating non-spatial forms of distraction (i.e., distrac-
tion that originates from something else than misguided saccades towards the 
distractor), such as temporal attention (Failing & Theeuwes, 2015; Le Pelley et al., 
Óä£Ç®]VyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}­Ƃ`iÀÃiÌ>°]Óä£ÓÆÀiLÃiÌ>°]Óä£ä®]ÛÃÕ>ÜÀ-
ing memory (Infanti et al., 2015), and cognitive control (Rusz et al., 2019, 2018a). 
Still, these results are mixed. Therefore, more studies are needed to investigate 
whether reward-associated irrelevant cues disrupt other processes than visual 
attention. Such studies could focus on cognitive processes that are crucial for op-
timal performance in daily life. As an example, future studies could test whether 
reward-associated cues disrupt the retrieval of stored knowledge from memory, 
which is a crucial aspect of getting good scores on an exam and of giving good 
talks at conferences. Another interesting direction would be to examine wheth-
er reward-associated distractors impair task switching, which is a common fea-
ture of jobs where people have to manage multiple projects at the same time. 
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A too complex performance task
Although the new experimental paradigm (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) was de-
signed to extend the investigation of reward-driven distraction to cognitive con-
ÌÀÌ>ÃÃ]ÌÃiÜ«>À>`}>ÃÌÃÌ>ÌÃÌ°ƂÃLÀiyÞ`ÃVÕÃÃi`>LÛi
(Aim 1), the math task in this paradigm may have been too complex to establish 
what exact aspects of cognitive control were impaired by reward-associated 
distractors. That is, during performance on the math task, many processes are 
in operation at the same time. For example, there is incoming goal-relevant 
information (numbers) that people have to maintain and update in working 
memory; in the meantime, this working memory representation needs to be 
shielded from incoming distractors. Surprisingly, although this task seems de-
manding, participants performed quite well, even when they were exposed 
to reward-associated cues. Thus, it could be that reward-associated distrac-
ÌÀÃ``Ì>ÀÛiÀ>«iÀvÀ>Vi]LÕÌÌ>ÌÌiÞ>Þ>ÛiyÕiVi`ÕÃÌ
some part of the process. For instance, reward-associated distractors may have 
grabbed people’s gaze, but people could still have corrected for this misguid-
ed saccade and, later, could still have produced an accurate response at the 
end of the trial. Alternatively, it may be the case that complex tasks such as the 
one in my study, which require strong top-down attentional regulation (or pro-
active control), are resistant to reward-associated distractors. The limitation of 
this paradigm is that we cannot disentangle these mechanisms. Thus, the math 
task may have been too complex to measure distraction of cognitive control by 
reward-related distractors.
To address this limitation, future research should apply paradigms that allow for 
a more precise way to test whether reward-associated distractors harm cogni-
tive control processes. New studies may use tasks that allow for a direct test of 
ÜivwViÌ«i«i>ÀiÛiÀÀ`}>ÕÌ>ÌVÀiÃ«ÃiÃÌ>Ì>Ài`ÀÛiLÞ
reward-associated distractors. Examples are Stroop and Flankers tasks. Similar 
to our paradigm, future experiments may include a learning phase, in which 
people learn to associate stimulus features (e.g., colors, letters, pictures) with 
rewards (e.g., monetary or social). Next, these stimulus features would serve 
as task-irrelevant cues in the Stroop or Flankers tasks. Future studies may also 
ÕÃi Ì>ÃÃ Ì>Ì >Ü vÀ ÌiÃÌ} Ìi yiÝLÌÞ v V}ÌÛi VÌÀ  `i>}
ÜÌV}ÀiiÛ>Ì>`ÀÀiiÛ>ÌvÀ>Ì­	À>ÛiÀ]Óä£Ó®]ÃÕV>ÃÌiƂ8
continuous performance task (Chiew & Braver, 2013, 2014). In the latter task, it 
would be interesting to test whether reward-associated distractors are harmful 
during a more proactive control mode, when there is a strong maintenance of 
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goal-relevant information, or they are most harmful during a more reactive con-
trol mode, when control operates in a late correction manner. All in all, future 
research should test which aspects of cognitive control could be harmed by 
goal-irrelevant information that carries high rewards.
Studying real-life relevance of reward-driven distraction
Although this dissertation took some preliminary steps, it did not manage to 
fully understand the real-life relevance of reward-driven distraction. There are 
potential limitations to the way this dissertation studied real-life relevance. In 
the experiment in Chapter 5, real-life reward cues related to smartphones (e.g., 
>ViL>««ÜÌ>ÌwV>ÌÃ}®ÜiÀiÌÀ`ÕVi`Ì>L>ÃVÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀV
paradigm. Drawing from the theory of grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2009), it 
can be argued that when we take reward cues out of their usual situation, and 
ÜiÌiÞÃiÀÌÌi>>ÀÌwV>>LÃiÌÌ}]ÌiÞ}ÌÃiÌiÀÀiÜ>À`
value altogether. In particular, according to this theory, real-life reward expe-
riences are stored in situated conceptualizations in the human mind: within a 
complex structure of actions, emotions, bodily states, sensory inputs cogni-
tions, goals, and desires (Barsalou, 2003, 2008, 2009). Recent research shows 
that for instance foods or alcohol are often stored in memory in terms of the 
place where they are eaten or drunk, or the people with whom they are be-
ing eaten or drunk (Keesman et al., 2018; Papies, 2013). Therefore, when we 
use reward cues in the lab, we take them out of their situated conceptualiza-
tions—their natural habitat, so to speak—and therefore they might not evoke 
the same experiences as they would in a rich real-life setting (Best, Barsalou, & 
Papies, 2018; Best & Papies, 2017; Papies, Best, Gelibter, & Barsalou, 2017). 
Indeed, subjective ratings from our study show that people perceive these cues 
as rewarding, yet when we insert them in an experiment, the reward value of 
these cues does not manifest itself in actual behavior (in this case, cognitive 
performance).
Future research, therefore, should study reward-driven distraction in a more 
situated manner. A potential solution would be to create situations in the lab 
that are congruent with the situation in which the real-life behavior appears. 
ÀÃÌ>Vi]VÌÀi`wi`iÝ«iÀiÌÃVÕ`LiV`ÕVÌi`i«Þii½Ã
ÜvwViÃÀV>ÃÃÀÃ°Ì>ÞÜiLiÌiV>ÃiÌ>ÌÀiViÛ}>7>ÌÃƂ««
message during work on one’s own smartphone carries more reward than just 
ÛiÜ}>7>ÌÃƂ««VÌiV«ÕÌiÀÃVÀii`ÕÀ}>ÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀVÌ>Ã
(as was done in Chapter 5). Another potential way to test reward-driven distrac-
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tion in a more situated manner is to use situated stimuli. For instance, instead of 
ÕÃ}>Ã}i7>ÌÃƂ««}]iVÕ`ÕÃi>`Þ>V7>ÌÃƂ««ÌwV>Ì
that suddenly and unexpectedly pops up on the screen, as would happen in 
real life. All in all, I suggest that future research should embrace, rather than 
reduce, the complexity of real world by studying reward-driven distraction in a 
situated way.
Box 7.4. Future directions.
Future research should:
• Further extend the study of reward-driven distraction to cognitive processes 
that are needed for real-life performance, such as cognitive control, memory, 
or task switching.
• Use cognitive control tasks that allow for a precise examination of the mecha-
nisms that are disrupted by reward-associated distractor information.
• Embrace, rather than reduce, the complexity of the real world by studying 
reward-driven distraction in a situated manner. 
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FINAL CONCLUSION
This dissertation showed that rewards impact cognitive processes in a poten-
tially important way: rewards draw attention, even if they are irrelevant to peo-
ple’s current goal and the task. The dissertation also suggests that this impact 
of goal-irrelevant rewards could explain why people get distracted from their 
current activities so often. Findings from this dissertation can provide a strong 
basis for new studies that examine the real-life implications of reward-driven 
distraction. A promising avenue for future research is to curve away from con-
trolled laboratory settings, by studying distractions in places and contexts in 
which they naturally occur.
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De overkoepelende doelstelling van dit proefschrift was het begrijpen van de 
V}ÌiÛiiV>Ãi`iÌi}À`Ã>}}}i>>`i`>}iÃi>yi`}°
Voortbouwend op recente ontwikkelingen uit de cognitieve psychologie, stel-
`iÛÀ`>Ì>yi`}ÛÀÌÌÕÌ`i>`>«ÌiÛii}}Û>iÃi`i
wereld om hen heen te verkennen in het streven naar belonende resultaten, 
zoals voedsel, geld of sociale feedback. Deze adaptieve neiging leidt dus soms 
tot onthechting van de huidige taak, wat uiteindelijk leidt tot verminderde 
«ÀiÃÌ>ÌiÃ°i`ÌiV>ÃiLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}°
&QGNUVGNNKPI*GVDGNQPKPIUIGUVWWTFGCƃGKFKPIUOQFGNVGUVGP
De eerste doelstelling van mijn proefschrift was om de centrale onderzoekshy-
«ÌiÃiÛ>iÌLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}Ã`iÌiÌiÃÌi°iâiÞ«Ìi-
se houdt in dat mensen meer afgeleid zouden moeten worden door prikkels 
die meer waarde voor hen hebben. Om deze hypothese te onderzoeken, heb 
ik eerst een onderzoekssynthese uitgevoerd van bestaande bevindingen in het 
veld (hoofdstuk 2). Ik heb systematisch gezocht naar studies die samen gebruik 
maken van een grote verscheidenheid aan cognitieve taken, zoals visueel zoek-
}i`À>}vVyVÌÛiÀÜiÀ}]iii}ÀÌiÛiÀÃVi`ii`>>Li}ÃÃ}-
nalen, zoals geld, voedsel of de eigen naam van mensen. Een meta-analyse van 
91 studies die voldeden aan de inclusiecriteria, toonde sterk bewijs voor belo-
}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}°>ÌÜâi}}i]LÀiÛ>>yi`}iÌii}i
beloning hebben de cognitieve prestaties van mensen voortdurend verstoord 
ÛiÀ}i}iÌiÕÌÀ>iLÀiÛ>>yi`}viÌii>}iLi}]
over verschillende paradigma’s en verschillende soorten beloningssignalen 
heen. Kortom, hoewel de effectomvang klein was, toonde de meta-analyse 
`Õ`i>>`>ÌiÀ Ã«À>i Ã Û>Li}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}°iÌ>`iÀi
ÜÀ`i]Li}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}ÌiiÀ>VÌ}viiiÌiâ°
Aangezien het merendeel van de studies in deze meta-analyse zich richtte op 
zeer elementaire cognitieve processen (d.w.z. het visueel zoeken naar doelen 
«iÌV«ÕÌiÀÃViÀ®]ÜiÌiÜiÜi}ÛiÀLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}
bij meer complexe taken, bijvoorbeeld bij taken die cognitieve controle ver-
eisen (bv. het bijhouden van doelgerichte informatie). Om deze leemte op 
ÌiÛÕi]ÌÜiÀ«iiiÕÜ«>À>`}>`>ÌLi}Ã}i`ÀiÛi>yi`}
test tijdens het uitvoeren van een complexe cognitieve taak (hoofdstuk 3 en 
hoofdstuk 4). Tijdens deze taak leerden de deelnemers eerst kleuren te asso-
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VlÀiiÌw>VliLi}i°>>À>ÛiÀ`i`i`iiiiÀÃiiÛiii-
sende wiskundige taak uit. Tijdens deze wiskundige taak, verschenen de eerder 
>>Li}}iÀi>ÌiiÀ`iiÕÀiÜiiÀ>ÃLÀÛ>>yi`}`i`i`iii-
mers moesten negeren. De resultaten van deze laboratoriumstudie waren niet 
in lijn met de meta-analyse: we vonden geen duidelijk bewijs voor belonings-
}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}°>ÌÜâi}}i`>ÌiÃiiÌiiÀ>v}ii`Ü>Ài`À
beloningsaanwijzingen van een hoge waarde in vergelijking met die van een 
lage waarde.
Kortom, de resultaten van de meta-analyse en de laboratoriumstudies waren 
}ii}`°iiÌ>>>ÞÃiÌ`i>>`>ÌLi`iLÀiÛ>>yi`}
de prestaties van verschillende soorten taken, waaronder visueel zoeken, maar 
ook cognitieve controle, schaden. Integendeel, mijn experimenten toonden 
}ii`Õ`iLiÜÃÛÀLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}Ì`iÃiiÃ«iVwi
type cognitieve controletaak: een wiskundige taak.
/ÌÃÌ>>yi`}LÃ}i]>>ÀiÌ>iÌ>iÜÀ`iLi`°i-
wel toekomstig onderzoek duidelijk noodzakelijk is, ondersteunt de meta-ana-
lyse wel het idee dat tijdelijke onttrekkingen aan de taak in kwestie kunnen 
voortkomen uit de adaptieve neiging van mensen om naar lonende resultaten 
te streven.
Deze resultaten zijn interessant omdat ze aantonen dat beloningen in veel situ-
aties de prestaties kunnen schaden in plaats van ze te verbeteren. Daarnaast to-
nen deze resultaten voor het eerst een meta-analytische ondersteuning dat het 
denken over cognitieve processen in de traditionele top-down en bottom-up 
theoretische dichotomie achterhaald kan zijn. Dat wil zeggen dat cognitieve 
processen kunnen worden gemoduleerd door beloningen, onafhankelijk van 
de huidige doelen (top-down) en onafhankelijk van de fysieke aantrekkings-
kracht (bottom-up).
&QGNUVGNNKPI&GYGTMGNĎMGTGNGXCPVKGXCPDGNQPKPIUIGUVWWTFG
CƃGKFKPIKPFGRTCMVĎMQPFGT\QGMGP
Als tweede doelstelling van mijn proefschrift wilde ik de werkelijke relevantie 
Û>Li}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}`iÀâii°iÜivÕ`>iÌii`iÀ-
âi>>ÀLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}VÀÕV>> Ã] ÃiÌ}ÀÌi`iiÃ Ã}i-
««i`Û>`iÃiÌÌ}ÃÜ>>ÀLÀiÛ>>yi`}iVÌi}iÛ}iÕi
hebben. Om deze leemte op te vullen, onderzocht ik of beloningsgestuurde 
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>yi`}` i«ÌiÌiiivÌ>yi`}iLÕÌiiÌ>LÀ>ÌÀÕ]` iiVÌi
wereld, te verklaren.
Inderdaad, er zijn bevindingen uit dit proefschrift die wijzen op het idee dat 
Li}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}`i>yi`}iÌiVÌiiÛi>ÛiÀ>Ài°i
iÌ>>>ÞÃiÌ`i>>`>ÌLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}iiLÀii`Ìi«>Ã-
singsgebied heeft (Hoofdstuk 2). In het bijzonder, zoals ik hierboven al zei, 
Ü>ÃiÀÃ«À>iÛ>Li}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}LÛiiÛiÀÃVi`iÃÀÌi
taken. Ook ontdekte ik dat wanneer mensen leren om beloningen te associ-
eren met stimuli, deze associaties zich over de context heen verplaatsen, wat 
suggereert dat beloningsassociaties die aangeleerd zijn in de ene setting (bv. 
thuis) de prestaties in een andere (bv. op het werk) kunnen beïnvloeden. Bo-
vendien kunnen verschillende vormen van beloningsleren (in het bijzonder in-
ÃÌÀÕiÌiii*>ÛÛ>>ÃiÀi®i`iÌÌiiLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}°
Ten slotte toonde de meta-analyse aan dat mensen afgeleid lijken te worden 
door beloningsgerelateerde signalen, ook al wordt hen expliciet gezegd dat 
âi `i LÀi Û> >yi`}iÌi i}iÀi°" > `iâi LiÛ`}i Ìi
vertalen naar het echte leven, zelfs als mensen zich bewust zijn van en volledig 
ÛÀLiÀi`â««ÌiÌii>yi`i`i}iLiÕÀÌiÃÃi­LÛ°Vi}>½Ã`i«
de deur kloppen, e-mails die binnenkomen), zelfs als beloningsassociaties op 
ii>`iÀi«>>ÌÃiÌ`ÜÀ`i}iÛÀ`]>Li}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}
nog steeds plaatsvinden.
Anderzijds zijn er ook redenen om te vermoeden dat beloningsgestuurde af-
i`}  iÌ iVÌi iÛi iÌ >Ì` Ûi`} `i >yi`} > ÛiÀ>Ài° <
toonde de meta-analyse bijvoorbeeld aan dat studies die echte prikkels bevat-
ten (bv. chocoladegeur, foto’s van aantrekkelijk voedsel, alcohol) minder kans 
iLLiLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}«ÌiÃ«Ài°iÀiÃÕÌ>ÌiÛ>
laboratoriumexperimenten versterken dit punt nog meer (hoofdstuk 5). Het 
`iÛ>`iâiÃÌÕ`iÜ>ÃiÌÌiÃÌiÛ>Li}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}ii
Li«Àiv`>yi`}Ã«>À>`}>`>Ìii>yi`}Ã«Ài Õ`Ì`iiÃi
vaak tegenkomen in hun dagelijks leven. Gezien smartphones in de huidige 
>>ÌÃV>««ÜÀ`iLiÃVÕÜ`>ÃiiLi>}ÀiLÀÛ>>yi`}]âi
we voor smartphonesignalen. In ons onderzoek hadden de deelnemers geen 
smartphone bij zich en kwamen ze naar het laboratorium om een visuele zoek-
opdracht uit te voeren, waarbij de smartphonesignalen (d.w.z. app-pictogram-
i®>Ã>yi`i`iv>VÌÀ`i`i°-}iÛ>`iâiLÀiÛ>>yi`}
werden geassocieerd met een hoge sociale beloning (bv. een Facebook-logo 
met een zichtbare melding) en andere met een lagere sociale beloning (bv. 
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ii7i>ÌiÀ>««}®°iLiÛ`}iÃÕ}}iÀiÀi`>Ì`iâiÃV>i>««Ã`i
`iiiiÀÃiÌ>yi`iÛ>`iÛÃÕiiâi>VÌiiÌ>ÃâiÕÃ>ÀÌ«-
hone niet bij zich hebben (wat in principe de aantrekkingskracht van belonings-
aanwijzingen zou moeten vergroten), hoewel ze de pictogrammen van sociale 
apps als lonender ervaren.
/ÌÃÌÌLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}iiÛÕ`}ÌiâLi}iVÌÀ-
leerde laboratoriumsituaties, maar het is nog steeds minder voorspelbaar wat 
er gebeurt als er echte prikkels worden geïntroduceerd in een taak in het la-
LÀ>ÌÀÕ°"`i«À>ÌÃViÀiiÛ>ÌiÛ>Li}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}
de praktijk vast te stellen, moet toekomstig onderzoek zich richten op het on-
`iÀâiiÛ>Li}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}iÌiVÌiiÛiiiÌiVÌi
ÃÌÕ°ÌiÌi«i>yi`}iÌiLi}À«iâ>ÃâiiÌ`>}iÃ
leven voorkomen.
&QGNUVGNNKPI1PFGT\QGMGPTGƃGEVKGQXGTFGQPFGT\QGMURTCMVĎMGP
In de afgelopen jaren is het duidelijk geworden dat veel bevindingen in de psy-
chologie, zelfs bevindingen die goed ingeburgerd leken te zijn, niet gerepro-
duceerd konden worden. Het is dus essentieel geworden om de kwaliteit van 
eerdere bevindingen te beoordelen en te werken met een meer transparante 
methodologie (d.w.z. open wetenschappelijke praktijken). De derde en laatste 
doelstelling van mijn proefschrift was dan ook het beoordelen van de algeme-
iÃÌ>`Û>â>iÛ>`iÌiÀ>ÌÕÕÀÌÀiÌLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}i
iÌÀiyiVÌiÀiÛiÀ«iÜiÌiÃV>««ii«À>ÌiÛ>ÕÌiiÛÀi}«-
baanperspectief voor onderzoekers.
iiÌ>>>ÞÃiÌ`i>>`>Ì`iÌiÀ>ÌÕÕÀÛiÀLi}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi-
ding zich op dit moment in een gezonde toestand bevindt (hoofdstuk 2). Eerst 
onderzocht ik de prevalentie van publicatievertekening, het fenomeen dat po-
ÃÌiÛi]Ã}wV>ÌiLiÛ`}iiiÀ`iÀÜÀ`i}i«ÕLViiÀ``>i}>ÌiÛi]
iÌÃ}wV>ÌiLiÛ`}i°iÌÀiVÌiÀ«ÌÃÕ}}iÀiiÀ`i`>Ì`i ÌiÀ>ÌÕÕÀ
ÌÀiÌ Li}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i >yi`} }ii «ÕLV>ÌiÛiÀÌii} >>Ì âiÆ
iÌ ÌiÀ`ÕÃ«`>Ìi}>ÌiÛii«ÃÌiÛi]iÃ}wV>ÌiiiÌÃ}w-
cante bevindingen evenveel kans hebben om te worden gepubliceerd. Ten 
tweede heb ik een p-curve-analyse uitgevoerd om de bewijskracht van belo-
}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}ÌiLiÀ`ii°iÀiÃÕÌ>ÌiÌ`i>>`>ÌLi-
}Ã}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}ii}iLiÜÃÀ>VÌiivÌ°	Ûi`iÜ>ÃiÀ}ii
duidelijk teken van p-hacking (wanneer onderzoekers meerdere analyses of da-
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ta-uitsluitingen proberen om de conventionele mijlpaal van betekenis, p <.05, 
te bereiken). Deze resultaten impliceren dat we vertrouwen kunnen hebben in 
eerdere bevindingen in het veld.
Hoewel de resultaten van deze methoden suggereren dat de literatuur er goed 
voor staat, zijn er een aantal zaken om rekening mee te houden. Ten eerste, 
hoewel alle studies erop gericht zijn om dezelfde hypothese te testen (dat af-
leiding wordt beloond), hebben onderzoekers verschillende ideeën over hoe 
deze hypothese moet worden getest. Als gevolg daarvan zijn er meerdere 
soorten analyses om hetzelfde idee te testen. Het probleem is dat als één van 
deze tests betekenis heeft, onderzoekers geneigd zijn om steun te claimen 
voor hun hypothese. De mogelijkheid om meerdere testen ter beschikking te 
hebben die allemaal leiden tot de ondersteuning van dezelfde hypothese is 
echter problematisch: onderzoekers hebben gewoon meer kans om statisti-
ÃViÃ}wV>Ìi ÌiÛ`ii`>>ÀÕiÜiiÀiÌ âiiÀÛ>â`>Ì
het effect zo betrouwbaar en solide is als het lijkt. Ten tweede suggereerde de 
p-curve-analyse dat de studies mogelijkerwijs ondermaats zijn. Dit is problema-
tisch, omdat de kans op het vinden van een echt effect wordt verkleind doordat 
de studies niet voldoende worden ondersteund. Beide problemen zouden kun-
nen worden opgelost door open wetenschappelijke praktijken, zoals preregis-
tratie, toe te passen.
Hoewel het aannemen van open wetenschappelijke praktijken de norm wordt, 
vordert deze verandering tamelijk traag. Het huidige stimuleringssysteem is 
nog niet volledig aangepast om transparante en solide methoden te belonen 
voor belangrijke resultaten. In hoofdstuk 6 heb ik over deze moeilijkheden 
nagedacht vanuit een vroeg loopbaanperspectief.
Conclusie
Dit proefschrift toonde aan dat beloningen een diepgaande impact hebben 
op cognitieve processen. In het bijzonder wordt er aandacht besteed aan be-
loningen, zelfs wanneer deze niet gerelateerd zijn aan de huidige doelen of de 
taak. De adaptieve neiging om op de beloningen te reageren kan dus, althans 
soms, een averechtse uitwerking hebben, in die zin dat de beloning nadelig is 
voor de uitvoering van de huidige taak. Het bestuderen van beloningsgestuur-
`i>yi`}Û>ÕÌii vÕ`>iÌii«iÀÃ«iVÌiv ÃÕ}}iÀiiÀÌ`>ÌLi}Ã-
}iÃÌÕÕÀ`i>yi`}«ÌiÌi`i>yi`}iÌiVÌiiÛi>ÛiÀ>Ài°
Het is echter duidelijk dat er veel meer onderzoek nodig is op dit gebied. Het 
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is een veelbelovende weg voor toekomstig onderzoek om zich af te buigen 
Û>}iVÌÀiiÀ`i>LÀ>ÌÀÕÃÌÕ>ÌiÃ]`À>yi`}iÌiLiÃÌÕ`iÀi«
plaatsen en in contexten waar ze van nature voorkomen.
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SUMMARY
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to understand the cognitive mech-
anisms that underlie everyday distractions. Building on recent developments 
from cognitive psychology, I proposed that distractions stem from people’s 
adaptive tendency to explore the world around them in the pursuit of reward-
ing outcomes, such as food, money, or social feedback. This adaptive tenden-
cy, then, sometimes leads to disengagement from the current task, which even-
tually impairs performance. I call this mechanism reward-driven distraction.
Goal 1: Test the reward-driven distraction model
/iwÀÃÌ}>vÞ`ÃÃiÀÌ>ÌÜ>ÃÌ«ÀÛ`i>ÌiÃÌvÌiViÌÀ>Þ«Ìi-
sis of the reward-driven distraction model. This hypothesis holds that people 
should be more distracted by stimuli that carry more value to them. To examine 
ÌÃ Þ«ÌiÃÃ]  wÀÃÌ V`ÕVÌi` > ÀiÃi>ÀV ÃÞÌiÃÃ v iÝÃÌ} w`}Ã 
Ìiwi`­Chapter 2). I systematically searched for studies that together used 
>Ü`iÛ>ÀiÌÞvV}ÌÛiÌ>ÃÃ]ÃÕV>ÃÛÃÕ>Ãi>ÀVÀVyVÌ«ÀViÃÃ}]
and a wide variety of reward cues, such as money, food, or people’s own name. 
A meta-analysis of 91 studies that met the inclusion criteria, showed strong 
evidence for reward-driven distraction. That is, high-reward distractors consist-
ently impaired people’s cognitive performance compared to low-reward and 
neutral distractors across different paradigms and across different types of re-
ward cues. In sum, although the effect size was small, the meta-analysis clearly 
showed that reward-driven distraction exists. In other words, reward-driven dis-
traction seems to be a robust phenomenon.
As the majority of studies in this meta-analysis targeted very basic cognitive 
processes (i.e., visual search for targets on the computer screen), we know very 
little about reward-driven distraction during more complex tasks, for instance, 
during tasks that require cognitive control (e.g., the maintenance of goal-rel-
iÛ>ÌvÀ>Ì®°/wÌÃ}>«]`iÃ}i`>Ûi«>À>`}Ì>ÌÌiÃÌÃÀi-
ward-driven distraction during the performance of a complex cognitive task 
(Chapter 3 and Chapter 4®°ÌÃÌ>Ã]«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃwÀÃÌi>Ài`Ì>ÃÃV>Ìi
colors to monetary rewards. After, participants carried out a demanding math 
task. During this math task, the previously reward-associated colors reappeared 
as distractors that participants had to ignore. Results from these lab studies 
were not in line with the meta-analysis: we found no clear evidence for re-
ward-driven distraction. That is, people were not more distracted by high-value 
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compared to low-value reward cues.
In sum, results from the meta-analysis and the lab studies were mixed. The 
meta-analysis showed that reward-associated distractors harm performance on 
various types of tasks, including visual search, but also cognitive control. On the 
contrary, my experiments showed no clear evidence for reward-driven distrac-
Ì`ÕÀ}>Ã«iVwVÌÞ«ivV}ÌÛiVÌÀÌ>Ã\>>ÌÌ>Ã°
To conclude, distraction can be reward-driven in some, but not all tasks. Though 
future research is clearly necessary, the meta-analysis does support the idea 
that momentary disengagements from the task at hand could stem from peo-
ple’s adaptive tendency to pursue rewarding outcomes.
These results are interesting because they demonstrate that rewards can hurt 
instead of enhance performance in many situations. Additionally, these results 
ÃÜiÌ>>>ÞÌVÃÕ««ÀÌvÀÌiwÀÃÌÌiÌ>ÌÌ}>LÕÌV}ÌÛi«À-
cesses in the traditional top-down and bottom-up theoretical dichotomy may 
be outdated. That is, cognitive processes can be modulated by rewards, inde-
pendently of current goals (top-down) and independently of physical salience 
(bottom-up).
Goal 2: Explore the real-life relevance of reward-driven distrac-
tion
As a second goal of my dissertation, I aimed to explore the real-life relevance 
vÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ°7iL>ÃVÀiÃi>ÀVÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌ
is crucial, it is largely disconnected from the settings in which distractors can 
>ÛiÀi>viVÃiµÕiViÃ°/wÌÃ}>«]iÝ«Ài`ÜiÌiÀÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi
distraction has the potential to explain distractions outside the laboratory, in 
the real world.
`ii`] ÌiÀi>Àiw`}Ã vÀ ÌÃ`ÃÃiÀÌ>Ì Ì>Ì«Ì ÌÜ>À`Ã Ìi `i>
that reward-driven distraction can explain distractions in real-life settings. The 
meta-analysis demonstrated that reward-driven distraction has a broad scope 
(Chapter 2®°-«iVwV>Þ]>ÃiÌi`>LÛi]ÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÜ>Ã
present across many different types of tasks. Also, I found that when people 
learn to associate rewards to stimuli, those associations transfer across contexts, 
suggesting that reward associations learned on one setting (e.g., at home) can 
impact performance on another (e.g., at work). In addition, different types of 
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reward learning (in particular, both instrumental and Pavlovian learning) can 
cause reward-driven distraction. Finally, the meta-analysis showed that people 
seem to be distracted by reward-associated cues even if they are explicitly 
Ì`Ì}ÀiÌÃi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÀÃ°/ÌÀ>Ã>Ìi>ÌiÃiw`}ÃÌÀi>vi]iÛi
if people are aware of and entirely prepared for potentially-distracting events 
(e.g., colleagues knocking on the door, emails coming in), even if reward as-
sociations were formed in a different place and time, reward-driven distraction 
may still happen.
On the other hand, there are also reasons to suspect that reward-driven distrac-
tion may not be able to fully explain distractions in real-life. For instance, the 
meta-analysis showed that studies that contain real-life stimuli (e.g., chocolate 
smell, pictures of attractive food, alcohol) are less likely to detect reward-driv-
en distraction. Findings from my lab experiments further strengthen this point 
(Chapter 5). The goal of this study was to test reward-driven distraction in a 
well-established distraction paradigm that involved a distractor stimulus that 
«i«ivÌiiVÕÌiÀÌiÀiÛiÀÞ`>ÞÛiÃ°7iVÃiÃ>ÀÌ«iVÕiÃ>Ã
in current society smartphones are considered as major source of distraction. 
In our study, participants were deprived from their smartphones and came to 
the lab to perform a visual search task, in which smartphone cues (i.e., app 
icons) served as distractors. Some of these distractors were associated with 
}ÃV> ÀiÜ>À` ­i°}°]>>ViL }ÜÌ>ÌwV>ÌÃ}®>`Ãi
ÜÌ iÃÃÃV> ÀiÜ>À` ­i°}°]>7i>ÌiÀ>«« }®°`}ÃÃÕ}}iÃÌÌ>Ì]>-
though people perceived social app icons as more rewarding, these social apps 
did not distract participants from the visual search task – not even when they 
were deprived from their smartphones (which should, in principle, enhance the 
salience of reward cues).
To conclude, reward-driven distraction seems to be straightforward within con-
trolled laboratory settings, but it is still less predictable what happens when re-
>viÃÌÕ}iÌÃÌÀ`ÕVi`>Ì>ÃÌi>L°/wÀÞiÃÌ>LÃÌi«À>VÌV>
relevance of reward-driven distraction, future research should focus on examin-
ing reward-driven distraction in real-life settings and with real-life stimuli. This 
should help to understand distractions as they occur in everyday life.
)QCN+PXGUVKICVGCPFTGƃGEVQPTGUGCTEJRTCEVKEGU
Ìi>ÃÌVÕ«ivÞi>ÀÃ]Ì>ÃLiViVi>ÀÌ>Ì>Þw`}Ã«ÃÞV-
}Þ]iÛiw`}ÃÌ>ÌÃiii`ÌLiÜiiÃÌ>LÃi`]VÕ`ÌLiÀi«V>Ìi`°
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/ÕÃ]Ì>ÃLiViiÃÃiÌ>Ì>ÃÃiÃÃÌiµÕ>ÌÞv«ÀiÛÕÃw`}Ã>`Ì
work with more transparent methodology (i.e., open science practices). Ac-
VÀ`}Þ]ÌiÌÀ`>`w>}>vÞ`ÃÃiÀÌ>ÌÜ>ÃÌ>ÃÃiÃÃÌi}iiÀ>
ÃÌ>ÌivÌiÀiÜ>À``ÀÛi`ÃÌÀ>VÌÌiÀ>ÌÕÀi>`ÌÀiyiVÌ«iÃViVi
practices from an early career researcher perspective.
The meta-analysis showed that the reward-driven distraction literature is in a 
healthy state at this point (Chapter 2). First, I examined the prevalence of pub-
V>ÌL>Ã]Ìi«iiÌ>Ì«ÃÌÛi]Ã}wV>Ìw`}Ã>ÀiÀiiÞ
ÌLi«ÕLÃi`Ì>i}>ÌÛi]Ã}wV>Ìw`}Ã°ƂvÕi«ÌÃÕ}}iÃÌ-
ed that the reward-driven distraction literature shows no publication bias; so, it 
ÃiiÃÌ>Ìi}>ÌÛi>`«ÃÌÛi]>`Ã}wV>Ì>`Ã}wV>Ìw`}Ã
are equally likely to be published. Second, I conducted a p-curve analysis to 
assess the evidential value of reward-driven distraction. The results showed 
that reward-driven distraction has high evidential value. Moreover, there was 
no apparent sign of p-hacking (when researchers try multiple analyses or data 
iÝVÕÃÃÌÀi>VÌiVÛiÌ>iÃÌivÃ}wV>Vi]p < .05). These 
ÀiÃÕÌÃ«ÞÌ>ÌÜiV>>ÛiVw`iVi«ÀiÛÕÃw`}ÃÌiwi`°
Though results from these methods suggest that the literature is in good health, 
there are some issues to consider. First, although all studies aim to test the 
same hypothesis (that distraction is reward-driven), researchers have different 
ideas on how this hypothesis should be tested. As a result, there are multiple 
types of analyses to test the same idea. The problem is that if any of these tests 
Þi`ÃÃ}wV>Vi]ÀiÃi>ÀViÀÃÌi`ÌV>ÃÕ««ÀÌvÀÌiÀÞ«ÌiÃÃ°Ü-
ever, the option of having multiple tests at one’s disposal that all lead to the 
support of the same hypothesis is problematic: researchers simply have more 
V>Vi Ì w` ÃÌ>ÌÃÌV> Ã}wV>Vi >`] VÃiµÕiÌÞ] Üi V>Ì Li ÃÕÀi
that the effect is as reliable and solid as it seems. Second, the p-curve analysis 
suggested that the studies may be underpowered. This is problematic, as not 
>`iµÕ>ÌiÞ«ÜiÀi`ÃÌÕ`iÃÀi`ÕViÌiV>VivÀw`}>ÌÀÕiivviVÌ°	Ì
of these problems could be solved with adopting open science practices, such 
as preregistration.
7i>`«Ì}«iÃViVi«À>VÌViÃÃLiV}ÌiÀ]ÌÃV>}iÃ
rather slow. The current incentive system has not yet fully adapted to reward 
ÌÀ>Ã«>ÀiÌ>`Ã`iÌ`ÃÛiÀÃ}wV>ÌÀiÃÕÌÃ°Chapter 6]ÀiyiVÌi`
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ÌiÃi`vwVÕÌiÃvÀ>i>ÀÞV>ÀiiÀÀiÃi>ÀViÀ«iÀÃ«iVÌÛi°
Conclusion
This dissertation showed that rewards have a profound impact on cognitive 
«ÀViÃÃiÃ°-«iVwV>Þ]«i«i«>Þ>ÌÌiÌÌÀiÜ>À`ÃiÛiÜiÌÃiÀi-
wards are not related to the current goals or to the task. Thus, the adaptive ten-
`iVÞÌ>ÌÌi`ÌÀiÜ>À`ÃV>L>VwÀi]>Ìi>ÃÌÃiÌiÃ]Ì>Ì>ÌÌi`}
to rewards harms performance on the current task. Studying reward-driven dis-
traction from a fundamental perspective suggests that reward-driven distrac-
tion can potentially explain real life distractions. However, it is clear that much 
more research is needed in this area. A promising avenue for future research is 
to curve away from controlled laboratory settings, by studying distractions in 
places and contexts in which they naturally occur.
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